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Abstract
This dissertation contains two lines of research: the allocation of talent and
development; and sovereign default.
The first chapter contributes to the policy debate on whether the rapid growth
of the US financial sector is socially desirable. I propose a heterogeneous agent
model with asymmetric information and matching frictions that produces a trade-
off between finance and entrepreneurship. By becoming bankers, talented indi-
viduals efficiently match investors with entrepreneurs, but do not internalize the
negative effect on the pool of talented entrepreneurs. Thus, the financial sector
is inefficiently large in equilibrium, and this inefficiency increases with wealth in-
equality. The model explains the simultaneous growth of wealth inequality and
finance in the US, and why more unequal countries have larger financial sectors.
The second chapter explains the simultaneous growth of the services sector and
income inequality by studying an endogenous educational choice of heterogeneous
agents in the form of talent. There are two mechanisms of financing higher ed-
ucation: bequests and loans. The model with bequests predicts an endogenous
and permanent separation of the population between the rich and the poor. The
model with loans allows for social mobility, but still generates a persistent level
of inequality. On the transition from the traditional economy with bequests to
the economy with loans, the model qualitatively reproduces the dynamics of skill
supply, the college wage premium, tuition fees and the labor allocation between
sectors in the last century in the US.
The third chapter provides a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow
on both domestic and international markets and why defaults are mostly selective
(on either domestic or foreign investors). Domestic debt issuance can only smooth
tax distortion shocks, whereas foreign debt can also smooth productivity shocks.
If the correlation of these shocks is sufficiently low, the sovereign borrows on both
markets to avoid excess consumption volatility. Defaults on both types of investors
arise in equilibrium due to market incompleteness and the government’s limited
commitment. The model matches business cycle moments and frequencies of dif-
ferent types of defaults in emerging economies. We also find, contrary to existing
contributions, that secondary markets are likely to increase the risk of sovereign
defaults. The outcome of the trade in bonds on secondary markets depends on
how well each group of investors can coordinate their actions.
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Introduction
This dissertation contains two lines of research that I have been pursuing during
the course of my Ph.D. the allocation of talent and development; and sovereign
default. A common theme among them is to develop a macroeconomic theory
of economies with frictions, while addressing policy issues I consider relevant. In
what follows I provide a brief summary of these lines of research.
The Allocation of Talent and Development
The first theme of my thesis is to analyze the effect of ex-ante heterogeneity
and frictions on economic outcomes: growth, inequality, etc. The main challenge
is to correctly identify the “exact” source of inefficiency. Once this has been done,
we can address the normative question: what policies can correct the inefficiency?
I have focused on wealth and talent as important sources of heterogeneity.
The first chapter, “The allocation of talent: finance versus en-
trepreneurship” , studies the effect of private information and matching on the
allocation of talent and wealth in a framework with ex-ante heterogeneous agents
who face an occupational choice. The paper analyzes a meaningful tradeoff be-
tween financial intermediation and production. Financial intermediation is socially
desirable, because it increases the efficiency of production, but does not directly
contribute to production. The allocation of talent is inefficient due to externalities:
bankers do not internalize the fact that more bankers means fewer entrepreneurs.
The model provides an explanation for the expansion of the finance sector and
assesses the efficiency of the expansion. I argue that the unequal accumulation of
wealth leads to the expansion of the financial sector. Small initial differences in
wealth among investors cause substantial income inequality among entrepreneurs,
which is translated into greater wealth inequality next period. Wealthy investors
are willing to pay a higher premium for financial services that increase the return
on their savings, and so the greater is the dispersion of wealth, the higher is the
price of financial services. This higher price induces a larger fraction of talented
agents to pursue careers in finance. Hence, the growth of finance and the increase
in wealth inequality go hand in hand. The paper provides an novel explanation
for why the financial sector might grow too large.
The second chapter, “Structural changes and labor income distri-
bution: the importance of educational policies” , looks at the allocation of
talent between services and manufacturing. This paper explains the simultaneous
growth of the services sector and income inequality by studying the impact of
an endogenous educational choice on both sector composition and labor income
distribution. In my analysis, there are two mechanisms of financing higher edu-
cation: bequests and loans. The model with inheritance predicts an endogenous
and permanent separation of the population between the rich (skilled) and the
poor (unskilled), and generates a misallocation of talent. The model with loans
leads to an efficient outcome, even though it still may generate a persistent level of
inequality. Putting both models into a historical perspective, considering bequests
as the traditional way to finance higher education, and loans as the modern one,
the economy, switching from bequests to loans, qualitatively reproduces the dy-
namics of the supply of skills, the college wage premium, tuition fees and the labor
allocation between sectors in the last century in the US. This novel explanation
has not previously been studied in the literature.
Sovereign Default
The second theme, strategic sovereign default, has been studied extensively in
the literature. The literature seeks to explain the incentives for sovereign borrowers
to repay their debts, and hence also the incentives for creditors to lend to sovereigns
in the first place. In addition, sovereign default models have proven to be a useful
tool to understand and predict the dynamics of macroeconomic variables.
The third chapter, joint work with Wojtek Paczos (EUI), “Sovereign debt
issuance and selective default” , looks at two types of debts: external and
domestic, and how debt composition changes government incentives to borrow
and default selectively. Domestic debts and, consequently, domestic defaults have
been neglected in the literature despite the fact that empirical evidence shows that
in the vast majority of cases, governments default selectively either on domestic
or external public debt holdings, and at least 58 de jure sovereign defaults on
domestic public debt have happened over the last century. As the question why
governments usually default selectively on either foreign or domestic debt remains
open, this paper is an attempt to fill this gap.
We consider standard frictions: incomplete markets and limited commitment
of the government. The government has to cover its expenditures by using three
sources of funding: distortionary taxes, domestic debt and foreign debt. The
government uses external borrowing to smooth output fluctuations. Consequently,
consistent with the strategic sovereign default literature, external default is more
likely in recessions, when a risk-averse borrower finds it more costly to repay non-
contingent debt. The government finds it optimal to use mostly domestic debt
to smooth distortions. Domestic default is thus more likely when tax distortions
are high. Total default happens when high distortions coincide with a recession.
Second, the model matches important data moments: a reasonably high debt-to-
GDP ratio with a reasonably low default probability. Third, contrary to recent
theoretical findings we show that trade in secondary markets might increase the
risk of sovereign default.
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Chapter 1
The Allocation of Talent: Finance
versus Entrepreneurship
1.1 Introduction
“We are throwing more and more of our resources, including the
cream of our youth, into financial activities remote from the
production of goods and services, into activities that generate high
private rewards disproportionate to their social productivity.”
— James Tobin (1984)
The growth of the financial sector is well known and well documented. Figure
1.1 shows that the share of finance in GDP as well as employment has increased
substantially since the Second World War. The figure shows that finance accounts
for a higher share of GDP than of employment before the Second World War and
after the 1980s (Philippon and Reshef, 2012). More importantly, while the share
of finance in employment has stabilized after the 1980s, the share of finance in
GDP has continued to rise.
The substantial expansion of the financial sector has driven a debate on whether
this expansion is socially desirable. On the one hand, the former chairman of
the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan (2002) stated: “[M]any forms and layers of
financial intermediation will be required if we are to capture the full benefit of our
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Figure 1.1: The growth of the financial sector in the US
advances in technology and trade.” This idea is related to a vast literature arguing
that financial development causes economic growth, because by relaxing financial
constraints the financial sector corrects capital misallocation and consequently
mitigates productivity losses from financial frictions. (See Schumpeter (1934) for
an early contribution and also Merton (1995). Brunnermeier et al. (2012) review
the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions, while Levine (2005) provides
a survey of an even larger empirical literature.)
On the other hand, critics of the financial sector suggest that it might have
negative implications for the allocation of talent. Another former chairman of the
Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker (2010) clearly stated the issue: “[I]f the financial
sector in the United States is so important that it generates 40% of all the profits
in the country. . . What about the effect of incentives on all our best young talent,
particularly of a numerical kind, in the United States?” Furthermore, this concern
has been vividly expressed on both sides of the Atlantic, in particular by Lord
Turner, the former chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, who stated
in 2009 that the financial sector had increased “beyond a socially reasonable size.”
Barack Obama (2012) and James Tobin (1984) tend to agree. This concern has
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been supported by empirical findings. For example, Berkes et al. (2012) suggest
that finance starts having a negative effect on output growth when credit to the
private sector reaches 100% of GDP. Other authors, such as Goldsmith (1995) and
Lucas (1988), claim that the role of finance has been overstated, and argue that it
responds passively to economic growth.
In order to evaluate these claims in a structured way, I build a model in which
financial intermediation potentially enhances welfare but draws some talented in-
dividuals away from production. The model includes three key elements: (a)
heterogeneous agents who differ in terms of capital and talent; (b) an occupational
choice between being a banker or an entrepreneur; (c) financial frictions. Hetero-
geneity and an occupational choice provide a framework to study the allocation of
capital (wealth) and talent. Talent is important for both industry and the financial
sector: more talent in industry means more output is produced per unit of capital,
while more talent in finance means capital is potentially allocated more efficiently.
Financial frictions in the form of private information cause the misallocation of
capital, because investors cannot distinguish between talented and ordinary en-
trepreneurs. Since talented bankers can make this distinction, the financial sector
can potentially correct this misallocation.
The model generates four important insights about the financial sector. First,
it implies that the optimal (constrained efficient) size of the financial sector is
larger for countries or periods with higher wealth and talent inequality, because
in these cases the potential productivity losses from capital misallocation are par-
ticularly severe. The planner faces a tradeoff between the misallocation of capital
and the misallocation of talent. Second, the decentralized equilibrium exhibits
a misallocation of talent: the financial sector absorbs talent beyond the socially
desirable level, because it provides talented agents with an opportunity to extract
an excessive informational rent due to the presence of externalities. When agents
make their occupational choice between finance and entrepreneurship, they do
not internalize the negative externality that they impose on investors: the more
bankers there are, the fewer talented entrepreneurs and good investment oppor-
tunities there are. Third, even though the equilibrium is generically inefficient,
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efficiency can be restored by taxing the financial sector. Fourth, the model pro-
vides a novel explanation for the growth of finance by linking it to an increase in
wealth inequality. In the dynamic framework, this effect is self-reinforcing: small
initial differences in wealth among investors cause substantial income inequality
among entrepreneurs, which is translated into greater wealth inequality next pe-
riod. Wealthy investors are willing to pay a higher premium for financial services
that increase the return on their savings, and so the greater is the dispersion of
wealth, the higher is the price of financial services. This higher price induces a
larger fraction of talented agents to pursue careers in finance. Hence, the growth
of finance and the increase in wealth inequality go hand in hand.
Some papers provide indirect empirical evidence on the misallocation of tal-
ent. Data from college graduates in the US suggests that the financial sector has
become one of the most popular destinations for graduates of elite universities,
regardless of their major. For example, Shu (2012), studying the career choices
of MIT graduates, concludes that careers in finance attract students with high
levels of raw academic talent. She concludes that the overall allocation of talent is
inefficient. (See also Goldin and Katz (2008) for Harvard graduates, and Wadhwa
et al. (2006) for Engineering Management graduates at Duke University.) In addi-
tion, Kneer (2012) finds that US banking deregulation reduces labor productivity
disproportionately in industries that are relatively skill-intensive. Finally, MGI
(2011) estimates that the United States may face a shortfall of almost two million
technical and analytic workers over the next ten years.
This paper is related to a vast literature on misallocation, particularly to papers
attributing the misallocation of capital to financial frictions Buera and Shin (2013);
Midrigan and Xu (2014). Whereas most papers focus on the impact of frictions
on output and the allocation of capital, and abstract away from its impact on the
labor market and the allocation of human capital (Jovanovic (2014) is one of the
exceptions), this paper argues that financial development has an important impact
on the allocation of both capital and talent, which cannot be neglected. The issue
of allocative efficiency has also been studied theoretically in relation to venture
capital. For example, Jovanovic and Szentes (2013) show that the competitive
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equilibrium is always socially optimal, while in search-matching models such as
Michelacci and Suarez (2004), the Hosios condition must hold for the equilibrium
to be efficient.
Apart from the current paper, three recent papers have analyzed whether the
expansion of the financial sector is efficient. The financial sector is inefficient in
all three papers, but the source of the inefficiency is different. Murphy et al.
(1991) argue that the flow of talented individuals into law and finance might not
be entirely desirable, because even though private returns in these occupations are
high, social returns might be higher in other occupations. However, they provide
no reason for the disparities between social and private returns. The study of
Philippon (2010) is the first that acknowledges the meaningful role of the financial
sector, a monitoring device that helps to overcome the opportunistic behavior of
entrepreneurs. The allocation is not optimal in his model, because the projects
developed by entrepreneurs have higher social benefits than private ones; therefore,
they need to be subsidized with respect to workers and bankers. Bolton et al.
(2011) focus on financial innovations, in the sense that the financial sector creates a
new over-the-counter (OTC) market. Informed dealers in the OTC market extract
excessive rents, and consequently the financial sector attracts too many individuals.
However, none of these papers seek to explain the growth of the financial sector;
none of them consider the financial sector as financial intermediaries connecting
investors and entrepreneurs; neither Murphy et al. (1991) nor Philippon (2010)
allow for excessive informational rent extraction; and finally, neither Philippon
(2010) nor Bolton et al. (2011) have a role for talent in either finance or industry.
Many studies analyze the causes of the expansion of the financial sector. Several
explanations have been suggested: the fluctuation of trust in financial intermedi-
aries Gennaioli et al. (2013); the increasing efficiency of the production sector
Bauer and Mora (2014); structural change in finance Cooley et al. (2013); and
asset bubbles Cahuc and Challe (2012). None of them connect the expansion of
the financial sector and the increase in wealth inequality. The only paper that par-
tially attributes the growth of finance to capital accumulation is Gennaioli et al.
(2013). I focus not on aggregate capital accumulation, but rather on increasing
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wealth inequality. I show that the growth of wealth inequality alone is enough
to fully explain the growth of finance. This is in line with Piketty and Zucman
(2014)’s argument that the primary reason for increased inequality is the fact that
financial services associated with asset management generate superior returns and
disproportionately affect the wealthy. According to Greenwood and Scharfstein
(2013), much of the growth of the financial sector comes from asset management,
which is mostly a service for wealthy individuals.
The calibrated model qualitatively replicates well other features of the US data:
the increase in wealth inequality, the productivity slowdown, and the growth of
the financial sector as a share of both employment and GDP. The model predicts
that the financial sector would continue to grow as a share of GDP, but not of
employment. It also provides an additional explanation for the US productivity
slowdown. Furthermore, cross-country regressions show that, in line with the
predictions of the model, inequalities of wealth and talent are positively associated
with the size of the financial sector.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the static version of the
model and policy results. Section 1.3 provides the dynamic version of the model
and quantitative analysis. Section 1.4 performs a cross-country analysis to confirm
the findings. The last section discusses the paper, concludes, and motivates further
research.
1.2 Static model
There are two opposing views on finance. On the one hand, a large literature
on finance and development establishes a positive link between finance and aggre-
gate output. From the theory side, the standard way to think about the issue is
that, due to financial frictions, there is misallocation of capital and consequently
output losses, which can be severe. The financial sector plays an important role
in overcoming or at least mitigating the effect of these frictions. Based on this
view, the main policy prescription is to promote the development of the financial
sector. On the other hand, the Great Recession has cast doubt on the efficiency of
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the rapid growth of finance, suggesting that possible rent seeking behavior might
be involved. The model presented below features financial frictions that generate
capital misallocation. The financial sector can correct this misallocation at the
cost of talent misallocation.
I adopt the “classical” view of financial intermediaries as institutions that con-
nect surplus agents (investors) and deficit agents (entrepreneurs). Financial inter-
mediaries are efficient at obtaining information, but they require talent to acquire
this information. A talented banker can screen entrepreneurs to discover the best
investment opportunities, and sells this information to an investor. The financial
sector in the model is clearly a productive sector, because it mitigates informational
frictions.
1.2.1 Environment
The economy consists of two types of agents: investors and entrepreneurs. To
produce output, two inputs are required: capital and an idea. Investors have
wealth but no investment opportunities of their own, while entrepreneurs have
ideas but need external funding. The Cobb–Douglas production function is assumed
F (z, k) = zαzkαk .
Agents are heterogeneously endowed with talent and wealth. (Since capital is the
only asset in the economy, the terms “wealth” and “capital” are used interchange-
ably.) Investors can be capital-abundant or capital-scarce, while entrepreneurs can
be talented or ordinary. Entrepreneurs can choose whether to remain entrepreneurs
or to become bankers instead. In industry, talent translates into capital produc-
tivity. The more talented is the entrepreneur, the more output is produced from
a unit of capital. In finance, talent affects bankers’ ability to distinguish between
talented and ordinary entrepreneurs or to sort them, as we shall see below.
I consider a two-sided one-to-one matching market: one entrepreneur needs to
be matched with one investor to produce. The economy is subject to financial
frictions: two-sided private information, meaning that the types of entrepreneurs
(investors) are not publicly observable. When investors are looking for investment
opportunities, they do not know whether an entrepreneur that they meet is tal-
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ented or ordinary. The same holds for entrepreneurs: entrepreneurs do not know
whether an investor they are dealing with is capital-abundant or -scarce. Even
though the latter assumption seems questionable at first, in the venture capital in-
dustry it is common for entrepreneurs to be imperfectly informed about the total
wealth of investors.1 Two-sided private information guarantees that the outcome is
random matching in the case of continues distribution over types, because it is im-
possible to write an enforceable contract based on only one observable outcome for
two unobesrvable inputs. In the case of discrete distributions, we need to be sure
that two different pairs of inputs lead to the same output (F (zH , kL) = F (zL, kH)).
The literature on assortative matching states that as long as the private informa-
tion is one-sided, there is a separating equilibrium that supports the same positive
assignment as in the full-information equilibrium assignment. In the economy with
private information, but without matching, the aggregate outcome is exactly as
in random matching, because investors optimally allocate equal shares to every
entrepreneur. Matching simply ensures that all funds are not allocated to one
entrepreneur. Alternatively, we can simply assume that without financial interme-
diation, the investment technology in the economy is random matching.
All agents are assumed to be risk-neutral and discount the future at a zero rate,
so all agents maximize their incomes and aggregate output is welfare criteria.
1In the model, the wealth of investors is invested fully; immediately afterwards, a one-time
investment output is produced. In reality, it is more complicated. Even after engaging with
a venture capitalist, the entrepreneur faces a substantial degree of uncertainty about the total
amount of investment, because of staging. Staging is one of the central incentive mechanisms
used in the venture capital industry (Sahlman, 1990). As shown by Bienz and Hirsch (2011),
staging is frequently implemented through multiple negotiated financing rounds. Furthermore,
the venture capital literature often assumes that neither the inputs of the investor nor those of
the entrepreneur are contractible. The standard feasible contract in the venture capital literature
specifies only a sharing rule and an initial investment, but not the total investment, which, like
entrepreneurial inputs, is assumed to be noncontractible.
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1.2.2 Simple model without finance
This subsection presents a simple static general equilibrium model with unob-
served heterogeneity. The model without finance and full information is a variant
of the standard static model of two-sided matching in which a Becker–Brock type
of assignment problem arises (Becker, 1973). I add to this framework two features:
two-sided private information and intermediation. Two-sided private information
ensures that the assignment should be random—without intermediation (the fi-
nancial sector), there is no mechanism to enforce positive assignment (assortative
matching). The full dynamic model presented in the next subsection will incorpo-
rate this same static model into a dynamic framework.
In this section, for the sake of simplicity, I consider a very particular distribution
of wealth and talent: there is a unit mass of agents with talent and no capital, who
can be talented zH or ordinary zL; there is a unit mass of agents with capital
and no talent, who can be capital-abundant kH or capital-scarce kL. The share of
capital-abundant investors (talented entrepreneurs) is denoted as βi (βe). Hence,
the mass of agents with capital is equal to the mass of agents with talent. Agents
with capital and no talent are potential investors, while agents with no capital
and talent can be either entrepreneurs or bankers. Every investor can be matched
with at most one entrepreneur. Hence, I consider the simplest case of matching,
which is one-to-one matching. Furthermore, I assume that all short-sided agents
are matched with certainty.2 The outcome of the match is given by a strictly
supermodular function F (z, k) depending on both capital and talent. The strict
supermodularity in the discrete case is given by:
F (zH , kH) + F (zL, kL) > F (zH , kL) + F (zL, kH) (1.1)
Condition (1.1) suggests that positive assortative matching maximizes the sum of
match outputs when the entrepreneur’s type and the investor’s type are comple-
ments in the match output function.
2One-to-one matching can be viewed as a technological constraint. Many-to-one matching,
different specifications of the matching function and a continuum of types over talent and wealth
are discussed in section 1.5 below.
10 1.2. STATIC MODEL
Figure 1.2 shows the outcome of matches in this economy. Since investors and
entrepreneurs can be of only two types, we have four possible outcomes (sky blue,
yellow, pink and orange). I introduce an additional notation FIJ = F (zI , kJ),
where I, J = {H,L}, I stands for the entrepreneur’s type and J stands for the
investor’s type. For example, FHL is the outcome of a match between a high-type
entrepreneur and a low-type investor; the yellow area is the combination of two
colors: green zH and brown kL.
Figure 1.2: Model without bankers
1.2.3 First best vs. random matching
In this section, I define the first best as an optimal allocation under the con-
straint of the matching technology. Since the financial sector mitigates information
frictions but does not directly contribute to production, the first best in this econ-
omy is the allocation in which nobody is a banker and all talented agents are
matched with investors. Under the supermodularity assumption on the produc-
tion function (outcome of the match) and observability of types, the most efficient
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outcome in this economy is positive assortative matching—when high-type en-
trepreneurs are matched with high-type investors, and low-type entrepreneurs are
matched with low-type investors (see the Becker–Brock efficient matching theo-
rem). However, in the case when FHL = FLH assortative matching cannot be
achieved due to two-sided private information about types, so I consider the assor-
tative matching outcome as the first-best allocation. The only possible outcome
in the economy with private information and without a financial sector is random
matching.
The simple example below shows the disparity between the first best and ran-
dom matching: the loss of aggregate output due to the misallocation of capital
caused by private information in this economy can be severe. I consider the case
in which the production function is simply the product of two inputs F = zk. I
assume that the value of the high type is one with probability one-quarter, while
the value of the low type is zero with the complementary probability for both the
distribution of talent and the distribution of wealth. Hence, only if two high types
are matched is any output (one unit) produced. It happens with probability 1/16
in the case of random matching and with probability 1/4 in the case of assortative
matching (the first best). Table 1.1 summarizes the information described above.
As we can see, output is four times lower in the case of random matching com-
Table 1.1: The simple example
value probability
zH 1 1/4
zL 0 3/4
kH 1 1/4
kL 0 3/4
Random matching 1/16
Assortative matching 1/4
pared to the first best due to capital misallocation. This brings us to the first main
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question of whether the financial sector can mitigate this capital misallocation.
1.2.4 The role of finance in the model
The financial sector clearly provides many useful functions to the economy, as
discussed in section 1.5. This paper focuses on two services: intermediation and
sorting between investors and entrepreneurs. It is important to remember that the
most desirable outcome is assortative matching. All investment goes to industry.
Bankers are good at sorting, but they do not directly produce any output. The
quality of sorting depends on talent. Both finance and industry require talent.
While talent in industry increases the firm’s productivity, talent in finance gives
an advantage in obtaining information and therefore increases the quality of sort-
ing. By the latter, I mean that the financial sector brings the allocation as close
as possible to the allocation under assortative matching. However, the allocation
under assortative matching cannot be achieved. As a reminder, the first-best allo-
cation is the allocation under assortative matching; the allocation without financial
intermediation is the allocation under random matching. I call the allocation with
financial intermediation the allocation under intermediated matching. It is impor-
tant to distinguish between the constrained efficient allocation under intermediated
matching, discussed in the next subsection, and the decentralized allocation under
intermediated matching, discussed later.
For most of this paper, if not specified otherwise, I consider an extreme case
in which only the high-type zH banker can match a talented entrepreneur and a
capital-abundant investor for sure, while the low-type zL banker can only match
randomly. This assumption has two possible interpretations. Under the first inter-
pretation, the quality of sorting depends on the talent of the agent who does the
sorting. A banker with ability z can distinguish between ideas with productivity z
and z′ < z. Hence, the planner would only consider allocating talented zH agents
to finance.
Under the second interpretation, there is a cost of screening ψ(z) per project
discovered, which depends on talent. If this cost is high enough for the low type
while low enough for the high type, ψ(zL)  ψ(zH), then the planner might
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find it optimal to allocate to intermediation some of the talented agents, who can
provide efficient matches at a small cost, while she would not allocate any of the
ordinary agents to intermediation because of their higher matching costs. In other
words, the financial sector provides a useful service (sorting) because it has an
information advantage, but requires talent to realize this advantage. This accords
with Philippon and Reshef’s (2012) empirical observation that working in a world
of innovative finance requires talent.3
Even though the model can be applied to the financial sector as a whole, pri-
vate equity finance is a subindustry for which the assumptions of the model are
particularly valid: matching and information superiority. A private equity fund
precisely does matching between a few selected young firms and high-net-worth
individuals. The private equity fund provides an opportunity to invest in a few
companies over a long-term horizon for a small number of wealthy investors (You
can find more details in Appendix 1.7.1). Information superiority of the financial
sector with respect to is a fairly standard assumption in finance literature sup-
ported by empirical evidence (Durnev et al., 2004; Luo, 2005; Chen et al., 2006).
Furthermore, this paper abstracts from a potentially interesting extension, the
trustworthiness of bankers, because the social planner can always punish bankers
for an undesirable outcome in the case of intermediated matching, and it is always
possible to write a contract between a banker and an investor/entrepreneur, which
insures truth-telling.
I introduce an additional technical assumption: limited capacity. A banker
has no capacity advantage in comparison with ordinary investors. Each banker
can only provide transaction support for one deal at a time. This assumption
is to ensure that one banker cannot undo all private information frictions. This
assumption is discussed in detail in section 1.5.
To sum up, the two assumptions imply that if the share γ of talented agents
βe is allocated to the financial sector, they can match at most γβe talented en-
3In other words, talented bankers provide an investment opportunity with a superior return
because of their informational advantage. We can also think of agents as having different search
costs in the case of search frictions.
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Figure 1.3: Model with bankers
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trepreneurs. To be precise, min{γ, 1−γ}βe talented entrepreneurs are matched by
bankers with capital-abundant investors and max{1− 2γ, 0}βe are left for random
matching. Figure 1.3 summarizes the situation stated above and describes the
outcome of matches in the case of γ ≤ 1/2. It is very similar to Figure 1.2, but
with the addition of the financial sector. Out of talented agents βe, the share γ
is allocated to the financial sector, while the share 1 − γ, together with all ordi-
nary agents 1 − βe, is allocated to industry. We observe losses (the white area)
because some investors remain unmatched, and gains (the sky blue area) because
the number of efficient matches increases.
1.2.5 Constrained efficiency
In this subsection, I introduce the notion of constrained efficiency. A social
planner faces the same private information constraints as individuals do. To over-
come these constraints, the planner can choose consumption of agents based on
observables (the number of bankers and the outcomes of matches) to make sure
that a fraction of talented agents self-select themselves into the financial sector.
Since only talented agents zH have an informational advantage and can distin-
guish between good and bad projects, they are the only agents that need to be
considered as possible bankers, because the social planner can always punish a
ordinary banker. If ordinary agents zL select to be a banker, they have no infor-
mational advantage and, hence, have a positive probability to match an ordinary
entrepreneur with a capital-abundant investor, that generates the lower outcome
(FLH < FHH). Since the outcome of the match is observable, the social planner
assign the consumption of an ordinary banker lower enough to make sure that none
of ordinary agents select themselves into finance. For simplicity, I assume that the
number of investors is always greater than the number of bankers.4 Hence, some
investors are matched with nobody. By allocating the fraction γ of talented agents
to finance, the planner gains the value of intermediated matches between talented
entrepreneurs and capital-abundant investors FHH and incurs two costs: the direct
4I prove that this is necessary for the existence of a decentralized equilibrium. See the proof
of Proposition 2 in appendix 1.6.2
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cost is due to the fact that γβe investors become unmatched; the indirect one is
that the probability of being randomly matched with talented entrepreneurs drops
substantially. Because of risk neutrality, the constrained efficient allocation is one
that maximizes aggregate output. The precise expression for aggregate output is
given by
Y = max
γ
{
(βi−min{γ,1−γ}βe)
(1−min{γ,1−γ}βe) [max{1− 2γ, 0}βeFHH + (1− βe)FLH ] +
(1−βi)
(1−min{γ,1−γ}βe) [max{1− 2γ, 0}βeFHL + (1− βe)FLL] + min{γ, 1− γ}βeFHH
}
.
(1.2)
As soon as γ exceeds 1/2, all talented entrepreneurs are matched with capital-
abundant investors. There is no gain to allocating an additional talented agent
to the financial sector. Therefore, the constrained efficient allocation γ∗ cannot
exceed 1/2; otherwise we would observe pure losses in the quantity of talented en-
trepreneurs without any additional gains from matching, which cannot be efficient.
Proposition 1 describes the solution of problem (1.2):
Proposition 1. The constrained efficient allocation γ∗ is always the corner solu-
tion of problem (1.2), i.e. γ∗ can be either 0 or 1/2.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.1.
I calculate ∆Y, the difference between the values of the planner’s objective
(1.2) with γ = 1/2 and γ = 0. This difference is given by
∆Y = (1/2−βi)βe(FHH−FHL)− β
e
2 FHL−
(1− βi)(1− βe)βe
2− βe (FLH−FLL). (1.3)
After analyzing expression (1.3) above, we can conclude that if βi ≥ 1/2, γ∗ = 0
is the only possible solution of the planner’s problem. For γ∗ = 1/2 to be the
solution, two conditions must be satisfied: βi < 1/2, and FHH needs to be high
enough. In other words, it is efficient to have a financial sector if two requirements
are met: the probability of a random match between a talented entrepreneur and a
capital-abundant investor is relatively low, but the value of this match is relatively
high. I provide two potential interpretations of this result. On the one hand, one
might think that the level of development affects the optimal size of the financial
sector. In a developing country with weak institutions, it is difficult for an investor
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to meet the “right” entrepreneur. Hence, it is essential for such countries to develop
their financial sectors to mitigate the effect of underdeveloped institutions. The
conclusion might be that the more developed a country is, the less likely it is to
benefit from the financial sector. This conclusion seems at best to be counter-
factual. However, Mayer-Haug et al. (2013) observe that entrepreneurial talent is
more relevant in developing economies. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests
that the misallocation of capital is a particularly acute problem in developing
countries. On the other hand, having a financial sector is efficient for countries
with higher degrees of wealth or talent inequality. The more unequal a country
is, the higher are the benefits from the presence of the financial sector. I provide
empirical support for the latter interpretation in section 1.4. (See also Restuccia
and Rogerson (2008) for the argument that resource misallocation shows up as
low TFP, and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for empirical evidence on misallocation in
China and India.)
If we go back to the simple example in Table 1.1 and calculate aggregate output
in the constrained efficient case, we obtain 1/2βeFHH = 1/8, which is twice as large
as in the case of random matching (the economy without finance), but still two
times lower than in the first best. In the case of the simple example, we can say
that the financial sector undoes half of the financial friction.
1.2.6 Decentralized equilibrium
In this subsection, I study the decentralized equilibrium (DE) and compare it to
the constrained efficient allocation to answer the question of whether the financial
sector attracts the right amount of talent. The main difference between the DE and
the constrained efficient allocation is the fact that the occupational choice of agents
depends on the private returns in the two sectors, as opposed to social returns in the
planner’s case. The planner chooses consumption of agents based on observables
(the number of bankers and the outcomes of a match) to make sure that the right
number of talented agents to self-select themselves into finance and at the same
time how much consumption they should get. Given the information structure,
it is a complicated task for the market to solve, because the number of talented
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agents in finance affects the way the surplus is shared between three parties: an
investor, an entrepreneur and a banker. On the one hand, surplus is created
by agents in industry (entrepreneurs). On the other hand, private information
frictions create an information rent that can be captured by agents in the financial
sector (bankers). In addition, due to matching it is important to understand how
the outcome of the project is split between the investor and the entrepreneur. The
most natural way to do this is Nash bargaining, where the bargaining power of
the entrepreneur δ ∈ [0, 1] is exogenously given, and the bargaining power of the
investor is the complement 1− δ.
The timing of the problem is as following. The problem is one shoot game.
First, anticipating equilibrium outcomes agents choose occupations and cannot
reoptimize. The talented banker screens entrepreneurs until she finds a talented
one. If the banker succeeds, she signs a contact to seek exclusive representation
promising to deliver a investor with a capital kH in the exchange for fees pe.
The banker posts a contract for in exchanges for fee pi promising to match with
a talented entrepreneur zH . If an investor and an entrepreneur agree to sign a
contract with a banker, they meet and split the outcome of the match according to
the entrepreneurial bargaining power δ. Then, the banker collects fees potentially
from both parties pi and pe. Investors and entrepreneurs can always prefer to be
matched randomly for free. Random matching is the outside option for investors
and entrepreneurs. In addition, I study the equilibrium of occupational choice
in pure strategy. Agents cannot mix to be a banker and an entrepreneur with a
positive probability.
The rest remains as outlined in subsection 1.2.1. The banker with talent zH
can distinguish between entrepreneurs with productivity zH and zL < zH . She
can sell this information to an investor for price pi and an entrepreneur for price
pe. Each talented banker can discover at most one talented entrepreneur zH and
consequently makes at most one match between a capital-abundant investor and
a talented entrepreneur. If an investor (entrepreneur) pays pi (pe), she knows that
she will be matched with a high-type counterpart with certainty; otherwise, she
can always choose to be randomly matched for free. I assume that if there are
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more bankers than talented entrepreneurs, γ > 1/2, some of the bankers discover
nothing and therefore receive zero income. In this case, bankers bear all the risk
and need to be compensated for this. Equilibrium prices are set competitively.
Returning to the Nash bargaining problem, to solve the problem, I need to
define the bargaining power, the surplus of the match and the outside options of
the two counterparties. The outside option to intermediated matching is random
matching. Hence, the problem must be solved backwards. First, I provide the
solution for random matching with a given size of the financial sector γ. Then, I
use the solution for random matching as the outside options for the intermediated
matching problem.
To solve a Nash bargaining problem following Nash (1950, 1953), I need to
define the set of feasible utility payoffs from an agreement U and the utility payoffs
to the players from a disagreement D. Since preferences are linear, the sets U and
D are given by
U =
{
(xe, xi)|xe + xi = F (z, k), xj ≥ 0
}
, (1.4)
D =
{
(de, di)|
}
, (1.5)
where xe and xi are the payoffs to the entrepreneur and to the investor. The
entrepreneur’s payoff is
xe = arg max
[
(x− de)δ(F (z, k)− x− di)1−δ
]
. (1.6)
The solutions are:
xe = δ
(
F (z, k)− di
)
+ (1− δ)de, (1.7)
xi = (1− δ) (F (z, k)− de) + δdi. (1.8)
As every banker can discover at most one good project, the total number of
discovered good projects that are different from each other is min{γ, 1 − γ}. It
is worth mentioning that, contrary to the planner’s solution to problem (1.2),
γ∗ ≤ 1/2, the market outcome can be any number in the interval [0, 1].
I assume that investors have no access to a storage technology, while en-
trepreneurs have no opportunity for outside borrowing. Thus, the outside options
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for a random match—the set D in (1.5)—are (0, 0). The solution of the Nash
bargaining problem gives the value of random matching for a capital-abundant
investor. Note that not all investors are matched. The value of random matching
is equal to the probability of matching with somebody Prm multiplied by the sum
of products of the probability of being matched with a talented (ordinary) en-
trepreneur PrH (PrL) and the value of the match for a capital-abundant investor
(1− δ)F (zI , kH). It turns out that:
Prm = 1− γβ
e −min{γ, 1− γ}βe
1−min{γ, 1− γ}βe ,
P rH = (1− γ −min{γ, 1− γ})β
e
1− γβe −min{γ, 1− γ}βe ,
P rL = 1− β
e
1− γβe −min{γ, 1− γ}βe .
Hence the outside option for intermediated matching is
di = 1− δ1−min{γ, 1− γ}βe [(1− γ −min{γ, 1− γ})β
eFHH + (1− βe)FLH ] +
γβe
1− γβe0. (1.9)
Equation (1.9) defines the value of random matching for a capital-abundant in-
vestor, which is the outside option of a capital-abundant investor when negotiating
a deal with a talented entrepreneur after intermediated matching. It is important
to note that an increase in the size of the financial sector γ worsens the outside
option of the capital-abundant investor, because it affects the relative proportions
of agents. I return to this point later on.
Similar to (1.9), the value of random matching for a talented entrepreneur,
which is the outside option for bargaining in the case of intermediated matching,
is
de = δ1−min{γ, 1− γ}βe
[
(βi −min{γ, 1− γ}βe)FHH + (1− βi)FHL
]
. (1.10)
Applying once again the solution of Nash bargaining (1.7) to the intermediated
matching case, I obtain the restriction on the prices that can be extracted from
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investors (1.11) and entrepreneurs (1.12):
pi ≤ (1− δ)(FHH − di − de), (1.11)
pe ≤ δ(FHH − di − de). (1.12)
Conditions (1.11) and (1.12) are the participation constraints of a capital-abundant
investor and a talented entrepreneur. They state that both an investor and an
entrepreneur being matched by a banker cannot be worse off in comparison to the
random matching scenario. However, these inequalities are not necessarily binding.
It depends on which agents are on the short side of the market. In addition, the
prices obviously should be non-negative.
To complete the description of equilibria, I need an additional condition (1.13).
For the solution to be interior, γ ∈ (0, 1), the talented agent (zH > 0) should
be indifferent between being an entrepreneur or a banker. The income of a tal-
ented banker is the probability of finding a talented entrepreneur multiplied by
the sum of the two prices that are charged to the investor and the entrepreneur.
As long as there are more talented entrepreneurs in the market than bankers, the
probability of finding a talented entrepreneur is equal to one. The income of a
talented entrepreneur is the share of the surplus received from the match with a
capital-abundant investor. The indifference condition is therefore
min{γ, 1− γ}
γ
(pi + pe) = δ
(
FHH − di
)
+ (1− δ)de. (1.13)
Three conditions characterize all decentralized equilibria: the occupational choice
condition (1.13) and two participation constraints in financial services, one for
capital-abundant investors (1.11) and one for talented entrepreneurs (1.12). For
the sake of space, I restrict my attention to the case in which the exogenous
parameters are such that the constrained efficient size of the financial sector is
strictly positive (γ∗ = 1/2). I take the view that the financial sector is essential for
the economy. Furthermore, this is the interesting case in which to study policy,
because for regions of the parameter space in which the financial sector plays no
useful role, policy analysis is trivial. Proposition 2 characterizes the decentralized
equilibrium in the γ∗ = 1/2 case in terms of efficiency. A detailed analysis of all
possible cases can be found in appendix 1.6.2
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Proposition 2. If it is socially efficient to have a financial sector (γ∗ = 1/2) and
a decentralized equilibrium exists,
i. It is unique, γˆ;
ii. This equilibrium is generically inefficient, γˆ ≥ γ∗; and
iii. There exists a restriction on the set of exogenous parameters that restores the
constrained efficient allocation.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.2.
This restriction can be expressed as δˆ = f(βe
+
, zH/zL
+
, βi
−
, kH/kL
+
). The signs
beneath the expression stand for the sign of the derivative of δˆ with respect to the
corresponding variable.
Part (iii) of Proposition 2 might look similar to the Hosios condition in the
sense that the condition ensures the externalities cancel out (Hosios, 1990). In the
original case of Hosios, efficiency is achieved when the surplus share (bargaining
power) between workers and a firm is equal to the matching share (the elasticity of
the matching function). In a frictionless environment, there is a particular mecha-
nism, directed search, that restores efficiency. However, in a frictional environment
with heterogeneous agents even directed search might not be sufficient. The latter
might be the case of my model.
The result stated in Proposition 2 has a very intuitive explanation. When tal-
ented agents make their occupational choice between finance and entrepreneurship,
they do not internalize the externalities that they impose on investors. The more
talented agents become bankers, the smaller is the pool of good projects. The
bargaining process, matching friction and timing are important for this result.
First, a different bargaining process might incorporate more information and take
into account the externality. Second, in the perfectly competitive market prices
would adjust to eliminate the externality imposed by occupational choice. Third,
an infinitely repeated game, when agents can constantly switch from random to
intermediated matching and constantly change occupation, should converge to an
efficient solution.
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The opposite case, in which the set of parameters is such that the constrained
efficient size of the financial sector is zero (γ∗ = 0) is discussed in appendix 1.6.2.
The model of Murphy et al. (1991) can be viewed as a special case of my model
under parameter restrictions such that γ∗ = 0.
Proposition 2 states that the decentralized equilibrium is generically inefficient.
To put it differently, for a given set of parameters, the solution of the decentralized
equilibrium is highly unlikely to be efficient. The question is whether it is possible
to restore efficiency. The answer is yes. As discussed, there is a restriction on
parameters that restores efficiency. If there is a policy instrument that directly
affects one of the exogenous parameters, it is easy to ensure efficiency in the model.
For example, if the planner could set the bargaining power of entrepreneurs to the
particular value δˆ, it would make the decentralized equilibrium efficient. However,
it is not very intuitive to think that such policies exist.
1.2.7 Taxation
The more interesting question is whether it is possible to restore efficiency
using only one tax instrument. Fixing the set of parameters to values such that
the decentralized equilibrium exists and is inefficient, I take the tax on the financial
sector to be the available tax instrument.
The issue in this economy is that the return to finance is too high in comparison
with entrepreneurship. Hence an efficient policy should decrease the return to
finance and/or increase the return to entrepreneurship. The former can be done
through taxation of the financial sector. The latter can be done through subsidizing
entrepreneurship. Taxation of the financial sector has been a hot topic since the
Great Recession, especially in the European Union.5 Subsidies for entrepreneurship
are quite common: governments and donors spend billions of dollars subsidizing
entrepreneurship training programs around the world (see, for example, Santarelli
et al. (2006)).
I show how a tax τ on bankers’ incomes can work. The revenue from this tax
5See the discussion of taxation proposals at the European Commission web page: http://ec.
europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/index_en.htm.
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is distributed by lump-sum transfers T to balance the government’s budget. The
last equation of system (1.14) represents the government’s budget constraint. The
system below characterizes the equilibrium with taxation:
xe = (1− δ)(FHH − di(γ)− de(γ)) + T,
c = (1− δ)(FHH − di(γ)− de(γ))− 2(1− δ)T − τ,
xe = 1−y
y
c,
T = γβeτ.
(1.14)
Given the constrained efficient level γ∗ = 1/2, I impose that γ = γ∗ and calculate
the corresponding tax rate. The solution of the system can be represented graph-
ically. Figure 1.4 plots the tax on banking income in percent as a function of the
distortion (inefficiency) γˆ−γ∗. The optimal tax is zero when there is no distortion,
and increases with the size of the distortion as expected. The closed-form solution
of the system defining the tax on banking income as a function of all exogenous
parameters is:
τ = 2δ(1− δ)β
eFHH
(2− βe)
[
2(1− βi)
βe
FHH − FHL
FHH
+
1− βe
βe
(1− 2δFHH − FLH
FHH
− 1− 2δ − β
e
2δβe(1− δ)
]
.
Figure 1.4: Tax on financial income vs. inefficiency
1.2.8 Comparative statics
Returning to the solution of the decentralized equilibrium, I analyze the com-
parative statics of the outcome of the model as exogenous parameters change.
CHAPTER 1. THE ALLOCATION OF TALENT 25
The decentralized equilibrium is a function of all exogenous parameters: γˆ =
f(δ, βe, zH/zL, βi, kH/kL). For example, Figure 1.5 presents the solution γˆ as a
function of the bargaining power δ. As we can see, the decentralized equilibrium
exists only for δ ∈ [0, δˆ]; there is no solution for δ > δˆ. The decentralized equilib-
rium coincides with the constrained efficient outcome only for one particular value
of the bargaining power δˆ.
Figure 1.5: Fraction of bankers vs. bargaining power of entrepreneur
(efficient fraction is 1/2)
Figure 1.6 presents the solution of the decentralized equilibrium as a function
of wealth kH/kL and talent zH/zL dispersion. As we can see, wealth dispersion
has a stronger impact on the size of the financial sector. More importantly, the
static model predicts that an increase in wealth inequality will be associated with
the growth of finance. When the rich get richer, they demand more finance. This
is in line with empirical evidence. However, the wealth distribution has been
considered completely exogenous up until now. The next section endogenizes the
wealth distribution by introducing dynamics into the model.
1.3 Dynamic model and quantitative analysis
1.3.1 Dynamic model
As we saw above, the joint distribution of wealth and talent is an important
determinant of the size of the financial sector and the degree of inefficiency. While
26 1.3. DYNAMIC MODEL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Figure 1.6: Fraction of bankers vs. dispersion of wealth (talent)
(efficient fraction is 1/2)
the distribution of talent is often considered exogenous, it is difficult to think about
the wealth distribution as a fully exogenous object. In this subsection, I allow for
endogenous wealth accumulation. Endogenous growth of wealth inequality leads
to expansion of the financial sector. The rich get richer because they can afford to
pay high fees for financial services, which yield a higher return on their savings.
The higher are fees, the more talented agents work in finance. Consequently, the
growth of finance and the increase in wealth inequality go hand in hand.
To introduce simple dynamics, I consider an infinite overlapping generations
(OLG) model. The OLG structure seems to be natural for two reasons. First,
I study relatively long-term growth of wealth and the size of finance (both have
grown for at least the last six decades). Second, the generation structure is well
suited to the problem, because agents undergo an interesting life cycle with low-
wealth young age and higher-wealth old age. The young make an occupational
choice and work in one of the two sectors. The middle-aged invest the wealth they
have accumulated while young. The old consume the results of this investment.
I adopt the most basic OLG model. Every individual maximizes lifetime con-
sumption and lives for three periods: youth, middle age and old age. Individuals
are born in time t, work at time t, receive their income at t + 1 and consume at
t + 2. Individuals pass through three stages over the life cycle: working, invest-
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ment and consumption. The young are endowed with talent z and no wealth. The
young make an occupational choice either to be an entrepreneur or a banker. The
middle-aged are investors because they have wealth k, which they accumulated
while young. The middle-aged have a choice of either being matched randomly
or paying to a banker the price pi in exchange for being matched with certainty
with a talented entrepreneur. The middle-aged have no talent, because it fully
depreciated within one period. The old consume the result of their investments.6
The rest remains as before. Individuals, who are born every period, can be of
two types: talented or ordinary. Individuals are assumed to be risk-neutral and not
to discount the future. The production function F (z, k) is strictly supermodular
and depends on both capital and talent. Financial frictions are two-sided pri-
vate information and one-to-one matching. The high-type zh banker can provide
intermediated matching, while the low-type zL banker can provide only random
matching.
To keep two types of wealth, I consider a stand-in household that abstracts
from the distinction between expected and realized income. Following Lucas and
Rapping (1969) and more recent examples (Rogerson, 2008; Gertler and Kiyotaki,
2010), the stand-in household assumption has been a popular tool in macroeco-
nomics to keep models tractable. I introduce the stand-in household in the fol-
lowing way. First, there is income sharing in finance. The realized income that
every banker receives is the same as her expected income. Hence, all young tal-
ented agents zH receive the same income, and become capital-abundant investors
when they are old. Second, there is pooling of investment funds to ensure that the
realized income that an ordinary entrepreneur receives is the same as her expected
income. Hence, all ordinary entrepreneurs receive the same amount of capital.7
6Alternatively, due to risk-neutrality, individuals find it optimal to save their income fully
and consume only in the last period. The age-related decline of cognitive abilities is a well-
established fact in psychology. There is no consensus regarding the magnitude of the effect or
the exact mechanism. The wealth–age profile is also well documented. Wealth grows rapidly
over the life cycle and reaches its peak during one’s 60s (the end of working age) and flattens or
slightly declines afterwards.
7We can think of this as an insurance scheme within the financial sector. If agents are slightly
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These assumptions change nothing from the point of view of expected incomes,
but keep the model tractable. If I dropped any of these assumptions, the number
of types would grow exponentially with a constant doubling every period.
The simple model produces life-cycle behavior consistent with the data: agents
with a given talent level undergo a relatively realistic life cycle with low-income
working youth, high-income investment middle age, and retirement with high con-
sumption and zero income. Individuals typically start to accumulate assets for
their retirement during middle age, around the age of 40 (Gourinchas and Parker,
2002). Wealth grows rapidly over the life cycle, reaches its peak at the age of 60
and flattens out afterwards. Total individual consumption, including housing and
non-housing consumption, mimics individuals’ wealth (Yang, 2009).
I keep the distribution of talent constant over time, and assume an initial
distribution of wealth parametrized by the share of capital-abundant investors βi0
and their wealth kH0 , and the wealth of capital-scarce investors kL0 . To use the
solution of the static model from the previous subsection, I need to define the
evolution of the wealth distribution. The system of equations below defines the
evolution of the wealth distribution in the model:
βit = βe, (1.15)
kHt+1 = xet = δ
(
F
(
zH , kHt
)
− dit
)
+ (1− δ)det , (1.16)
kMt =
kHt (βit − βe(1− γˆt)) + kLt ∗ (1− βit)
1− βe(1− γˆt) , (1.17)
kLt+1 = δF
(
zL, kMt
)
. (1.18)
Due to profit sharing, all talented agents receive the same income and become
investors next period. Hence the share of capital-abundant investors every pe-
riod, with the exception of the first one, is equal to βit+1 = βe, expression (1.15).
The next-period wealth of capital-abundant investors kHt+1 is defined by expres-
sion (1.16) using the expressions for outside options in the case of intermediated
matching (1.10) and (1.9). Finally, I define the next-period wealth of capital-
scarce investors kLt+1, expression (1.18). Due to fund pooling, every entrepreneur
risk averse, uot+1 =
(
cot+1
)1−, where  ≈ 0, all bankers are willing to engage in income sharing,
and all investors are willing to engage in fund pooling.
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who is not matched receives the same amount of funds kMt , expression (1.17), and
consequently the same income which becomes her next-period wealth.
The next subsection brings the model to the US data in an attempt to replicate
the dynamics of wealth and the financial sector.
1.3.2 The US experience
This theoretical model has been designed to explain how the role and size of
the financial sector is determined and whether this size is efficient. Even though
the model is simplistic, the calibrated version of it performs surprisingly well. The
goal of the dynamic model is to explain the interrelationship between the growth of
the financial sector in terms of employment and the growth of wealth. Therefore,
I choose them as data moments to be matched.
In the first calibration exercise, I seek to explain the behavior of the whole finan-
cial sector. Then, I recalibrate the model to explain the behavior of one subindus-
try of the financial sector—private equity finance. Even though the model can be
applied to the financial sector as a whole, private equity finance is a subindustry
for which the assumptions of the model are particularly valid: matching and in-
formation superiority. In particular, a private equity fund precisely does matching
between a few selected startups and high-net-worth individuals. The private eq-
uity fund provides an opportunity to invest in a few companies over a long-term
horizon for a small number of wealthy investors.
The first eight parameters described in Table 1.2 are used to match as closely
as possible the share of employment in finance and the ratio of top 5% wealth to
median wealth over time in the US. The economy starts initially with an almost
egalitarian distribution of wealth (kH = 100 vs. kL = 95); otherwise the share of
employment in finance immediately jumps to the steady-state level and the wealth
disparity explodes. The distribution of talent remains the same every period:
talented agents are assumed to be 1.7 (zH/zL = 6.5/3.8 = 1.7) times more talented
than ordinary ones. Following Romer (1986), the production function exhibits non-
decreasing return to scale with respect to capital (αk = 1.095, αz = 1)—it is very
similar to the AK production function. While the increasing return on capital
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Table 1.2: Parameter values
Parameter Value
Distribution of talent
Talented zH 6.5
Ordinary zL 3.8
Share of talented βe 6.7%
Initial distribution of wealth
Capital-abundant kH0 100
Capital-scarce kL0 95
Share of capital-abundant βi0 3%
Other parameters
Elasticity of talent αz 1
Elasticity of capital αk 1.095
Bargaining power of entrepreneur δ 21%
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generates the growth of aggregate capital, the talent differentials ensure the rise of
wealth dispersion. Choosing realistic values for the eight parameters, I recall the
definition of δˆ, the maximum entrepreneurial bargaining power consistent with the
existence of an equilibrium γˆ, as a function of other parameters from Proposition
2. (See appendix 1.6.2 for more detail.) The calculated value is δˆ0 = 36.6%,
and it is growing with wealth dispersion, while the data suggests that the level of
entrepreneurial bargaining power is rather small. (Kaplan and Stromberg (2003)
report that the average founders’ share equals 21.3% of a portfolio company’s
equity value.) Hence, I set the level of bargaining power to be 21% and keep it
constant over time. Since δ < δˆt, according to Proposition 2, the solution of the
decentralized equilibrium exists and is inefficient (γˆt > γ∗). The inefficiency is
growing over time because of increasing wealth dispersion. Table 1.2 summarizes
all parameter values.
Figure 1.7 shows the comparison between the data and the outcome of the
model. On the left-hand side, we can see the share of employment in finance over
time. On the right-hand side is the ratio of top 5% wealth to median wealth over
time. As we can see, while the share of employment in finance was growing until
the 1980s and then stabilized a little above 5%, the ratio of top 5% wealth to
median wealth has been increasing over the whole sample apart from a small drop
during the Great Recession. The drop reflects the sharp decrease of asset prices:
stocks, housing etc. This business cycle type of consideration is outside the scope
of this paper.
The length of the period is a decade. A decade is arguably the shortest scale to
study long-term events, such as the accumulation of wealth and structural changes
in employment, and possibly the most appropriate one. First, ten years is a stan-
dard investment horizon for long-term investors, who are the subjects of this study.
Second, a decade is a long enough period to abstract away from business cycle con-
siderations, which are outside the scope of this paper. Furthermore, most of the
data is available only for the last 60 years.
To test the external validity of the model, let us consider some other interesting
data trends. First, the share of finance in GDP has steadily increased over the
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(a) Share of employment in finance (b) Top 5% wealth to median wealth
Figure 1.7: US data moments
whole period despite the stabilization of the employment share. Figure 1.8a shows
that this is in line with my model. Second, Figure 1.8b represents the deviation
ten-year moving average growth rate of US productivity from the long-term average
growth rate for the whole period of observation. It is calculated based on labor
productivity per hour worked in 1990 US dollars (converted at Geary–Khamis
PPPs). The yearly average for the period after the Second World War is 1.9%.
Figure 1.8b shows that US productivity growth has slowed significantly since 1973,
with a minor resurgence of productivity in the 1990s due to the IT revolution.
Several explanations of the slowdown have been suggested, but none has been
found to be fully satisfactory. My model links the slowdown to a misallocation of
talent. As we can see from the data and the model, the biggest increase of the
employment share in finance happened in the 1980s. We observe the largest drop in
productivity in the US in exactly the same period. This argument is in line with
Nordhaus (1982), who argues that a depletion of investment opportunities due
to a lack of inventions caused the slowdown. The patent data provides indirect
support for this statement. Patent applications and the quality of patents declined
significantly in the 1980s despite a constantly increasing number of scientists and
researchers. We observe a substantial decline in the share of the US in world
patents not only due to the rise of China, India and Korea, but also in comparison
with Scandinavian countries (OECD, 2011). The Scandinavian countries have not
experienced any substantial growth of the financial sector. To sum up, I argue
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that the US productivity slowdown was partly caused by the decreasing number
of talented individuals in industry to produce innovations.
(a) Share of finance in GDP (b) Productivity slowdown (c) Average return on wealth
Figure 1.8: Additional facts about the US
Third, Figure 1.8c shows the average return on private wealth in the US for
the period 1970–2010. The return on wealth (capital) has oscillated around a
central value of 5–7% a year. Piketty and Zucman (2014) first noticed that the
rate of return on capital is greater than the rate of economic growth over the long
term; the result is a growing concentration of wealth. The substantial dispersion in
wealth accumulation has been observed despite the minor difference in returns on
private wealth between capital-abundant and capital-scarce investors. Given that
I do not try to match the average return, it is surprising that the chosen 10-year
horizon generates a similar return on capital as in the data.
1.4 Cross-country data
In this section I provide cross-county evidence to answer the question of how
the distribution of wealth and talent affects the size of the financial sector. As
predicted by my model, the evidence clearly shows a positive relationship between
the size of the financial sector and inequalities of wealth and talent. Even though
my model predicts a causal link from the joint distribution of wealth and talent
to the equilibrium size of the financial sector, in this section I intend to make no
causal statement, only to document correlations.
To test the relationship, I need to have a compatible cross-country measure of
moments of talent and wealth distributions, and the size of the financial sector.
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Unfortunately, data availability limits my choice. For the talent distribution, I
employ the scores in the PISA test. The PISA test aims to evaluate education
systems worldwide every three years by assessing 15-year-olds’ competencies in
key subjects: reading, mathematics and science. To date, over 70 countries have
participated in PISA. It is a widely used measure for cross-country comparisons
of students’ performance. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that this measure of
talent suffers from reverse causality. There is no reason why the size of finance
today might affect the performance of high-school students today. I used the mean
and variance of scores in the PISA test for the years 2003, 2006 and 2009. I choose
the mean and variance of 2009 science scores in the PISA test as a proxy for
the moments of talent distributions, because it includes the greatest number of
countries. Moreover, this choice hardly affects the results, because PISA scores
are highly correlated over time and disciplines: the correlation coefficients exceed
0.97.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no cross-country data on wealth inequal-
ity. Therefore, I have to use the income distribution as a proxy for the wealth
distribution. Income inequality is a fairly standard proxy for wealth inequality,
but possibly underestimates wealth inequality. Income and wealth are not partic-
ularly well correlated either at the individual level for a given point (Rodriguez
et al. (2002) estimate the correlation between wealth and labor income to be 0.27)
or across countries (Fredriksen, 2012). However, if we measure the correlation over
time between top income and wealth shares for a particular country, for example
the US, we observe that the shares are highly correlated. The more concentrated
are the shares, the higher are the correlations between them. In addition, the
income shares are more volatile and tend to lead the wealth shares. We can see
from Figure 1.9 that the dynamics of wealth shares closely track the dynamics of
income shares for the US.
To measure income inequality, I employ the Gini indexes from the Standardized
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) and top income shares from the World
Top Incomes Database. The SWIID provides comparable Gini indexes of gross and
net income inequality for 173 countries for as many years as possible from 1960.
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Figure 1.9: US top income and wealth shares
The correlation for 10% (1%) is 0.52 (0.77)
The World Top Incomes Database includes 45 countries for over a century for some
countries.
The last issue is how to measure the size of finance. I construct the share
of financial industry employment in total employment using two datasets: the
International Labour Organization (ILO) dataset, which contains employment by
economic activity for 165 countries starting from 1968, and the STAN Database
for Structural Analysis, which contains industry-level data for employment and
output for 15 OECD countries from the 1970s up to the present.
After conducting panel unit root tests, such as the Fisher combination test
(Maddala and Wu, 1999) and the Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test, I conclude
that real GDP per capita is non-stationary; therefore I compute its growth rate.
The specification of the full model for the OLS estimation is given by
Empit = γ0 + γ1gGDPit + γ2IIit + γ3MPit + γ4V Pit + εit, (1.19)
where Empit is the share of employment in the financial sector; gGDPit is the
growth rate of real GDP per capita; IIit is the measure of income inequality (Gini
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or top shares); MPit is the mean PISA score; and V Pit is the variance of the PISA
score.
Table 1.3: The share of finance (in % of total employment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 5% income share 0.00460*** 0.00404***
Top 1% income share 0.00466***
Gini index 0.000613*
GDPPC growth 0.0139 0.00693 -0.0239 0.00738
Variance of PISA score 0.00189* 0.00195*** 0.00284***
Mean of PISA score 0.000284 0.000556*** 0.000370***
Obs. 215 201 201 744
R2 0.176 0.217 0.273 0.529
* (p¡0.05), ** (p¡0.01), *** (p¡0.001)
The results from Table 1.3 are consistent with my model. A higher share of
financial employment is associated with more unequal income and talent distribu-
tions. The estimation results from the biggest sample, the last column with the
Gini coefficient, show this clearly. Income inequality has an even stronger effect if
I use the top income share instead of the Gini coefficient (columns 2 and 3). The
result is not driven by country fixed effects (FE). We can see by comparing column
1 with FE and column 2 that the estimated coefficient of the top 5% share remains
positive, significant and almost unchanged.
1.5 Discussion and conclusion
In this section, I review the impact of the different assumptions on the outcome
of the model: the inefficiency result and the inequality result. First, the inefficiency
result states that the decentralized equilibrium is generically inefficient. Second,
the inequality result states that the endogenous growth of wealth inequality leads
to the expansion of the financial sector.
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Preferences and technology: First, for simplicity I assume the Cobb–
Douglas production function zαzkαk , which satisfies the supermodularity condi-
tion. However, the choice of a production function should not affect the results,
because as long as z and k are not fully substitutable, the supermodularity con-
dition holds. (See Topkis (1998) for a comprehensive mathematical treatment of
supermodularity, and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (2005) for applica-
tions in game theory and economics.) According to the Becker–Brock theorem, the
supermodularity condition implies that positive assortative matching is the first
best allocation of my model. Hence, the results of the model remains unchanged as
long as the production function is supermodular. Second, it should not be compli-
cated to include labor as an additional input, but it would not add further insights
on the questions addressed in this paper. It should not affect the choice of talented
agents, but it might have interesting implications for ordinary agents. Third, if
we consider a risk averse utility function instead of a risk neutral one, all agents
would like to engage in risk sharing. If profit sharing and fund pooling are avail-
able options, the introduction of risk aversion does not change anything, because
expected and realized incomes are the same. If these options are not available, the
impact of risk aversion is ambiguous. On the one hand, investors are willing to pay
a higher price for intermediated matching. The higher is the price, the higher is
the income of a banker. On the other hand, due to higher uncertainty with respect
to this income, risk aversion makes a banking career a less attractive option.
Distribution of types: First, as long as within each period the wealth dis-
tribution is independent from the talent distribution, the investment decision is
independent from the occupational choice. This makes the solution of the problem
tractable. The consideration of the two-dimensional joint distribution of wealth
and talent complicates the analysis enormously without much additional insight
for this particular question. Second, the fact that the constrained efficient allo-
cation admits only two values is an artifact of the discrete distribution of talent
and the particular type of information advantage for talented agents in finance: a
banker with ability z can distinguish between ideas with productivity z and z′ < z.
As long as both assumptions hold, the constrained efficient allocation admits two
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values (zero and one-half) for each type of talent: the planner would find it optimal
either to keep the allocation under random matching or make it as close as possible
to the allocation under assortative matching by exhausting fully the opportunities
for intermediated matching. The allocation in the case of a continuous talent
distribution would strongly depend on the assumption made with respect to the
impact of talent on agents’ productivity in the two sectors. Third, I can provide
intuition for the case of a continuous wealth distribution. The constrained efficient
solution either have a positive share for all values of talent distribution z or there
exists a threshold in terms of ability z¯, that separates bankers and entrepreneurs.
Calculating the decentralized equilibrium is a complicated numerical task.
Different types of frictions: First, this paper focuses on how the financial
sector arises as a result of one type of relevant friction, adverse selection. The
financial sector clearly provides other useful functions to the economy: it allocates
not only information, but also decision power and risk. On the theoretical side,
the financial sector’s functions include: screening to mitigate the effect of adverse
selection; monitoring to prevent the effects of moral hazard; auditing and punish-
ment to mitigate the effects of opportunistic behavior in the context of costly state
verification. (See Freixas and Rochet (2008) for a precise survey of the theoretical
literature.) Comparing my model with that of Bolton et al. (2011), who study
moral hazard and the financial sector as a liquidity provider, while I consider ad-
verse selection and the financial sector as a classical intermediary, we both obtain a
similar result in terms of efficiency, but the mechanisms are substantially different.
This suggests that the misallocation result might be a general feature of models
with financial frictions. Under the assumption that talent in finance affects the ef-
ficiency of monitoring, the inequality result is likely to survive as well. Second, The
matching friction is clearly important for the inefficiency, because in the perfectly
competitive market prices would take into account the negative externality, which
arrised from the occupational choice. However, More a general form of matching
friction, many-to-one matching can be easily introduced into the environment in at
least two ways: through diminishing returns on capital and fixed costs of engaging
with investors; or through making entrepreneurs’ bargaining power depend posi-
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tively on the number of investors in the market. Ceteris paribus, it is likely that
many-to-one matching would lead to more inefficiency in comparison to one-one
matching. The more investors can be matched with one entrepreneur, the fewer
bankers are needed to restore efficiency. The income of a banker increases with the
number investors matched with one entrepreneur. Hence, an even larger fraction
of talented agents is attracted to finance. The inefficiency should increase due to
both a decline in the constrained efficient fraction of talented agents in finance and
a rise in the decentralized one.
Third, the issue of competition has been studied extensively. Monopoly is
usually viewed as a bad thing. However, in my framework one monopolistic firm in
the financial sector might restore efficiency, because it maximizes the total surplus
by pushing all agents to their outside option. The monopolist is always on the
short side of the market. It would set the prices for its services to make both
entrepreneurs and investors indifferent between paying for the services and being
matched, and being randomly matched for free. On top of this, the monopolist
can set wages for its workers (bankers) to make them indifferent between the two
sectors. Hence, the monopolist could extract the total surplus and would hire the
efficient number of bankers. However, this possible advantage of a monopoly in
the context of information provision does not overcome common disadvantages of
monopoly for a society.
1.5.1 Conclusion
This paper develops a new model of an economy with a financial sector and
heterogeneous agents. The model sheds light on the role of the financial sector
and its implication for the allocation of capital between entrepreneurs and the
allocation of talent between finance and industry. Talent is important for both
industry and the financial sector: more talent in industry means more output is
produced, while more talent in finance means capital is allocated more efficiently.
The model establishes a link between the growth of the financial sector and the
increase in wealth inequality. It shows that the market overproduces finance, but
this inefficiency can be corrected by taxing bankers’ income. For the future, it
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would be interesting to quantitatively assess the size of this inefficiency and the
importance of current wealth in limiting investment.
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1.6 Appendix A
1.6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is organized in the following way. First, I show that as long as γ is
greater than 1/2, aggregate output Y (γ) decreases with γ. Second, depending on
other parameters, Y (γ) is either a strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or a
non-monotonic function of γ for the whole interval γ ∈ [0, 1/2]. In the latter case,
I prove that the function is a convex function for γ ∈ [0, 1/2].
For γ > 1/2, aggregate output Y (γ) is given by
Y (γ) = (βi−(1−γ)βe)(1−(1−γ)βe) (1− βe)FLH + (1−β
i)
1−(1−γ)βe (1− βe)FLL + (1− γ)βeFHH .
(1.20)
To show whether it is increasing or decreasing, we take the derivative of (1.20)
with respect to γ:
∂Y
∂γ
|γ>1/2 = βe(1−βi)(1−βe)(1−(1−γ)βe)2 FLH − βeFHH − β
e(1−βi)
(1−(1−γ)βe)2FLL. (1.21)
We need to estimate the sign of expression (1.21). Since F is a supermodular
function, FLL ≥ 0 and FHH ≥ FLH . Hence
∂Y
∂γ
|γ>1/2 ≤ βe(1−βi)(1−βe)(1−(1−γ)βe)2 − βe. (1.22)
Expressing the two terms on the right-hand side of condition (1.22) using a common
denominator, then replacing γ in the numerator by 1/2 (this value makes the
numerator as small as possible), and finally expanding, we obtain:
∂Y
∂γ
|γ>1/2 ≤ βe (1−βe)(1−βi)−(1−βe+γβe)2(1−(1−γ)βe)2 ≤ βe (1−β
e)(1−βi)−(1−βe+0.25(βe)2)
(1−(1−γ)βe)2 ≤ 0. (1.23)
Here is the end of the proof of the first part. To prove the second part, I follow
a similar procedure. I calculate the first derivative and restrict my attention to
the case in which the first derivative is neither positive or negative for the whole
interval γ ∈ [0, 1/2]. Then, I show that in this case the second derivative is positive,
i.e. the function is convex.
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For γ ∈ [0,1/2], the aggregate output Y (γ) is given by
Y (γ) = (βi−γβe)(1−γβe) [(1− 2γ)βeFHH + (1− βe)FLH ] +
(1−βi)
(1−γβe) [(1− 2γ)βeFHL + (1− βe)FLL] + γβeFHH .
(1.24)
Calculating the first derivative from (1.24), we obtain
∂Y
∂γ
|γ∈[0,1/2] = 1(1−γβe)2 [βeFHH (1 + 2γβe − (γβe)2 + βiβe − βe + 2βi)−
(1− βe)βe(1− βi)(FLH − FLL)− (2− βe)βe(1− βi)FHL] .
(1.25)
The first derivative is negative for the whole interval γ ∈ [0, 1/2] if
βeFHH (1 + 2γβe − (γβe)2 + βiβe − βe + 2βi)− (2− βe)βe(1− βi)FHL <
(1− βe)βe(1− βi)(FLH − FLL).
(1.26)
The left-hand side of inequality (1.26) increases with γ, while the right-hand side of
inequality (1.26) is independent of γ. Hence if inequality (1.26) holds for γ = 1/2,
it holds for any γ ∈ [0, 1/2].
[βeFHH (1− 0.25(βe)2 + βiβe + 2βi)−
(1− βe)βe(1− βi)(FLH − FLL)− (2− βe)βe(1− βi)FHL] < 0
(1.27)
If inequality (1.27) holds, the first derivative is negative. In the opposite case, the
sign of the derivative is unknown. Inequality (1.27) imposes the restriction on the
set of exogenous parameters.
We now calculate the second derivative and check its sign:
∂2Y
∂γ2 |γ∈[0,1/2] = 2β
e
(1−γβe)3 [β
eFHH (1 + βiβe + 2βi)−
(1− βe)βe(1− βi)(FLH − FLL)− (2− βe)βe(1− βi)FHL] .
(1.28)
If the second derivative is positive, the function is convex. I need to show that the
right-hand side of (1.28) is positive. As we have seen, when inequality (1.27) does
not hold, the sign of the first derivative is unknown, but it imposes the restriction
on the set of exogenous parameters. This is the case in which we need to know
the sign of the second derivative. We can estimate the right-hand side using the
complementary inequality to condition (1.27):
βeFHH (1 + βiβe + 2βi)− (2− βe)βe(1− βi)FHL−
(1− βe)βe(1− βi)(FLH − FLL) ≥ βeFHH0.25(βe)2 > 0.
(1.29)
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This completes the proof of the first part. We show that the sign of the first
derivative is either negative or unknown. In the case in which it is unknown, we
prove that the second derivative is strictly positive. Hence, the solution of the
planner’s problem can be either 0 or 1/2.
1.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The characterization of a decentralized equilibrium is the following triplet: two
prices and the share of talented agents in finance (pi, pe, γ). We have:
pi ≤ (1− δ)(FHH − di(γ)− de(γ)),
pe ≤ δ(FHH − di(γ)− de(γ)),
min{γ,1−γ}
γ
(pi + pe) = δ (FHH − di(γ)) + (1− δ)de(γ)− pe.
(1.30)
As a reminder, there are three types of agents who affect the solution of interme-
diated matching: capital-abundant investors, talented entrepreneurs and bankers.
The number of investors is βi, the equilibrium number of bankers is γβe, and the
equilibrium number of entrepreneurs is (1−γ)βe. There are two markets and con-
sequently two prices that clear them: entrepreneur–banker and investor–banker.
System (1.30) should be solved differently depending on who is on the short side
of both markets: capital-abundant investors, talented entrepreneurs or bankers. I
show that a solution exists only if capital-abundant investors are on the long side
of the investor–banker market. Furthermore, the condition γ∗ = 1/2 imposes an
additional restriction on the set of exogenous parameters, and eliminates a possible
solution with bankers being on the short side with respect to talented entrepreneurs
on the entrepreneur–banker market. However, the solution does not always exist.
I state the existence condition as well.
The system can be solved backwards. First, we need to define who is on the
short side of the market: capital-abundant investors, talented entrepreneurs or
bankers. Second, I solve the random matching problem for a given size of the
financial sector γβe to determine the outside options of capital-abundant investors
di(γ) and talented entrepreneurs de(γ) in the case in which they decide not to
be matched with a high-type counterpart with certainty through a banker. Third,
50 1.6. APPENDIX A
using the solution of random matching as outside options, I solve the intermediated
matching problem for capital-abundant investors and talented entrepreneurs.
Capital-abundant investors are on the short side: The number of
capital-abundant investors is lower than the number of bankers who provide ser-
vices for investors βi < γβe. Hence, competition among bankers drives the price
pi down to zero. If the number of bankers is greater than the number of talented
entrepreneurs, the bankers’ income is zero, because prices for their service are zero.
Furthermore, the number of bankers cannot be greater than the number of
talented entrepreneurs. Otherwise, bankers’ income is zero, and any talented agent
strictly prefers to be an entrepreneur. Thus, if capital-abundant investors are on
the short side of the investor–banker market, the share of talented agents in finance
must be γ ≤ 1/2.
If γ ≤ 1/2 and pi = 0, the system (1.30) collapses to one condition:
pe = δ(FHH − di(γ)− de(γ)),
2pe = δ (FHH − di(γ)) + (1− δ)de(γ).
(1.31)
Substituting prices, system (1.31) collapses to condition (1.32)
δFHH = δdi(γ) + (1 + δ)de(γ). (1.32)
Condition (1.32) does not hold unless δ = 0. Hence, capital-abundant investors
cannot be on the short side in equilibrium.
Capital-abundant investors are on the long side: The number of capital-
abundant investors is higher than the number of bankers who provide services for
investors βi ≥ γβe. Hence, bankers push capital-abundant investors to their out-
side options. The first equation of system (1.30) becomes an equality. Two cases
are possible.
First, if the number of bankers is lower than the number the talented en-
trepreneurs γ ≤ 1/2, 1 − 2γβe talented entrepreneurs are left for random match-
ing. We assume that investors have no access to a storage technology, while en-
trepreneurs have no opportunity for outside borrowing. Thus, the outside options
for a random match—the set D in (1.5)—are (0, 0). The solution of the Nash
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bargaining problem gives the value of random matching for capital-abundant in-
vestors, which is equal to the probability of matching with somebody 1−2γβe1−γβe mul-
tiplied by the sum of two terms: the probability of matching with a talented
entrepreneur (1−2γ)βe1−2γβe multiplied by the fraction of the project’s output received
by the investor (1 − δ)FHH ; and the probability of matching with an ordinary
entrepreneur 1−βe1−2γβe multiplied by the fraction of the project’s output received by
the investor (1− δ)FLH :
di = 1− 2γβ
e
1− γβe
1− δ
1− 2γβe [(1− 2γ)β
eFHH + (1− βe)FLH ] . (1.33)
A similar expression can be obtained for the talented entrepreneur. The probability
of matching with somebody for a talented entrepreneur is equal to 1, so
de = δ1− γβe
[
(βi − γβe)FHH + (1− βi)FHL
]
.
Due to the supermodularity of the output function, sorting is possible. There exists
a separating equilibrium such that the incentive compatibility constraint for the
capital-scarce investor holds (the low type has no incentive to mimic the high type).
The capital-abundant investor is indifferent between being randomly matched and
being matched by a banker, while the capital-scarce investor is strictly better off
under random matching. In this case, the system (1.30) takes the form below:
pi = (1− δ)(FHH − di(γ)− de(γ)),
pe = δ(FHH − di(γ)− de(γ)),
(pi + pe) = δ (FHH − di(γ)) + (1− δ)de(γ).
(1.34)
Surprisingly, as long as γ ≤ 1/2, the income of a banker is an increasing function
of the number of bankers, while the income of an entrepreneur is a decreasing
function of the number of bankers. The rise of bargaining power δ has no effect on
the banker’s income and a positive one on entrepreneurial income. The solution
of the system (1.34) is linear in δ:
γ˜ = δ
[
1
βe
+ 1− β
e
βe
FHH − FLH
FHH
− 2(1− β
i)
βe
FHH − FHL
FHH
]
− 1− β
e
βe
FHH − FLH
FHH
.
(1.35)
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There exist two thresholds δ¯ > 0, such that γ˜ = 0, and δ˜ > 0, such that γ˜ = 1/2:
δ¯ = (1− β
e)(FHH − FLH)
(1− βe)(FHH − FLH) + (2βi − 1)(FHH − FHL) + FHL , (1.36)
δ˜ = (1− β
e/2)FHH − (1− βe)FLH
(1− βe)(FHH − FLH) + (2βi − 1)(FHH − FHL) + FHL . (1.37)
Depending on parameter values, both δ¯ and δ˜ can potentially be greater than 1.
The solution γ˜ exists only for δ ∈ [min{δ¯, 1},min{δ˜, 1}]. The solution γ˜ exists as
long as δ¯ ≤ 1. Using expression (1.36), the latter can be rewritten as follows:
(2βi − 1)(FHH − FHL) + FHL ≥ 0. (1.38)
Second, the number of bankers is greater than or equal to the number of talented
entrepreneurs γ ≥ 1/2. Thus, all talented entrepreneurs are matched by bankers.
The number of capital-abundant investors βe(1 − γ) are matched by bankers. In
this case, the solution of the Nash bargaining problem for random matching is
given by
di = (1− β
e)
1− βe(1− γ)(1− δ)FLH , (1.39)
de = δ1− βe + γβe
[
(βi − βe + γβe)FHH + (1− βi)FHL
]
. (1.40)
If the number of bankers is greater than the number of talented entrepreneurs,
competition among bankers drives the price pi down to zero. In this case, system
(1.30) takes the form below:
pi = (1− δ)(FHH − di(γ)− de(γ)),
pe = 0,
1−γ
γ
pi = δ (FHH − di(γ)) + (1− δ)de(γ).
(1.41)
As we can see, the banker’s income is a decreasing function of the bargaining power
δ, while entrepreneurial income is an increasing function of δ. Furthermore, the
expected income of a banker grows with γ. System (1.41) can be expressed in the
form of a quadratic equation in γ:
γ2 +
[
(1− δ) (1−βe)
βe
FHH−FLH
FHH
+ δ−βe
βe
+ δ(1− δ)
]
γ−
−(1− δ)2 (1−βe)
βe
FHH−FLH
FHH
− (1− βi)(1− δ) δ
βe
FHH−FHL
FHH
= 0.
(1.42)
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The solution of quadratic equation (1.42) contains two roots, but one root is always
negative. For the solution to exist, the second root has to be greater than 1/2.
Let γˆ be the positive solution of (1.42). This solution exists as long as
δ(1 + βe(1− δ))
4(1− δ) ≤ (1− β
i)δFHH − FHL
FHH
+ (1− βe)FHH − FLH
FHH
(1/2− δ). (1.43)
Analyzing condition (1.43), we can conclude that the condition is likely to be sat-
isfied when: the dispersion of wealth kH/kL is high; the share of capital-abundant
investors βi is low; and the bargaining power of entrepreneurs δ is relatively low.
Furthermore, if δ ≤ 1/2, condition (1.43) is likely to be satisfied when the disper-
sion of talent is high and the share of talented agents βe is low. When condition
(1.43) is satisfied with equality, it can be rewritten as the definition of δˆ defined
in Proposition 2.
The constrained efficient allocation is γ∗ = 1/2: This implies that ∆Y
given by expression (1.3) is positive and can be rewritten in the following form:
(2βi − 1)(FHH − FHL) + FHL < −2(1− β
i)(1− βe)
2− βe (FLH − FLL). (1.44)
The right-hand side of inequality (1.44) is negative, therefore its left-hand side is
negative as well. If we compare the left-hand side of (1.44) with the left-hand
side side of expression (1.38), they are exactly the same. Hence, if γ∗ = 1/2, the
solution γ˜ does not exist.
1.6.3 The solution of the decentralized equilibrium if γ∗ = 0
In this section, I show the solution of the decentralized equilibrium in the case in
which the constrained efficient allocation is 0. The proposition below summarizes
the case:
Proposition 3. If the constrained efficient allocation is γ∗ = 0, then both equilibria
with few γ˜ and many γˆ bankers are possible. In this case, there is a range of
δ ∈ [δ˜, 1], such that the decentralized equilibrium is constrained efficient.
Proof : As shown in appendix 1.6.2, the solution γˆ exists as long as condition
(1.43) holds, and it does not depend on whether the constrained efficient allocation
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is 0 or 1/2; the solution γ˜ does not exist if γ∗ = 1/2. The solution γ˜ exists as
long as δ¯ < 1, defined by expression (1.36). The latter is likely to be satisfied if
γ∗ = 0.
1.7 Appendix B
1.7.1 Private banking and private equity finance
This subsection introduces an alternative way of calibrating the model. Most
global banks, such as Credit Suisse, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citibank, Deutsche
Bank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase and UBS, have a separate business unit with dedi-
cated teams of client advisors and product specialists exclusively for high-net-worth
individuals. They provide a wide range of investment opportunities, including
bonds, stocks and more importantly private equity finance.
Private equity is an important channel through which long-term investments
are made. It has grown steadily over the past three decades, and today private
equity funds worldwide manage over $1 trillion. For some countries, such as Israel,
the US and the UK, private equity accounts for more than 5% of total investment
(see Table 1.4 for details).
Table 1.4: The size of private equity
% GDP % Investment
2010 2011 2010 2011
Israel 0.63 2.09 3.50 10.45
UK 1.13 0.75 7.53 5.00
US 0.9 0.98 5.00 5.44
China 0.16 0.33
World 0.30 1.58
I would like to convince the reader that the matching assumption holds for
private equity. A small private equity fund provides an opportunity to invest in a
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few companies over a long-term horizon for a small number of wealthy investors. As
we can see from Table 1.5, private equity funds typically employ 12 professionals.
These professionals select one or two companies each for the fund to invest in.
Investments are large (over $50 million). Investors are wealthy and expected to
invest over a long-term horizon. The minimum required commitment rises from
a median of $1 million for funds of $100 million or less, up to a median of $10
million for funds of $1 billion or more. There is no active market for private
equity positions, making these investments illiquid and difficult to value. Private
equity funds typically have horizons of 10–13 years, during which the invested
capital cannot be redeemed. Furthermore, based on the sample of firms from
the Pricewaterhouse National Venture Capital Survey, Gordon (2000) shows that
71.32% of firms reported they had received more than one offer to invest from
venture capitalists. The mean number of offers was 3.18. This means entrepreneurs
have a choice about which venture capitalists invest in their companies, but this
choice is rather limited and matching plays an important role.
Table 1.5: Private equity funds
Number of Size ($ mn)
N professionals investments I/P Fund Investment
VC 94 9 20 2 225 11.25
Buyout 144 13 12 1 600 50
Given the long-term horizon and the high entry costs, the question is why
investors are willing to engage in these investments. Investors are compensated
well by substantially higher returns. Table 1.6 shows that the return from an
investment in private equity funds is three times higher than in stocks. We can see
the comparison with inflation and the returns on other assets: stocks, gold, T-bills
etc.
The first important ingredient of the model is the wealth distribution. If we
look at Table 1.7, we can conclude that at most 5% of households in the US can
afford to invest at least $1 million for the horizon of ten years. I target 5% as the
share of capital-abundant investors.
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Table 1.6: US real asset returns
Period PEF S&P TBond Gold Inflation
1997-2011 9.2% 3.2% 0.4% 7.0% 2.4%
1975-2011 7.5% 1.3% 4.0% 4.2%
Table 1.7: Wealth distribution in the US
1962 1983 1989 1998 2001 2007 2010
Average 194 284 326 362 468 564 464
Median 52 73 78 81 91 108 57
Top 20% 786 1157 1361 1507 1976 2397 2062
Top 5% 2120 3190 3841 4273 5542 6973 5842
Top 1% 6491 9599 12176 13650 15627 19486 16439
1% to median 125 131 156 168 173 181 288
The second important ingredient of the model is the distribution of talent.
The most challenging exercise is to calibrate it. I use three different proxies. First,
based on US firm-level data I estimate the moments of the productivity distribu-
tion in the US. Second, based on data on different test scores from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97), I estimates the moments of the IQ
distribution in the US. Finally, since my model contains only two levels of tal-
ent, we might think of these as being college graduates and high-school graduates.
Therefore, I use data on the share of college graduates over time as a proxy for the
increase in the supply of talent (skills).
Chapter 2
Structural Changes and Labor
Income Distribution:
The Importance of Educational
Policies
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between inequality and growth is of fundamental interest for
economists. The most challenging trends to explain of the last few decades, which
have attracted the attention of both economists and policymakers, have been the
growth of the service sector and the rapid increase of income inequality in devel-
oped countries. While both trends have been studied separately and extensively,
economists, perhaps surprisingly, have not formally analyzed the possible interac-
tion between the two. This paper is an attempt to do just that by shedding light
on the possible interaction between income inequality and the services economy
through endogenous education choice. The growth and structural change litera-
ture focuses mostly on labor demand, while the inequality and education literature
emphasizes the importance of labor supply. My contribution is to simultaneously
explain both trends by examining both sides of the labor market with an emphasis
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on endogenous education choice.
Before going into detail, I consider income inequality and services separately.
The growth of services and the decline of manufacturing are well known and well
documented. However, the service sector is large, up to 70% of GDP, and very
heterogeneous. It can be roughly split into two subsectors, which are very distinct
in multiple dimensions: producer services and consumer services. Consumer ser-
vices include personal services, transportation, entertainment, retail and wholesale
trade. Producer services include business services, telecommunications, finance,
insurance and real estate. While consumer services are mostly used for final con-
sumption and demand low-skilled labor, producer services are mostly used as in-
termediate goods and demand high-skilled labor. Manufacturing is very similar to
consumer services in terms of skills and the stage of consumption. Furthermore,
the employment share of consumer services has remained roughly stable over the
20th century in the US, while the employment share of producer services has almost
quintupled at the expense of manufacturing.
Many authors have observed the growth of labor income inequality in devel-
oped countries, in particular, the increase of wage inequality between educational
groups. Despite an increasing supply of college graduates, the college wage pre-
mium, the additional average salary a college graduate earns relative to a high-
school graduate, has increased sharply in the US from 40% in the 1950s to 90% in
the late 2000s (see Figure 2.4). The study by Autor et al. (2008) shows that the
effect of the increased college wage premium can explain up to 50% of the rise in
overall labor income inequality. To summarize, empirical evidence suggests that
the accumulation of skills plays an important role in explaining both trends: the
growth of services, mostly producer services, and the increase of income inequality.
Employing skill-biased technical change in a multi-sector framework as a stan-
dard mechanism to generate the growth of the college wage premium, this paper
concentrates on labor supply by analyzing an endogenous benefit, the college wage
premium, and an endogenous cost, a tuition fee. Tuition fees in the US have grown
faster than median incomes and even the college wage premium over the last few
decades, which might limit access to university and consequently high-skilled la-
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bor supply. (See Figure 2.8 for the US. Greenaway and Haynes (2003) document
a similar trend for the UK.)
This paper studies how an endogenous education choice can affect the econ-
omy’s sectoral composition and income inequality. It analyses two possible ways
of financing education: a bequest and a loan. In the first way, which might be seen
as traditional, parents leave educational bequests that determine the occupational
choices of their children. Occupational returns are determined by market condi-
tions. In the second way, which can be seen as modern, individuals employ loans
as the main source of funding for university tuition fees.
I develop a model with heterogeneous agents who differ in ability, who face an
educational cost and have to decide whether to study or not. The model is a three-
sector general equilibrium model, in order to better understand the driving forces
and interconnections between the rise of the service sector and wage inequality.
The first sector is producer services, which only demands high-skill labor and is
used as an intermediate input for manufacturing; the other two are consumer
services and manufacturing, which both compete for unskilled labor. Both sectors
provide goods for final consumption. The share of services and income inequality
are functions of the wage premium and the ratio between skilled and unskilled
labor, which are determined endogenously in the model.
As mentioned, the different ways of financing education have different implica-
tions for efficiency, as well as for sectoral growth and inequality. The model with
inheritance predicts an endogenous and permanent separation of the population
between the rich (skilled) and the poor (unskilled). Due to the absence of financial
constraints, the model with loans leads to an efficient outcome, even though it may
still generate a persistent level of inequality.
The model and data show that the growth of services and the rise of wage
inequality can be linked through the fraction of college graduates and the college
wage premium. As we will see below, the data suggests that the growth of services
in the US is mostly accounted for by producer services. These services demand
mainly high-skilled labor. As producer services grow, due to higher productivity,
for example, they demand more and more high-skilled labor. To attract labor, pro-
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ducer services increase wages. The increase of wage inequality between educational
groups has a very important impact on the growth of overall income inequality. As
a result, we observe both the rise of services and the increase of income inequality.
However, as pointed out above, higher inequality may in some cases limit access to
college for middle-class and poor households, and consequently restrict the supply
of high-skilled labor.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews related literature.
Section 3 then provides empirical motivation for the current research and data.
The model and theoretical results are described in Section 4. The last section
concludes and motivates further research.
2.2 Related Literature
My paper is related to a huge range of literature, of which I will provide a
very limited review. The review can be split into human capital growth literature,
education choice literature, and literature related to structural changes and R&D.
Let me first review the branch of the literature that deals with structural
changes and R&D. The rise of services has at least three theoretical explana-
tions: a shift of demand towards services; international trade and outsourcing;
and inter-sector productivity differences. The first explanation recalls the so-called
“hierarchy of needs” hypothesis proposed by Clark (1940). The hypothesis states
that as income grows, a higher share of household expenditure will be spent on
services. This result can be easily reproduced by using non-homothetic preferences
(Echevarria, 1997; Buera and Kaboski, 2011). The second explanation relies on
international trade, which may lead to specialization in skill-intense industry in
developed countries and could affect the demand for skilled labor.1 The last ex-
planation, based on the fact that different sectors experience different productivity
growth, is used in this paper.2 Surprisingly, Buera and Kaboski (2009a) demon-
strate that neither non-homothetic preferences nor skill-biased technical change
1See Acemoglu(2003), Blum(2008).
2Baumol (1967, 2001) for empirical evidence of the rise of services and Ngai and Pissarides
(2007) for a theoretical explanation.
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can quantitatively explain the recent structural changes in the United States.
As discussed in the introduction, there is consensus in the literature that tech-
nological change has been skill-biased for several decades and has generated an
increasing wage premium. However, this result is no longer true in the multiple
sectors model, because wages depend not only on productivity levels, but also on
prices of goods (Weiss, 2008). A similar observation about the importance of the
multiple sectors model was made originally by Baumol (1967).
The second branch of literature deals with an educational choice with or without
credit market imperfections, and how this choice affects the income distribution.
Some papers argue that credit market imperfections do not limit access to edu-
cation,3 while others claim the opposite (Kane, 1994). De Fraja (2002) showed
that in the presence of a credit constraint government can restore an efficient out-
come by public intervention in the provision of education. Moreover, Becker (1964)
advocates government subsidies of educational loans, because of the difficulty of
using human capital as collateral. More importantly, even in the absence of credit
constraints, a market might produce persistent inequality.
Many economists who conduct research in the field of education have contrasted
public and private education systems and studied their inequality implications.
The standard result is that the public education system leads to a reduction of
inequality, while private education might have a positive impact on income in-
equality.4
To the best of my knowledge, there is no paper that formally links income
inequality and a service sector. However, I would like to refer to two of the most
relevant papers, which are Eicher (2001), who considered a static model of the
labor market with non-monotonic demand for skilled labor, and Buera and Kaboski
(2011), who examined the importance of high-skilled labor in the rise of the service
sector.
3See Cameron and Heckman (2001), who provided a detailed analysis of educational attain-
ment and college participation in the US and concluded that the importance of short-term credit
constraints is greatly exaggerated.
4In Cardak (2004), parents can choose between public or private schools and can vote on taxes
used to fund public schools. See also Glomm and Ravikumar (1992).
62 2.2. RELATED LITERATURE
Buera and Kabosky’s paper presents the consumption demand-driven story,
which relies on three elements: an exogenous distribution of productivity growth, a
special type of non-homothetic preferences and a convex schooling cost. As produc-
tivity increases, it generates a rise in the college wage premium, which is completely
exogenous to the labor supply decision. The increasing premium affects income
and, consequently, stimulates demand through non-homothetic preferences. The
production of market services requires high-skilled labor and intermediate goods,
while the production of home services demands low-skilled labor and intermedi-
ate goods. As productivity rises exogenously, an individual’s consumption moves
into even more complex wants, eventually those in which high-skilled labor has a
comparative advantage. The representative household decides what fraction of the
household should be specialized high-skilled workers and what fraction should be
low-skilled workers, and ensures an equal level of consumption for all members of
the household.
Even though the set-up of my paper seems similar to Buera and Kabosky’s
paper, there are significant differences. I would like to emphasize several main
differences: an endogenous educational choice, a basket of final consumption items
and inequality implications. The first difference is that an endogenous educational
choice induces interaction between labor supply and labor demand. The second
difference is that, in Buera and Kabosky’s paper, final consumption takes the form
of services, while in my model, a basket of goods and services represents final
consumption. The last difference is that, since there is a representative household,
Buera and Kaboski (2011) do not explicitly discuss an application of their model to
income inequality, but it is possible to understand the behavior of income inequality
from their results. The college wage premium explodes, while the relative share of
high-skilled workers converges to a constant level. As a result, income inequality
also explodes.
Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa’s paper provided an alternative mechanism based
on the dual role of human capital to generate simple intra-sectoral inequality.
However, I believe that Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa’s results can be interpreted
in a different way. Because the service sector hires mainly skilled labor, while
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manufacturing demands unskilled labor, as a country accumulates skills (human
capital), we observe a shift of employment towards services. As a result, it is
essentially the same intra-sectoral inequality mechanism. However, the authors did
not discuss the application of their model to sector decomposition, even though
it was feasible in their framework, because the model operates in terms of skilled
labor and unskilled labor and the wage premium. The second main difference is
that I shift the focus onto the labor supply side of the story.
2.3 Data
This section justifies the assumptions of the model and formally links services
to the share of skilled workers and income inequality to the wage premium.
My paper attempts to show that there is a nontrivial relationship between
income inequality and sectoral composition. In particular, the post-industrial so-
ciety may be characterized by not only a relatively large service sector, but also
by relatively high income inequality. If we look at US data (Figure 2.1), we ob-
serve that US society was as unequal at the beginning of the century as it is now.
Income inequality dropped dramatically during the 1940s and reached a minimum
in the 1950s; then it started to grow. The ratio of value added in services to
manufacturing showed the same pattern. The minimums of the two graphs are
quite close to each other (less than 10 years difference or 14% of GDP per capita).
These U-shaped relationships can be viewed through the migration of the work-
force from manufacturing, with low value-added, to high value-added ‘producer’
services.5 However, there is an important difference, which is that low-skilled labor
from industry is not a perfect substitute for high-skilled labor, which is required
to produce producer services.6
5See Figure 2.6.
6This dynamic is not specific to the US. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present panel data of the value
added in services to manufacturing against the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in $ (in
1990 prices) and the top 5% income share against GDP per capita (in 1990 prices), respectively.
The data demonstrates a clear U-shaped pattern with a minimum around per-capita income
of $7,100 and definite growth starting after $12,000. A similar U-shaped relationship can be
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As we have seen, the growth of services started before the rise of income in-
equality. This time lag can be explained by two facts. First, in the seventies and
eighties the US economy experienced structural changes, which were associated
with a decline in the wage premium (Acemoglu, 2002). Second, Card and Lemieux
(2001) discovered that the entire rise of the wage premium can be attributed to
changes in the earnings of relatively young college-educated workers. The college–
high school wage gap for younger men with 3–7 years of experience doubled over
the 30 years between 1959 and 1989, whereas the gap for older men remained
nearly constant. Furthermore, the profile of the wage premium for men peaks at
about 13 years of experience. As a result, as services grow, the demand for edu-
cated workers increases, but the rise of earnings happens with a time lag, which
we observe in Figure 2.1.
While the college wage premium has shown a U-shaped trajectory over time,
the relative supply of skills has constantly increased. Figure 2.4 shows the US
experience over the past century.7 The growth has accelerated since the 1970s
and has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the college premium.8. Based
on widely available data for the US, I argue that Figures 2.1 and 2.4 present
fundamentally the same phenomena, i.e. the rise of services and the increase of
income inequality.
Having discussed the benefits of being college educated, let me turn to a cost.
Figure 2.5 shows that the cost of higher education, which is mostly tuition fees,
remained stable till the 1950s and then started to grow faster than median income
and even the college wage premium. Tuition fees at Harvard university are used
as a proxy for average tuition fees because, unfortunately, the long-term data for
observed in Figure 2.3, where the top 5% income share is plotted against GDP per capita, but
the minimum of the graph appears to be around $15,000 and definite growth starts after $20,000.
7Since the data of college wage premium is combined from different sources (Goldin and Katz,
2007; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011), caution should be taken.
8A similar, but less marked trend has been discovered for other countries with some exceptions.
When Walker and Zhu (2008) estimated the college wage premium for the UK between 1994 and
2006, they found that although the dramatic increase in higher education enrolment, the college
wage premium remained stable for men and rose for women.
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average tuition fees are not available.9 As we see from Figure 2.5, tuition fees at
Harvard are a good proxy for the average tuition fees in a private university. Tu-
ition fees in the US have been growing dramatically and soon even a public college
will not be affordable for 20% of Americans, while a private college will become un-
affordable for half of Americans. The New York Times commented on the current
situation: “The rising cost of college – even before the recession – threatens to put
higher education out of reach for most Americans. . . Over all. . . student borrowing
has more than doubled in the last decade” (Lewin, 2008). Moreover, Figure 2.9
shows that the average loan per full-time equivalent has risen dramatically over a
few decades. In 2008, total college debt exceeded total credit card debt.
Moving from the individual part of the story to services data, services are the
biggest sector in every developed country and they are very diverse. To examine
them, we need to decompose them into smaller parts. According to the stan-
dard broad industry group classification, services include the following industries:
Utilities, Transportation, Telecommunications, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Fi-
nance, Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE), Business and Repair Services, Personal
Services, Entertainment and Recreational Services, Social Services, and Govern-
ment. To connect services to high-skill labor, let me point to Table 2.1, which
presents the fractions of college-educated labor, total man-hours and value added
in different industries in 1940 and 2000. The data clearly shows that there is a
significant difference in terms of the fraction of college graduates in the labor force
between services and manufacturing. In 2000, the fraction of college graduates in
services was around 60%, while less than 40% of workers in manufacturing had a
college degree.
Following Buera and Kaboski (2011), Table 2.1 presents the ranking of services
into two groups: low-skill and high-skill. High-skill industries are those indus-
tries with at least 60% of college-educated labor in 2000. High skill services in-
clude: Telecommunications, FIRE, Business and Repair Services, Social Services,
and Government, while low-skill services with minor exceptions embrace: Trans-
9The tuition fees data for the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Iowa demon-
strate the same pattern.
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portation, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Personal Services, Entertainment and
Recreational Services.
Broadly speaking, the high-skill services can be subdivided into two categories:
services that are related to production goods (‘producer’ services), such as telecom-
munications, FIRE, business and repair services, and services that are strongly in-
fluenced by government policies, such as the majority of social services and public
administration. My paper focuses on production-related services, which, in 2000,
accounted for 16% of total man-hours and 36% of value added (See Table 2.1).
All ‘producer’ services have high information content or even require a specialized
degree, for example law, accountancy or risk management. Apart from the gov-
ernment sector, the two main industries of social services, which are healthcare
and education (18% of the total labor force), whose growth may be driven at least
in part by growth in government subsidies or other policies. To avoid possible
effects of government policies, the government-related services are excluded from
the current analysis.
Comparing the industries in Table 2.1, several important aspects should be
mentioned. First, the ranking of industries is remarkably stable, i.e. the higher
the fraction of college-educated people was in 1940, and the higher it is now.
Second, the high skill-intense industries grew not only extensively in terms of
persons engaged in production by industry, but also intensively in terms of value
added per employee (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6). The values in Table 2.1 and Figure
2.6 are different, because they are based on different sources of data and operate in
different terms. Third, although the fact that low-skill services had approximately
the same fraction of college graduates as non-services producer over time, the
share of low-skill services production only slightly decreased in comparison with
manufacturing and agriculture, which dropped dramatically. Furthermore, Figures
2.5 and 2.6 clearly show that the growth of services is mostly driven by producer
services and slightly by government and social services. Another important feature
of the data is that the non-service sectors shrank dramatically, while the low-skill
services declined slightly, but steadily. Last, both the decrease of the non-services
share and the increase of the ‘producer’ services share decelerate. Perhaps the share
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of GDP components may stabilize around current levels. Otherwise, it would be
strange to observe an unlimited growth of ‘producer’ services, while the industrial
sector declines. However, not only the real sector demands ‘producer’ services.
The last important feature of the US services economy is that so-called ‘pro-
ducer’ services provide output for intermediate consumption as well as for final con-
sumption. Therefore it is not fully correct to call FIRE, legal, communication and
other business services the ‘producer’ services, because, by definition, ‘producer’
services are intermediate inputs to further production. It is conventional wisdom
to consider FIRE, legal, communication and other business services as ‘producer’
services, but this is only partly true. The truth is that all so-called ‘producer’ ser-
vices provide both intermediate and final household consumption, and the share of
intermediate products varies greatly (see Table 2.2). For example, in the US, the
FIRE sector in fact provides more than 50% for final consumption, while almost
90% of the R&D sector is intermediate input. However, on average, in 2005, pro-
ducer services provided 40% of total output for final consumption, which is higher
than the average for the whole economy, and only 53% for intermediate inputs.
Moreover, the data suggests that the distribution between final and intermediate
consumption is roughly stable over time.
To summarize, the data presented in this section clearly shows that the rise of
services has been driven by so-called ‘producer’ services,10 which hire mainly high-
skill graduates and pay them substantially higher salaries. The producer services
have grown not only intensively, but also extensively, but at present they are still
less than 20% of the labor force. To attract more labor, the FIRE sector (the
main part of ‘producer’ services) increased wages. The growth of wages has had a
direct impact on labor income inequality, which is now approximately equivalent
to income inequality. The rise of the wage premium has been accompanied by the
even faster growth of the cost of education; therefore the logical implication is that
the cost of education will limit the rise of college enrolment.
As a result, this data section provides strong evidence to support two claims:
the rise of the service sector is directly related to the increase of the fraction of
1040% of ‘producer’ services output accounts for final consumption.
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college graduates, and the rise of the wage premium has a direct impact on income
inequality. The next section develops the model that links income inequality and
the service sector.
2.4 Model
As mentioned, the model includes the following components: multiple sectors,
growth, an endogenous education choice and distribution of abilities. To study
structural changes, it is necessary to have multiple sectors. Apart from this fact, a
multiple sectors model allows us to explore important general equilibrium effects.
In particular, relative wages depend not only on productivity levels, but also on
prices of goods. This can reverse results (Weiss, 2008). Both exogenous and semi-
endogenous productivity growth are analyzed and contrasted in the paper. The
main component is an endogenous educational choice.
There are two different models in my paper, because I consider two ways of
financing higher education: through loans and bequests. In the first case, after
observing their ability and tuition fees, individuals decide to borrow or not to
finance higher education. In the second case, parents leave an educational bequest
to their children without knowing their ability. The bequest as well as the loan
can be spent only on education. Different ways of financing higher education affect
only the household side of the story (labor supply), therefore the production side
remains the same for both models. The next subsection provides a description of
production.
The model is intended to be as simple as possible to have a closed-form solution,
while allowing for the potentially complicated effects outlined in the empirical
part. The analysis focuses on steady states and transitional dynamics. Substantial
emphasis is put on the changes in labor supply due to different education policies.
Data suggests that the service sector hires a significantly higher share of skilled
labor in comparison with manufacturing. As the service sector increases, demand
for skills increases as well. It forces the skilled wage premium to rise as well, but
the cost of education grows differently for different individuals.
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2.4.1 Production
My model includes three sectors, which are producer services, low-skill services
and manufacturing. The producer services sector hires high-skilled labor (college
graduates) and produces intermediate goods. The output of this sector together
with low-skilled labor is used in the manufacturing sector to produce one of the
final consumption goods. The last sector is a low-skill service that uses only low-
skilled labor to produce the second final consumption good. All three sectors are
competitive, therefore the zero-profit condition holds.
The production of producer services requires only one input, which is low-
skilled labor, and demonstrates decreasing returns to scale. The high-skill services
firm’s maximization problem is given by
maxLs [psqsLαs − wsLs].
FOC:
ws = αpsqsLα−1s . (2.1)
Equation (2.1) represents the first-order condition, where α ∈ (0, 1) is a pa-
rameter; ws and qs are the wage and the productivity level in producer services;
and ps is the price of producer services. As discussed, the wage depends not only
on the productivity level, but also on the price of the good. Ls is total demand
for high-skilled labor.
The manufacturing production technology is described by the CES function,
which admits some degree of substitutability σ ∈ (0,∞) between intermediate
inputs and high-skilled labor. The manufacturing firm’s maximization problem is
given by
maxLm,Qs [pm((qmLm)(σ−1)/σ +Q(σ−1)/σs )σ/(σ−1) − wmLm − psQs].
FOC:
wm = pmq(σ−1)/σm L−1/σm (qmLm)(σ−1)/σ +Q(σ−1)/σs )1/(σ−1). (2.2)
ps = pmQ−1/σs (qmLm)(σ−1)/σ +Q(σ−1)/σs )1/(σ−1), (2.3)
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where Qs = qsLαs is the output of producer services; wm and qm are the wage
and the productivity level in manufacturing; and pm is the price of manufacturing.
The maximization problem of the consumer (low-skill) services firm is expressed
by
maxLl [plqlLαl − wlLl].
FOC:
wl = αqlplLα−1l . (2.4)
Equation (2.4) represents the first-order condition, where α ∈ (0, 1) is a param-
eter; wl and ql are the wage and the productivity level in low-skill services; and pl
is the price of low-skill services. Competition between manufacturing and low-skill
services for low-skilled labor leads to equal wages in both sectors: wl = wm.
Equations (2.1)–(2.3) taken together lead to the equation for labor demand:
ω = α(qs/qm)(σ−1)/σLα−1−1/σs L1/σm , (2.5)
where ω = ws/wm is the college wage premium depending on the relative
productivity level and the relative demand for skilled labor.
Expressions (2.3) and (2.4) taken together lead to the expression for the relative
price of final consumption goods:
p = αqlLα−1l (qm)(1−σ)/σL1/σm [(qmLm)(σ−1)/σ +Q(σ−1)/σs ]1/(1−σ). (2.6)
As discussed, I consider two types of productivity process: exogenous and semi-
endogenous growth. I follow the seminal paper by Jones (1995):
(qs)t = (1 + g)(qs)t−1, (2.7)
(qs)t = (qs)t−1 + (qs)µt−1(Ls)γt−1. (2.8)
The last condition, which needs to be satisfied, is sectoral allocation given by:
Ls + Lm + Ll = 1. (2.9)
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2.4.2 Model with Bequests
I employ the standard overlapping generations (OLG) framework, adopted by
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and developed by Galor and Moav (2004). There
are two types of agents: parents and their children. The agents live two periods
and they are differentiated by abilities and initial asset holdings. There is an
exogenous distribution of the people in terms of ability that is characterized by a
density function ψ(a).
In every period the economy is populated by children and their parents. In
the first period, the children only study to be high-skill employees during the next
period if their parents decide to pay tuition fees, but not otherwise. In the second
period, parents earn money depending on their educational level and divide it
between their own consumption and tuition fees for their children. I employ this
approach, because the equilibrium concept is simple and allows us to have a closed-
form solution. Thus individuals simply allocate their wealth optimally between
their own consumption and their bequests to their offspring (tuition fees for their
children).11
Hence the income of the agents is predetermined by the decision of the parents
in the previous period. There is a positive wage gap between college-educated
employees, who work in the service sector, and school-graduated workers, who are
employed in the production sector. However, there is a cost of being a college
graduate, which is the tuition fee. The cost of higher education is an increasing
11There are at least four formulations of the intergenerational link in the distribution and
growth literature. Three of them deal with altruism in the sense that some bequest to children
is directly incorporated into the utility function of the parents, in contrast to a life-cycle model
with inheritance. First, members of the current generation could value the utility level achieved
by their descendants (Loury, 1981). Second, they could value the allocations of their descendants
(Kohlberg, 1976). Third, members of the current generation may value the wealth they pass on to
their descendants (Banerjee and Newman, 1991). Finally, there is the Blanchard–Yaari approach
of perpetual youth (Blanchard, 1985; Yaari, 1965), which is a standard OLG model with the
key additional assumption that an agent has a constant probability of death, independent of
age. The dead agent is replaced by a newborn agent who inherits his wealth as well (Blanchard
and Fischer, 1989). In the first two formulations, members of each generation take as given the
optimal decision rules of their offspring.
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function of median income and a decreasing function of ability and the number
of skilled people, which plays a critical role in the model, because it prevents all
people from being college educated.
In period t, given earnings Et, which are predetermined by the parents’ de-
cisions bt−1 and the level of ability at−1, the adult household maximizes its own
levels of consumption (cm)t and (cl)t and the amount of bequest bt to its children.
The maximization problem of a household is:
maxcm,cl,b[log(ct) + θlog(bt)]
ct + bt ≤ Et(bt−1, at−1)
c = (ηm(cm)(−1)/ + ηl(cl)(−1)/)/(−1
a ∈ Φ(.)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of parental altruism. Due to the log-log utility
specification, all variables are defined in relative terms with respect to the wage
of a low-skill individual (wm)t. Then, the earnings can be either ω if the adult
individual is a college graduate, or 1 otherwise.
Et =

ωt if bt−1 > τ(at−1, ωt−1) = τ¯ ω
1/ρ1
a1/ρ2
1 otherwise
(2.10)
Solving for the first-order conditions of the household problem, we find the
following:
bt =

ωtθ
θ+1 if bt−1 ≥ τ(at−1, ωt−1)
θ
θ+1 otherwise
ct =

ωt
θ+1 if bt−1 ≥ τ(at−1, ωt−1)
1
θ+1 otherwise
cm
cl
= (ηmpl
ηlpm
)
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Due to homotheticity of preferences, it is easy to derive aggregate earnings E
and consequentially, using expression (2.10) the aggregate spending on education
pBm and the total consumption expenditure C = Cl + pCm. These are given by
E = wl(Lsω + (1− Ls))
pBm = θ(θ+1)
1
pl
E
Cl + pCm = 1(θ+1)
1
pl
E
The next period labor supply is determined by the current period decision and
given by
(Ls)t = (Ls)t−1(1− Φ(a¯1(ωt−1)) + (1− (Ls)t−1)(1− Φ(a¯2(ωt−1))) (2.11)
There are two thresholds in terms of ability, given by:
a¯1(ω) = ωρ2/ρ1(θ+1)ρ2
ωρ2θρ2
a¯2(ω) = ωρ2/ρ1(θ+1)ρ2
θρ2
(2.12)
Equation (2.11) represents the important dynamics of labor supply. The whole
population is split into two groups: the high-skilled workers (the rich) and the low-
skilled workers (the poor). The first element describes the share of people from
rich families, who acquire higher education, while the second element represents
the share of people from poor families. As we see from equations (2.12), for a
given college wage premium ω, the threshold for rich people a¯1t−1 is significantly
lower than the threshold for poor people a¯1t−1. Contrary to the standard result of
a bequest model, which is the division of population into stable dynasties of the
rich and the poor, my model generates mobility between educational groups. To
put it differently, a very talented student from a poor family can acquire higher
education and become rich.
It is clear that the economy with educational bequests leads to an inefficient
allocation, due to the fact that the occupational choices of children are determined
not only by the level of ability, but also by the size of educational bequests. Since
agents cannot borrow, they cannot overcome this issue. As a result, there is room
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for government policies. The two most obvious policies are redistributive taxation
from the rich to the poor and educational loans. The first of these is not in the
scope of the current analysis, while the second will be discussed in detail in the
next subsection.
2.4.3 Model with Loans
The current section presents a model with fixed-rate government-guaranteed
loans. As opposed to the previous model, now individuals can borrow as much as
they want to borrow. As mentioned above, in the absence of financial constraints,
loans should lead to an efficient outcome. However, there still exists a small source
of inefficiency, which is the fixed interest rate. The government-guaranteed loan
was chosen instead of a market loan, because in regard to higher education this
choice is an accurate description of reality.12
The maximization problem of a household is:
maxcm,cl [log(c)]
c = (ηm(cm)(−1)/ + ηl(cl)(−1)/)/(−1
ct + (1 + r)dt−1 ≤ E(at)t
a ∈ Φ(·)
Comparing the current maximization problem with the maximization problem
from the previous subsection, we can notice that parents are not altruistic anymore
towards their children, which corresponds to the case of θ = 0, but now children
can borrow without a constraint. The earnings of the children depend on their
occupational choices, which depend on their abilities. As a result, the economy
with unconstrained borrowing can reproduce an outcome close to the efficient one.
Since the government supplies loans, it needs to balance its budget by lump-sum
transfers or taxes trt. The earnings of an individual are given by
12In 2011, less than 5% of the loans were issued by private lenders. The estimated size of the
private student loan market was $6 billion, compared with Federal Student Aid, which delivered
$157 billion of federal aid, mostly in the form of loans. Source: the College Board.
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E =

ωt + trt if dt−1 > 0
1 + trt otherwise
Solving for the first-order conditions of the maximization problem, we find the
following:
dt−1 =

τ(a, ωt−1) if ωt − (1 + r)τ(a, ωt−1) ≥ 1
0 otherwise
(2.13)
cm
cl
= (ηmpl
ηlpm
)
There is a common threshold for all individuals a¯t. Compare to equations
(2.12).
a¯t =
ω
ρ2/ρ1
t−1 (1 + r)ρ2
(ωt − 1)ρ2 (2.14)
Then aggregate labor supply, in contrast to equation (2.11), is given by:
(Ls)t = (1− Φ(a¯t)) (2.15)
As mentioned, the government should have a balanced budget, which means
that the current generation’s demand for loans should be covered by the revenues
from the previous generation of borrowers. If not, the surplus/deficit of the gov-
ernment is redistributed/covered by taxes.
(1 + r)
∫ ∞
a¯t−1
τ(a, ωt−1)φ(a) da−
∫ ∞
a¯t
τ(a, ωt)φ(a) da = trt (2.16)
Aggregate earnings E and consequentially, using (9) aggregate spending on
education pBm and total consumption expenditure C = Cl + pCm are given by
Et = (wl)t((Ls)tωt −
∫ ∞
a¯t
τ(a, ωt)φ(a) da+ (1− (Ls)t)) (2.17)
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pBm = θ(θ+1)
1
pl
E
Cl + pCm = 1(θ+1)
1
pl
E
(2.18)
2.4.4 Income Inequality
We now turn to the impact of an increasing share of high-skill labor over time
on income inequality and the share of services. It is obvious that the employment
share of producer services Ls/(1 − Ls) is the relative supply of college skill, and
therefore an increasing function of Ls. On the other hand, labor inequality I can
be expressed as follows:
I = (1− Ls)Ls(ω − 1)2.
To understand the direction of changes in income inequality over time we com-
pute the following expression:
∆I
∆t = (ω − 1)
[
(1− 2Ls)(ω − 1)∆Ls∆t + 2(1− Ls)Ls
∆ω
∆t
]
. (2.19)
The first part of expression (2.19) is growing over time if Ls is growing over time
up to the point at which Ls = 0.5. The second part of expression (2.19) increases
over time if ω increases over time. As we can see later on, Ls is growing over
time according to both the model and the data, but it is below 0.5. The college
wage premium exhibits U-shape dynamics and generates the U-shape dynamics of
income inequality.
2.5 Simulations and Results
This section provides the results for four specifications of models: the bequest
economy with exogenous growth and semi-endogenous growth of high-skilled labor
productivity, and the education loans economy with exogenous growth and semi-
endogenous growth of high-skilled labor productivity. First, as mentioned above,
the loans economy produces a more efficient allocation than the bequest economy.
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Second, there is almost no difference between semi-endogenous and exogenous
growth.
The first set of results, related to allocation and wages, is presented in Fig-
ure 2.10. Only one sector experiences a technological improvement, which is the
producer services sector. Since the output of this sector Qs and low-skilled labor
in manufacturing Lm are gross substitutes, there is no need in Lm that makes
Lm converges to zero. Following labor demand equation (2.5), the decline of Lm
compensates for the growth of relative productivity and stabilizes the college wage
premium ω at a constant level in both cases: exogenous and semi-endogenous
growth. The constant college wage premium translates through labor supply equa-
tion (2.11) in the case of the bequest economy or equation (2.15) in the case of
the loans economy to the constant level of high-skilled labor Ls. Hence, to satisfy
sectoral allocation, the labor in low-skill services should converge to a constant
level as well.
The second set of results, related to consumption expenditures and tuition
fees, is presented in Figure 2.11. The two final consumption goods are gross com-
plements, so the ratio between them in final expenditure should converge to a
constant level due the adjustment of their relative price. The bequest economy
spends relatively more on services than the loans economy due to the fact that the
bequest introduces inefficiency in terms of labor allocation. To put it differently,
a significantly higher share of the labor force works in low-skill services than it
should. Tuition fees per student and average expenditures on education converge
to constant levels as well.
Since the direct comparison of two economies can be misleading due to the fact
that individuals in these economies have different preferences, I decide to put the
two models in a historical perspective and to see what results can be generated by
switching from the bequest economy to the loans economy. Traditionally, higher
education was financed by intergenerational transfers from parents to their chil-
dren, which is a bequest motive. Then, more recently, loans were introduced. As
we look at the data, we observe that on all graphs the 1950s marked an impor-
tant turning point. The college wage premium (Figure 2.4) and the ratio between
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services and manufacturing reached their minimums; tuition fees and the relative
supply of college skills kept constant till the 1950s and grew rapidly thereafter.
What important event happened in the 1950s?
My answer is that US Government-backed student loans were first introduced
in the 1950s under the National Defense Education Act. The student loan program
was established in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik satellite,
and a widespread perception that the United States was falling behind on education
and technology in the Cold War. Given this fact, the 1950s was the turning point,
when the US economy was shifted from the traditional way of financing education
to the modern one.
Confronting the simulated graphs (Figure 2.12) and the data (Figure 2.4), we
see that a “regime-switching” story can explain not only the drop in the 1950s
and the further growth of the college wage premium, but also the piecewise broken
growth in the share of college graduates. The current research can also explain
the experiences of major developed economies in the world, commonly referred
to as the “productivity slowdown”, during the same period when the college skill
premium soared.
By comparing Figure 2.13 and Figure 2.8, we can see that the historical model
can also account for the piecewise broken growth of tuition fees and personal
expenditure on higher education, and the rise of loans per student.
Even though the model fails to explain the full dynamics of labor shares in
different sectors (compare Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.6), it generates the correct
behavior of the ratio between labor shares in manufacturing and services (see
Figures 2.7 and 2.15).
2.6 Conclusion
This paper develops a set of general equilibrium models of the service economy
with heterogeneous agents. Placing these models into historical perspective and
considering bequests as the traditional way to finance higher education, and loans
as the modern one, the modeled economy qualitatively reproduces the dynamics
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of skill supply, the college wage premium, tuition fees and the labor allocation
between sectors over the 20th century by switching from bequests to loans.
Of course, I make no claim that the only possible mechanism of interaction
between income inequality and services is through the wage premium and the
share of skilled labor, but I do believe that this mechanism is important.
It has been argued that high-skill services are distinct enough from the other
types of services to be considered independently. These services evolve in well-
developed countries and require a highly educated workforce. Since technological
changes (Acemoglu, 2002; Aghion, 2002) seem to be skill biased, this type of work-
force can demand high salaries that influence wage inequality.
80 2.6. CONCLUSION
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. (2002): “Directed Technical Change,” Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 69, 781–809.
Acemoglu, D. and D. Autor (2011): Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Impli-
cations for Employment and Earnings, Elsevier, vol. 4 of Handbook of Labor
Economics, chap. 12, 1043–1171.
Aghion, P. (2002): “Schumpeterian Growth Theory and the Dynamics of Income
Inequality,” Econometrica, 70, 855–882.
Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz, and M. S. Kearney (2008): “Trends in U.S. Wage
Inequality: Revising the Revisionists,” The Review of Economics and Statistics,
90, 300–323.
Banerjee, A. V. and A. F. Newman (1991): “Risk-Bearing and the Theory
of Income Distribution,” Review of Economic Studies, 58, 211–35.
Baumol, W. J. (1967): American Economic Review, 57, 415–426.
——— (2001): Paradox of the services: exploding costs, persistent demand, vol. 1
of The growth of service industries : the paradox of exploding costs and persistent
demand, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Becker, G. S. (1964): Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis,
11271, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Blanchard, O. J. (1985): “Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons,” Journal of
Political Economy, 93, 223–47.
81
82 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Blanchard, O. J. and S. Fischer (1989): Lectures on Macroeconomics, vol. 1
of MIT Press Books, The MIT Press.
Buera, F. J. and J. P. Kaboski (2009a): “Can Traditional Theories of Struc-
tural Change Fit The Data?” Journal of the European Economic Association,
7, 469–477.
——— (2009b): “The Rise of the Service Economy,” .
——— (2011): “Scale and the origins of structural change,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 1, 1–29.
Cameron, S. V. and J. J. Heckman (2001): “The Dynamics of Educational
Attainment for Black, Hispanic, and White Males,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 109, 455–499.
Card, D. and T. Lemieux (2001): “Can Falling Supply Explain The Rising
Return To College For Younger Men? A Cohort-Based Analysis,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116, 705–746.
Cardak, B. A. (2004): “Education Choice, Endogenous Growth and Income
Distribution,” Economica, 71, 57–81.
Clark, C. (1940): The Conditions of Economic Progress, London/New York.
De Fraja, G. (2002): “The Design of Optimal Education Policies,” Review of
Economic Studies, 69, 437–66.
Echevarria, C. (1997): “Changes in Sectoral Composition Associated with Eco-
nomic Growth,” International Economic Review, 38, 431–52.
Eicher, T. (2001): “Inequality and growth: the dual role of human capital in
development,” Journal of Development Economics, 66, 173–197.
Galor, O. and O. Moav (2004): “From Physical to Human Capital Accumula-
tion: Inequality and the Process of Development,” Review of Economic Studies,
71, 1001–1026.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 83
Glomm, G. and B. Ravikumar (1992): “Public versus Private Investment in
Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality,” Journal of Political
Economy, 100, 813–34.
Goldin, C. and L. F. Katz (2007): “The Race between Education and Tech-
nology: The Evolution of U.S. Educational Wage Differentials, 1890 to 2005,”
NBER Working Papers 12984, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Greenaway, D. and M. Haynes (2003): “Funding Higher Education in The
UK: The Role of Fees and Loans,” Economic Journal, 113, F150–F166.
Jones, C. I. (1995): “R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth,” Journal of
Political Economy, 103, 759–84.
Kane, T. J. (1994): “College Entry by Blacks since 1970: The Role of College
Costs, Family Background, and the Returns to Education,” Journal of Political
Economy, 102, 878–911.
Kohlberg, E. (1976): “A model of economic growth with altruism between
generations,” Journal of Economic Theory, 13, 1–13.
Lewin, T. (2008): “College May Become Unaffordable for Most in U.S.” The New
York Times.
Loury, G. C. (1981): “Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earn-
ings,” Econometrica, 49, 843–67.
Maddison, A. (2005): “Measuring And Interpreting World Economic Perfor-
mance 1500-2001,” Review of Income and Wealth, 51, 1–35.
Ngai, L. R. and C. A. Pissarides (2007): “Structural Change in a Multisector
Model of Growth,” American Economic Review, 97, 429–443.
Schaltegger, C. A. and C. Gorgas (2011): “The Evolution of Top Incomes
in Switzerland over the 20th Century,” CREMA Working Paper Series 2011-06,
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
84 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Veall, M. (2010): “Top Income Shares in Canada: Updates and Extension,”
WORKING PAPER.
Walker, I. and Y. Zhu (2008): “The College Wage Premium and the Expansion
of Higher Education in the UK,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110, 695–
709.
Weiss, M. (2008): “Skill-biased technological change: Is there hope for the un-
skilled?” Economics Letters, 100, 439–441.
Yaari, M. E. (1965): “Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the
Consumer,” The Review of Economic Studies, 32, 137–150.
CHAPTER 2. EDUCATIONAL POLICIES 85
2.7 Appendix
Figure 2.1: Top 10% income share and the relative share of services in the US
Sources: Author’s calculations based on
1. The top 10% income share: Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas
Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, The World Top Incomes Database, http://g-mond.
parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes;
2. The value added share of GDP by major sector (agriculture, industry, and ser-
vices): National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
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Figure 2.2: Ratio of Services to Manufacturing in value-added vs. Log of Income
per capita (Country Panels)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on
1. The value added share of GDP by major sector (agriculture, industry, and ser-
vices)Buera and Kaboski (2011)
2. The long longitude real (1990 base year) income per capita data: Maddison (2005)
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Figure 2.3: the Top 5% income share vs. GDP Per capita (Country Panels)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on
1. The top 5% income share: Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas
Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, The World Top Incomes Database, http://g-mond.
parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes; Canada 2000-2007: Veall (2010); Ice-
land: Inland Revenue; Switzerland 1997-2007: Schaltegger and Gorgas (2011).
2. The real (1990 base year) GDP per capita: Total Economy Database http://
www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/
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Figure 2.4: Relative supply of college skills and the college wage premium
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Census Bureau; Goldin and Katz (2007);
Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
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Figure 2.5: Tuition Fees vs. Median Income
Sources: the Harvard Fact Book and the Harvard Crimson; Trends in College Pricing
(2011).http://trends.collegeboard.org/college_pricing/; the World Top
Incomes Database; the US Census Bureau.
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Figure 2.6: The growth of Low and High skill industries shares: Labor
Source: National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data.
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Figure 2.7: The ratio between labor shares in manufacturing and low-skill services
Source: National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data.
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Figure 2.8: Tuition fees and expenditures on the higher education
Sources: the Harvard Fact Book and the Harvard Crimson; National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) data.
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Figure 2.9: The increase of student aids: grants and loans against the growth of
tuition fees
Source: Trends in Student Aid
(2011).http://trends.collegeboard.org/college_pricing/.
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Figure 2.10: Labor allocation and the college wage premium
Source: Computer simulations.
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Figure 2.11: The share of services and expenditure on higher education
Source: Computer simulations.
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Figure 2.12: Simulation: relative supply of college skills and the college wage
premium
Source: Computer simulations.
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Figure 2.13: Simulation: tuition fees and expenditures on higher education
Source: Computer simulations.
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Figure 2.14: Simulation: Labor allocation
Source: Computer simulations.
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Figure 2.15: Simulation: the ratio between labor shares in manufacturing and
low-skill services
Source: Computer simulations.
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Table 2.1: High-skill and low-skill industries
Fraction of college Fraction of Fraction of Compensation
educated labor total man-hours value added per employee
id industry 1940 2000 1940 2000 1947 2000 1940 2000
All industry 14,7% 53,4% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1087 42888
NON-SERVICES 6,0% 43,3% 48,3% 27,3% 41,4% 21,2%
1 Mining 10,3% 32,6% 1,5% 0,5% 2,8% 1,2% 1409 69359
2 Agriculture 1,8% 33,9% 22,0% 2,7% 8,0% 1,0% 150 15786
and Fishing
3 Construction 4,1% 35,2% 3,7% 7,5% 3,7% 4,4% 938 54771
4 Nondurable 9,3% 39,1% 10,9% 6,6% 13,3% 5,7% 1346 49934
Drugs 28,5% 66,3% 0,0% 0,3%
5 Durable 9,7% 41,6% 10,3% 10,0% 13,5% 8,8% 1638 33157
Office machines 22,5% 65,7% 0,2% 0,4%
SERVICES 10,8% 59,3% 50,4% 71,7% 56,6% 79,6%
Low-skill 8,3% 43,0% 34,3% 28,0% 29,5% 24,4%
6 Transportation 7,2% 38,5% 5,1% 3,6% 5,7% 5,7% 1714 43281
Air transportation 26,0% 65,1% 0,1% 0,5%
7 Personal Services 5,6% 39,5% 8,7% 2,6% 2,8% 2,3% 678 16426
8 Retail Trade 8,2% 41,0% 15,5% 14,7% 11,5% 6,7% 889 24012
Household 16,1% 65,9% 0,2% 0,8%
appliance
9 Wholesale Trade 12,1% 47,6% 2,9% 3,8% 6,8% 6,0% 1666 54712
Drugs 22,3% 60,1% 0,0% 0,2%
10 Utilities 15,5% 49,0% 1,3% 1,0% 1,5% 2,8% 1874 74676
11 Entertainment 20,0% 57,3% 0,9% 2,2% 1,1% 0,9% 1025 32094
broadcasting 31,7% 68,3% 0,1% 0,5%
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Fraction of college Fraction of Fraction of Compensation
educated labor total man-hours value added per employee
id industry 1940 2000 1940 2000 1947 2000 1940 2000
High-skill 16,1% 69,2% 17,4% 44,7% 28,7% 55,1%
Production 13,2% 66,9% 7,2% 16,4% 13,8% 36,0%
related services
12 Business and 15,0% 64,7% 2,8% 8,9% 2,5% 13,5% 1497 40652
Repair Services
Auto repair 5,7% 31,8% 1,2% 1,3% 0,4%
Misc repair 12,1% 40,4% 0,4% 0,5% 0,3%
Misc business 22,7% 66,2% 0,3% 3,9% 1,0% 4,7%
Advertising 23,6% 67,6% 0,2% 0,4%
Accounting 31,4% 81,3% 0,0% 0,6%
Legal services 25,7% 81,6% 0,8% 1,2% 0,4% 5,6%
Engineering 34,4% 82,2% 0,0% 1,0% 0,4% 3,2%
13 Telecommunications 12,4% 65,2% 0,9% 1,1% 1,4% 2,8% 1802 75174
Telephone 9,7% 64,0% 0,7% 0,8%
Telegraph 25,7% 68,0% 0,1% 0,3%
14 FIRE 14,4% 70,1% 3,5% 6,4% 10,0% 19,7% 1609 64469
Estate offices 12,4% 21,5% 0,0% 0,0%
Real estate 14,1% 63,0% 1,1% 1,5% 7,5% 12,1%
Banking 15,0% 68,7% 1,1% 2,3% 1,4% 3,4%
Insurance 14,3% 71,6% 1,3% 1,9% 1,0% 2,4%
Invest companies 27,4% 83,1% 0,0% 0,8% 0,1% 1,7%
Government 17,3% 70,5% 10,2% 28,4% 14,8% 19,2%
related services
15 Government 12,2% 67,5% 4,3% 6,7% 12,5% 12,3% 1410 52845
State 16,5% 26,9% 0,0% 0,0%
Postal service 11,0% 57,3% 0,7% 0,7%
Federal 12,6% 67,5% 1,5% 3,4% 8,4% 3,9%
Local 12,4% 70,2% 2,1% 2,7% 4,1% 8,4%
16 Social Services 21,0% 71,5% 5,9% 21,6% 2,4% 6,9%
Welfare and 23,7% 62,0% 0,9% 1,1%
religious services
Membership 23,7% 63,3% 0,0% 0,5% 0,5%
organizations
Health services 22,2% 65,2% 0,0% 4,7% 3,1%
Misc professional 36,0% 66,7% 0,0% 2,5%
Hospitals 15,8% 74,3% 2,4% 3,9% 1,5% 2,4% 610 43787
Education 24,7% 76,6% 2,7% 8,9% 0,3% 0,8% 1084 31455
Source: Author’s calculations based on Buera and Kaboski (2009b).
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Table 2.2: Final vs. Intermediate consumption
Final Household Intermediate Net Export Other
Consumption Consumption
2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995
All industry 37,6% 36,6% 46,2% 46,3% -3,1% -0,7% 19,2% 17,8%
Agriculture 16,9% 12,6% 85,5% 88,2% -2,3% 2,1% -0,1% -2,9%
Mining 2,2% 1,6% 130,3% 123,3% -54,4% -26,6% 21,9% 1,6%
Food 65,9% 60,9% 37,0% 37,9% -4,3% 1,0% 1,4% 0,2%
Textiles 163,6% 78,7% 61,9% 55,7% -132,3% -36,3% 6,9% 1,9%
Chemicals 36,4% 25,6% 72,5% 72,4% -10,5% 0,9% 1,6% 1,1%
Metals 0,7% 0,4% 124,4% 107,8% -27,6% -8,9% 2,5% 0,7%
Vehicles 45,8% 40,7% 47,0% 34,8% -25,4% -19,6% 32,6% 44,1%
Utilities 44,1% 34,6% 55,6% 65,4% -0,5% 0,0% 0,8% 0,0%
Construction 0,0% 0,0% 12,1% 36,9% 0,0% 0,3% 87,9% 62,9%
Producer 17,1% 17,6% 41,2% 38,2% 2,3% 1,0%
services
Telecommunications 29,8% 36,1% 65,9% 60,6% 1,2% 1,3% 3,1% 2,0%
Finance and 41,6% 51,2% 56,1% 46,1% 1,8% 2,8% 0,6% 0,0%
Insurance
Real estate 59,4% 61,5% 32,0% 33,1% 0,0% 2,4% 8,5% 2,9%
Information 8,7% 2,3% 55,5% 91,8% 2,0% 2,9% 33,8% 3,0%
R&D 5,9% 0,5% 89,6% 98,0% 0,4% 1,4% 4,1% 0,1%
Business Activities 14,0% 10,6% 78,8% 86,9% 7,2% 0,7% 0,0% 1,7%
Social and
Government
Public admin. 15,1% 0,0% 8,0% 1,2% 0,2% 0,0% 76,7% 98,8%
Education 81,1% 25,9% 17,4% 4,2% 0,0% 0,0% 1,5% 69,9%
Health 97,7% 88,7% 2,1% 3,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 8,2%
Low skill
Retail and 59,5% 54,9% 30,1% 35,2% 4,7% 4,1% 5,7% 5,8%
Wholesale
Recreation 78,5% 75,6% 21,2% 24,3% 0,1% 0,2% 0,2% -0,1%
Transportation 23,5% 23,9% 64,5% 62,5% 8,1% 11,0% 3,9% 2,5%
Personal services 39,1% 66,4% 60,0% 32,1% 0,5% 1,7% 0,4% -0,2%
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD input-output database.
Chapter 3
Sovereign Debt Issuance and
Selective Default
3.1 Introduction
“A national debt, if it is not excessive, will be to us a national
blessing.”
— Alexander Hamilton
Humanity has witnessed sovereign debt crises for hundreds of years. The first
recorded instance of sovereign default dates back to 377 B.C. in ancient Greece.
Sovereign default has been studied extensively in the literature. However, the
focus has mainly been on default on external debt, while the study of domestic
defaults has been neglected. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) have documented and
categorized all default events in the last 210 years. Based on their observations,
there have been at least 58 de jure defaults on domestic public debt. This is cer-
tainly an underestimate, due to the difficulty of detecting pure domestic defaults.1
Also, out of 267 defaults in this period, only 17 times did the government default
simultaneously on both domestic and foreign debt.
1For example, the large-scale 1989 pure domestic default is relatively unknown outside Ar-
gentina. The most well know domestic default happened in Russia 1998, which was one of the
largest local currency debt defaults (US $39 billion). This number does not include de facto
default through inflation, the nationalization of pensions and other forms.
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In this paper, we address the open question of why governments usually default
selectively on either foreign or domestic debt. We do so by providing a novel
theory of domestic debt and default, where domestic debt is issued to smooth tax
distortions, and combining it with the well established literature on foreign debt
and default. We present a two-period model to deliver the economic intuition,
and a calibrated quantitative model to replicate data moments. We show that
our theory is empirically plausible, as it is able to match frequencies of different
types of default and debt compositions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first contribution that is able to replicate two stylized facts: that defaults happen
mostly in a selective fashion, and that the composition of bondholders matters for
interest rates and the volume of total public debt. The two-period version of the
model is the starting point for an additional discussion of the role of secondary
markets in solving sovereign default problems. Our analysis questions the efficiency
role associated with secondary markets.
We build an incomplete markets model in which the government has limited
commitment. The government has to cover its expenditures and has three means
of financing them: it issues one-period defaultable bonds on an international and
a domestic market, and it collects taxes. Tax collection is costly because taxes
are distortionary. The economy is subject to two shocks: an output shock and a
tax distortion shock. While the output shock provides incentives for the govern-
ment to borrow on international markets, the tax distortion shock creates a wedge
between domestic borrowing and taxation. This breaks Ricardian equivalence in
our endowment economy, and draws a distinction between tax-financed and debt-
financed expenditure policies. In this we provide a simple theory of domestic debt
issuance.
Foreign debt can be used to smooth out both shocks, which makes it a more
valuable instrument. However, if the correlation of the two processes is suffi-
ciently low, then using only one instrument to smooth two shocks would result in
households’ consumption being too volatile. Therefore, the government engages in
borrowing on both markets. When the government has outstanding debts on both
markets it faces two trade-offs: one between foreign repayment and default, and
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another between domestic repayment and default.
The mechanism of foreign default is similar to that in Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and Arellano (2008). A benevolent government accumulates defaultable
foreign debt in order to smooth residents’ consumption over the business cycle.
Interest rates reflect default probabilities, which are endogenous to the borrower’s
incentives to default. The government decides each period whether to transfer
resources away from the economy as a repayment of debt to foreign investors or to
keep resources at home and suffer default penalties. When output is low, ceteris
paribus, it is more costly for a risk averse borrower to respect the contract. Default
occurs along the equilibrium path after a long enough sequence of negative output
shocks. These contributions gave rise to a large literature, which has nonetheless
not yet considered domestic debt and default in an open economy setting.
While the mechanisms and trade-offs behind foreign default are clear, the do-
mestic default literature is still at an early stage. There are two recent contribu-
tions that adhere to the benevolent government assumption and study domestic
default in a Ramsey setting. D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2013) propose a heteroge-
neous agent model in which a utilitarian government relies on lump-sum taxes and
defaultable bonds to finance stochastic governments expenditures. Default has a
redistributive aspect, because it hurts mostly the rich, while repayment by taxa-
tion hurts mostly the poor. Pouzo and Presno (2014), on the other hand, consider
a model in which the government relies on distortionary labor income taxes and
defaultable bonds to finance its stochastic expenditures. The government might
default to mitigate these distortions. The second crucial trade-off in our model,
the one behind domestic debt and default, is similar to their mechanism. Both
contributions, however, are closed-economy models that do not consider borrowing
on international markets.
Both repayment and default on domestic debt are transfers of resources within
the economy. In a case of default on domestic debt, the government suffers default
penalties similar to the penalties imposed after foreign default. When the gov-
ernment decides to repay, it needs to finance this repayment by collecting taxes.
When distortions from taxation are high, the government prefers to issue debt
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rather than collect taxes, hoping that in the future tax collection will be less dis-
tortionary, giving it the ability to repay the debt at a lower cost. The government
thus issues domestic debt up to an endogenous debt limit, and if the possibility of
repayment through non-distortionary taxes does not arrive it has no other choice
than to default.
Vasishtha (2010) and Erce (2012) study the selective nature of sovereign default
with foreign and domestic investors. The former generates domestic debt issuance
through disutility of taxation, but in equilibrium foreign default never happens. In
the latter, both domestic and foreign debt levels are exogenously predetermined.
Our analysis shows that incorporating two shocks, to output and to taxation, is
crucial to generating equilibria with both types of selective default, and that the
feedback loop from selective default to debt issuance should not be neglected.
In our paper, both domestic and foreign debt issuance and selective default are
optimal decisions of the government. In addition, Cooper et al. (2008) study
how the distribution of debt among domestic and foreign investors influences the
government’s incentives to default. They find conditions (government expenditure
and the fraction of debt held by foreign investors being high enough) under which
the government has incentives to default, but the underlying composition of debt
is given exogenously. In this paper, we derive endogenous fractions of public debt
held by domestic and foreign investors.
The main contributions of this paper are the new theory of selective sovereign
defaults and a quantitative framework to study sovereign debt issuance and debt
composition. But our analysis also has also some other, quite novel implications.
After the Great Recession, secondary sovereign debt markets attracted increasing
interest among economists. Based on the two-period version of our model, we
analyze the role of secondary markets in solving the problem of sovereign risk.
Broner et al. (2010) show that, even in the absence of default penalties, sovereign
risk does not prevent governments from borrowing on international markets if
foreign creditors can resell their assets to domestic investors on secondary markets.
We show that the key assumption behind their result is that tax collection is
costless. We show conditions for which their result does not survive with costly
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taxation (the supply of defaultable bonds is high compared to demand). The
result of the trade depends on how well each group of investors can coordinate
their actions. In particular, without any coordination, trade on secondary markets
generates a possible welfare loss, as it incentivizes the government to default on
all its debt, instead of only foreign debt. We also prove that whenever secondary
markets fail to reduce the default problem, debt haircuts can play a useful role,
and vice versa.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
summarize empirical facts on domestic and foreign public debt holdings and se-
lective defaults. Section 3 studies equilibrium in a two-period model and shows
intuitively the main trade-offs. Section 4 presents an infinite-horizon version of
the model and the results of a calibration exercise. Section 5 analyzes the role of
secondary markets and haircuts. The last section concludes.
3.2 Facts
The goal of this section is to establish three stylized facts that motivate our
analysis. First, that sovereign defaults happen mostly in a selective fashion; second,
that governments have a number of tools to discriminate among different types of
bondholders; and third, that the composition of bondholders matters. In this
section we review some empirical studies of selective sovereign defaults and the
composition of bondholders, and augment them with our findings.
Before we begin our discussion, we set the scene with some definitions. There
are three different ways to draw the distinction between domestic and foreign debt.
According to the legal definition, domestic debt is any debt issued according to
domestic law, regardless of its currency, and regardless of who holds it. According
to the economic definition, domestic debt is held by residents, regardless of the
currency and the law under which it was issued. Finally, according to the currency
definition, domestic debt is the debt denominated in home currency, regardless
of law and the residency of bond holders. The second definition creates clear
differential incentives for the sovereign to default. For this reason, throughout the
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model, we adopt the economic definition.
An important point to raise is that these three definitions do not necessarily
overlap. However, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011a) claim that: “The overwhelming
majority of external public debt, debt under the legal jurisdiction of foreign govern-
ments, has been denominated in foreign currency and held by foreign residents”.
This was certainly true before the wave of capital flow liberalizations starting in
the 1980s. After this, the mapping between the legal and the economic definitions
is less ideal.2 Still, we observe selective sovereign defaults both before and after
the wave of capital flow liberalizations.
For our stylized facts and in our calibration we rely on three sources of data.
Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) provide the breakdown of the public debt by the
residence of holders for ten industrialized economies between 1990 and 2012. For
the developing economies we rely on the dataset compiled by Panizza (2008), which
covers the data of up to 130 countries between 1990 and 2007. Data for developing
economies is however obtained using the legal definition. Our third source is the
dataset on crises and defaults provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b), which
covers up to 70 countries between 1800 and 2010. The legal definition of debt is
also used for the default data. In what follows we present three empirical facts
that motivate and guide our theoretical analysis.
1. Sovereign defaults usually happen in a selective fashion. The database
collected by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) reveals interesting features of sovereign
default episodes between 1800 and 2010. First, domestic debt, usually neglected
in the theoretical literature on sovereign risk, plays an important role in the build-
up, during and after sovereign defaults on foreign holdings. This argument is
2A notable example here is the Mexican crisis of 1994. Short-term securities called tesobonos
were dollar-denominated (foreign debt according to the currency definition), issued according to
Mexican law (domestic debt according to the legal definition) and held by investors both in the
US and Mexico (partly domestic and partly foreign debt according to the economic definition).
Also, at that time, there were no means of tracing the final creditor either by nationality or by
residence. Therefore, a default on tesobonos obligations could not have been classified either as
domestic or as foreign selective default. Luckily, Mexico did not default in 1994.
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Figure 3.1: Fraction of countries in different types of default
Source: Own calculations based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b)
extensively developed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2011a). Second, sovereign defaults
happen on both domestic and foreign debt holdings, usually in a selective fash-
ion. Whereas foreign defaults are common, domestic defaults are hardly rare.
Out of 267 episodes of sovereign debt crisis identified across 70 countries in the
last 210 years, 205 were pure foreign, 26 were pure domestic, and 36 featured
government default on both domestic and foreign debt. Only 17 times did the
default on home and foreign debt happen within the same year. In Figure 3.1
we plot the fraction of sovereign borrowers that were in foreign, domestic or total
default in a given year between 1800 and 2010. These findings suggest that the
assumption that sovereigns can default selectively fits reality better than the two
alternative assumptions commonly used in the literature: that domestic debt is
always senior and so only foreign debt is defaulted on, or that defaults can only
be non-discriminatory.
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2. Governments have a number of tools to discriminate among types
of bondholders. How can the government default on foreign investors while re-
paying domestic investors or vice versa? The assumption that the two types of
bondholders are indistinguishable, and therefore sovereigns can only default on
total debt outstanding, underestimates the creativity of governments.
Among the tools that governments use to discriminate against particular types
of bondholders, the most popular are capital controls, exchange controls and freezes
on deposits. In 1990 Brazil defaulted on its domestic debt but kept servicing its
foreign debt. All foreign exchange transactions were directed through the central
bank and a multiple exchange rate regime was introduced as well as a freeze on
local currency deposits.
In 1998 Russia defaulted on both foreign and local currency debt, imposing
capital and exchange rate controls. However, in subsequent years Russia “unde-
faulted” on its foreign obligations and kept servicing debts to foreign investors.
Moreover, bonds held by domestic companies were also repaid, so Russia effec-
tively defaulted only on domestic households’ holdings of public debt. Default was
accompanied by both foreign and local currency deposit freezes.
Argentina’s 2001 default is often considered as a model case of foreign default.3
In fact, this episode is cataloged as a total default. First, all resident-held bonds,
both domestic and foreign currency denominated, were converted to government-
guaranteed loans, which were all later converted to pesos at a much lower rate
than the market exchange rate. Also, 60% of the debt defaulted on in December
2001 was held by Argentines.
Recent examples of what could be considered pure foreign default (in peace-
ful times) include: Bolivia in 1989 (most domestic debt was repurchased a year
before default), Pakistan in 1999 (which stopped payments on outstanding obli-
gations to creditors in the UK, Europe and the US and put a freeze on foreign
currency deposits mostly owned by non-residents) and most probably Cyprus in
3Many sovereign default models are calibrated to mimic salient features of this default (e.g.
Arellano (2008)).
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2013 (freeze and partial expropriation of deposits exceeding e100,000, which were
mostly owned by non-residents).
3. The composition of bondholders matters. Empirical work on the com-
position of bondholders is growing. We draw on this literature, particularly on
Andritzky (2012) and Dell’Erba et al. (2013), to show that the composition of
investors is correlated with interest rates and the total level of debt to GDP.
Dell’Erba et al. (2013) find that there is a significant correlation between spreads
and debt levels when the majority of the debt is denominated in foreign currency
(in both emerging economies and Eurozone countries). They also document that
financial crises have more profound effects on economies that rely more on for-
eign borrowing. Andritzky (2012) finds a strong positive correlation between the
fraction of domestic debt in total debt and the total debt-to-GDP ratio, and a
negative correlation between the fraction of foreign debt and spreads in advanced
economies. The present paper contributes to this literature by providing a frame-
work to study the driving forces behind debt composition and its consequences for
spreads, total debt and default incentives.
3.3 Two-period model
We begin by introducing the model in a simplified and tractable two-period
version. We study an endowment economy that consists of three types of actors:
domestic households, foreign investors and a benevolent government. The gov-
ernment can raise resources in three different ways: by issuing bonds to domestic
households, by issuing bonds to foreign investors and by collecting taxes. Taxes
are lump sum, but collecting taxes comes at a cost to the economy. We assume
raising an amount T of taxes by the government induces a loss of T (1 + τ) re-
sources to agents. This is a key element that will break Ricardian equivalence in
this endowment economy and create a trade-off between taxes and domestic debt.
Domestic households are identical and risk averse. The representative house-
hold decides on her bond holdings to maximize lifetime utility subject to two
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intra-period budget constraints:
max
bh
(u (c1) + βE [u (c2)]) (3.1)
subject to:
y1 = c1 + T1(1 + τ1) + qhbh, (3.2)
y2 + (1− dh)bh = c2 + T2(1 + τ2), (3.3)
where y is the exogenous output, c is consumption, T is taxes, τ is the distortion
imposed by taxes, bh is domestic bond holdings, qh is the discount price of domestic
bonds and dh is the government’s decision to repay (dh = 0) or default on (dh = 1)
domestic debt.
Foreign investors are risk neutral and have deep pockets. They borrow on
international markets at risk-free rate r and lend funds to the government at
discount qf to break even in expectation:
qf =
E [1− df ]
1 + r (3.4)
The government has to cover expenditures only in the first period g1 > 0.
Government expenditures in the second period are g2 = 0. This creates an incentive
to borrow due to the consumption smoothing motive. In the first period, the
government decides on debt issuances in the domestic and foreign markets bh and
bf . In the second period, the government takes repayment decisions dh and df .
The government maximizes the lifetime utility of domestic households subject to
two intra-period government budget constraints:
g1 = qhbh + qfbf + T1, (3.5)
(1− dh)bh + (1− df )qf = T2. (3.6)
If the government decides to default, the economy will suffer proportional out-
put penalties. After domestic default, output in the second period is reduced to
yhd = y2(1− δh), (3.7)
and after foreign default, output in the second period is reduced to
yfd = y2(1− δf ). (3.8)
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If the government decides to default on both markets, the economy will suffer from
both output penalties.
Finally, in the second period the economy is subject to two shocks: an output
shock and a tax distortion shock. Both processes are stochastic Markovian and
assume two outcomes:
y2 =

yH with prob. Πy
yL with prob. 1− Πy,
(3.9)
τ2 =

τL with prob. Πτ
τH with prob. 1− Πτ ,
(3.10)
where subscript H stands for high and L for low.
If the debts are repaid with taxes, the government imposes distortions on the
economy. If they are repaid with new debt, the government might go into default.
The main driving forces of the government’s optimal policies are two trade-offs.
The first is the trade-off between a transfer of resources away from the economy as
foreign debt repayment versus a loss of resources due to foreign default penalties.
The second is between imposing distortions on the economy from tax collection
versus imposing a loss of resources from domestic default penalties. Unlike in cases
where Ricardian equivalence holds, the timing of taxes matters here.
3.3.1 Default schedule
We solve the model by backward induction starting in the second period. Given
debt issuance decisions from the first period bh and bf , in the second period the
government takes default decision that maximize domestic households’ utility from
consumption. As it is the terminal period there is no demand for government
bonds in the second period, so the only source of income for the government is
taxation. In the second period, four scenarios may arise: repayment, foreign de-
fault, domestic default and total default. Substituting the government’s repayment
decisions (dh ∈ {0, 1}, df ∈ {0, 1}) and default penalties (3.7), (3.8) into house-
holds’ second-period budget constraint (3.3) and the government’s second-period
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budget constraint (3.6), household consumption levels in each of the four scenarios
are given by the following equations: (Notice that, in order to repay an amount bh
of domestic bonds to households, the government needs to raise bh(1 + τ) taxes,
which yields a net loss of τbh resources to the economy.)
cr = y2 − bf (1 + τ2)− bhτ2, (3.11)
cfd = y2(1− δf )− bhτ2, (3.12)
chd = y2(1− δh)− bf (1 + τ2), (3.13)
ctd = y2(1− δh)(1− δf ), (3.14)
where consumption superscripts stand for repayment, foreign default, home default
and total default respectively.
A. Foreign default schedule
When deciding whether to default on foreign investors, the government compares
household consumption under repayment and under foreign default. It is immedi-
ate to see that foreign debt will be repaid whenever:
bf
y
≤ δf1 + τ2 , (3.15)
where the left-hand side is the foreign debt-to-GDP ratio and the right-hand side
is a number defined by parameters of the model. Whenever the inequality has the
opposite sign, the government defaults on foreign debt.
Proposition 4. If taxation is costly then the government’s optimal policy on the
international market is characterized by the foreign default threshold (3.15). When-
ever the debt is below this threshold, it is riskless and is always repaid. Whenever
it is above the threshold, it will always be defaulted on and therefore can never be
issued. If either output or tax distortions are stochastic, the default threshold is
also stochastic, debt can be risky and default can arise in equilibrium.
Proof. The first part follows directly from comparing (3.11) and (3.12). For the
second part, suppose that future output y2 and tax distortions τ2 are known in
period one. Any debt bf exceeding y2δf1+τ2 will be defaulted on with certainty in
CHAPTER 3. SELECTIVE DEFAULT 115
period two, therefore its discount price in period one is zero. The government is
only able to take out loans bf ≤ y2δf1+τ2 which are repaid with certainty. Foreign
default cannot arise in equilibrium. For bf to be in the default area with positive
probability, we need at least one parameter to be stochastic.
B. Domestic default schedule
Similarly, we can define the domestic debt limit. Domestic debt will be repaid
whenever:
bh
y
≤ δ
h
τ2
, (3.16)
where the left-hand side is the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio and the right-hand
side is a number defined by parameters of the model. Whenever the inequality has
the opposite sign, the government defaults on domestic debt. Most importantly,
the denominator on the right-hand side of inequality (3.16) is of a different mag-
nitude than that in (3.15). This is because repayment of foreign debt is a transfer
of resources out from the economy, while repayment of domestic debt is only a
redistribution of resources within the economy. This redistribution is costly, and
these costs are captured by the parameter τ2. Inequality (3.16) allows us to prove
two interesting propositions.
Proposition 5. If taxation is costless and home default induces small positive
costs to the economy, then any level of domestic debt is repaid.
This is the result of Broner et al. (2010), where taxes are assumed to be lump
sum and default on domestic agents induces redistribution costs, which are en-
dogenously derived (here captured by the parameter δh). This result has powerful
consequences. For example, if any level of debt is sustainable on the domestic
market, then if secondary debt markets are efficient, any level of foreign debt is
also sustainable in repayment equilibrium. Foreign debt can always be repaid
even without exogenous default penalties, and a sufficient solution to the default
problem is to improve the efficiency of secondary debt markets.
Proposition 5 shows that the assumption of lump-sum taxes is the key to deriv-
ing the Broner et al. (2010) result. Without this assumption, there is finite limit
to the amount of domestic debt that can be sustained in repayment equilibrium.
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Proposition 6. If taxation is costly then the government’s optimal policy on the
domestic market is characterized by the domestic default threshold (3.16). When-
ever the debt is below this threshold, it is riskless and is always repaid. Whenever
it is above the threshold, it will always be defaulted on and therefore can never be
issued. If either output or tax distortions are stochastic, the default threshold is
also stochastic, debt can be risky and default can arise in equilibrium.
Proof. The first part follows directly from comparing (3.11) and (3.13). The proof
of the second part is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.
Inequalities (3.15) and (3.16) completely characterize government policy in the
second period. Notice that whenever both inequalities are reversed, it is also the
case that ctd > cr, which is consistent with the definition of total default being
simultaneous default on both domestic and foreign debts outstanding.
C. Default policies in the second period
Having established default thresholds in the second period, we posit an equilibrium
in which, depending on the realizations of stochastic shocks, all four outcomes (re-
payment, foreign default, domestic default and total default) arise in the second
period. The purpose of this part is to find a set of parameters that can sustain this
equilibrium and, in the next subsection, to check that this set of parameters deliv-
ers debt issuances that are consistent with the posited equilibrium. By doing this
we want to understand the mechanics and interactions between debt issuances and
selective default, and prove that the set of parameters that is able to deliver the
four outcomes is non-empty. Both of the stochastic processes in this economy have
two outcomes. Therefore, we impose equilibrium conditions that would map the
four possible realizations of joint (y, τ) stochastic processes into four equilibrium
outcomes. These conditions are:
1. After a bad output shock y2 = yL, the government defaults on foreign debt
regardless of the realization of the tax distortion shock.
2. After a good output shock y2 = yH , the government repays foreign debt
regardless of the realization of the tax distortion shock.
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3. After a bad tax distortion shock τ2 = τH , the government defaults on domes-
tic debt regardless of the realization of the output shock.
4. After a good tax distortion shock τ2 = τL, the government repays domestic
debt regardless of the realization of the output shock.
Mathematically these conditions can be summarized by four inequalities that
follow from substituting realizations of y and τ into (3.15) and (3.16):
yLδf
1 + τL
< bf ≤ yHδf1 + τH , (3.17)
yHδh
τH
< bh ≤ yLδh
τL
, (3.18)
where the inequalities in (3.17) correspond to conditions 1) and 2) respectively,
and the inequalities in (3.18) correspond to conditions 3) and 4) respectively. How
these conditions translate into a mapping between (y, τ) outcomes and repayment-
default decisions can be easily understood by looking at Figure 3.2. The red
(dotted) line represents the domestic default threshold, while the blue (solid) line
represents the foreign default threshold. In the second period, four situations
may occur. Circles show allocations for which debt is repaid, while crosses show
defaults. Colors represent respective debt types (red for home, blue for foreign).
A negative shock to output is shown as an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Figure 3.2 shows four possible outcomes denoted by letters A to D. Tax dis-
tortions τ are on the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis represents domestic
and foreign debt-to-GDP ratios in the second period bh
y2
and bf
y2
. A negative output
shock is shown as a move up, and a negative taxation shock is shown as a move
to the right. A) After a good output shock and a good tax distortion shock, both
debts fall below the default thresholds and therefore both are repaid. B) After
a bad output shock and a good tax distortion shock, foreign debt (blue cross) is
above its threshold and is therefore defaulted on. However, domestic debt (red
circle) is still repaid, as it falls below its threshold. C) After a good output shock
but bad a tax distortion shock, the situation is the reverse of B. D) After a bad
output shock and a bad tax distortion shock, both debts are above default their
thresholds and are therefore defaulted on.
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Figure 3.2: Default thresholds and selective defaults
3.3.2 Debt policies in the first period
In this section we solve for first-period debt issuance decisions that are consis-
tent with the second-period default decisions described by (3.17) and (3.18) (or
equivalently by Figure 3.2). In the remainder of this paper we assume a constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) instantaneous utility function for domestic agents:
u(c) = c
1−σ
1− σ .
The aim of this section is to first find a set of parameters for which foreign
default is driven by the output shock and domestic default is driven by the tax
distortion shock. The solution algorithm is provided in Solution algorithm. We
show that this set is non-empty (see Two-period model). Second, we examine the
comparative statics of an equilibrium solution.
The government chooses debt issuances bh and bf to maximize the lifetime
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utility of domestic agents:
max
{bh,bf}
u(c1) + βE [u(c2)] , (3.19)
where
c1 = y1 + τ1qhbh − (1 + τ1)(g − qfbf ),
c2 =

(3.11) with prob. ΠyΠτ
(3.12) with prob. (1− Πy)Πτ
(3.13) with prob. Πy(1− Πτ )
(3.14) with prob. (1− Πy)(1− Πτ ),
subject to price schedules derived from foreign investors’ zero-profit condition
and domestic households’ first-order condition:
qf =
Πy
1 + r , (3.20)
qh = β
ΠyΠτu′(cr) + (1− Πy)Πτu′(cfd)
u′(c1)
. (3.21)
Debt issuances must obey first-order conditions given by:
(bh :)(τL − τ1)qh = τ1bh∂qh
∂bh
, (3.22)
(bf :)u′(c)
(
(1 + τ1) qf + τ1bh
∂qh
∂bh
)
=
β (1 + τL)
(
ΠyΠτu′ (cr) + Πy (1− Πτ )u′
(
chd
))
. (3.23)
Comparative statics reveal that this two-period environment can account for
two empirically observed facts. First, that the share of foreign investors is neg-
atively correlated with interest rates; and second, that the share of domestic in-
vestors is positively correlated with the total public debt of the economy (see for
example Andritzky (2012)). We document these findings graphically in Two-period
model (graphical solutions).
Now that the trade-offs behind our model have been described in detail, we
can turn to quantitative analysis of an infinite-horizon version of the model.
120 3.4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
3.4 Quantitative analysis
We build an incomplete-markets model in which the government has limited
commitment. Let time be indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . The economy has an exogenous
stochastic stream of income yt ∈ Y, which is a Markov process. At each time t the
government has to cover a fixed exogenous stream of government expenditure gt.
In each period t the government decides either to repay or default on out-
standing foreign and domestic debt. When the government chooses to default,
the economy suffers from output penalties and is excluded from borrowing on the
market where default happened for a random number of periods. We allow the
expected exclusion durations and output costs to differ between types of default.
3.4.1 Households
Households are identical and risk averse. Their utility is given by:
∞∑
t=0
βtE0 [u(ct)] ,
where β is the discount factor, c is consumption and u(c) is increasing and strictly
concave. Households are allowed to save using domestically issued government
bonds bh. They take bond discount prices and taxes as given. They face an intra-
temporal budget constraint, which differs depending on the government’s decision
to default on either of the two bonds.
If the government repays both domestic and foreign debt, households’ budget
constraint is the following:
cr = y − T (1 + τ) + bh − qhb′h, (3.24)
where bh is the amount of domestic debt owed and repaid by the government
to households, b′h is the new issuance of government domestic debt (household
savings), qh is the domestic bond’s discount price, T is the amount of lump-sum
taxes and τ is the distortion imposed by taxation.4
4Whenever taxes are negative, the household budget constraint yields cr = y−T (1−τ)+bh−
qhb
′
h, so that rebates are distortionary and distortion does not increase the amount of resources
when taxes are negative. The same is true for the selective and total default cases.
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If the government defaults on foreign debt, households are still allowed to save
in the domestic market. However, foreign default induces output costs and affects
the endogenous price of domestic bonds:
cfd = y(1− δf )− T (1 + τ) + bh − qfdh b′h. (3.25)
In the case of domestic default, the government maintains foreign borrowing,
but the domestic debt market is closed:
chd = y(1− δh)− T (1 + τ). (3.26)
Similarly, in the case of simultaneous domestic and foreign default, which we
will refer to as total default:
ctd = y(1− δf )(1− δh)− T (1 + τ). (3.27)
3.4.2 Foreign investors
Foreigners are risk neutral investors with deep pockets and access to interna-
tional credit markets, where they can save and borrow at a constant interest rate
r. When lending resources to the government they account for the possibility of
default and break even in expected terms, therefore their policy can be summarized
as:
qf =
(1−∆f )
1 + r ,
where qf is the discount price of government bonds issued with foreign investors
and ∆f is the probability of foreign default.
3.4.3 Recursive equilibrium
We define a recursive equilibrium in which domestic households, foreign in-
vestors and the government act sequentially and the government acts with discre-
tion. The aggregate state of the economy S = (bh, bf , s) is given by two endogenous
debts bh, bf and two exogenous processes for income and tax distortions s = (y, τ).
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Figure 3.3: Government decision tree
V 0(bh, bf , s)
V r(bh, bf , s)
V 0
V td(s)
θhθf
V 0
(1− θh)θf
V hd
θh(1− θf )
V fd
(1− θh)(1− θf )
V td
V fd(bh, s)
θf
V 0
1− θf
V fd V td
V hd(bf , s)
θh
V 0
1− θh
V hd V td
When both markets are open (V 0), the government can decide to repay both debts
(V r), default on both debts (V td), repay only domestic debt (V fd) or repay only
foreign debt (V hd). Subsequent possible choices are depicted on the lower levels of
the decision tree.
Every period, the government decides whether to repay its two outstanding debts,
default on domestic debt, default on foreign debt or default on both:
V 0(bh, bf , s) = max{V r(bh, bf , s), V fd(bh, s), V hd(bf , s), V td(s)} (3.28)
The government’s repayment decision is summarized by two default indicators
df ∈ {0, 1} and dh ∈ {0, 1}, where di={h,f} = 0 stand for repayment, df = 1 stands
for foreign default and dh = 1 for domestic default. After a default, the government
is excluded from borrowing on the market and faces probability θh, θf of returning
to borrowing on domestic and foreign markets respectively. The government’s
choices are presented graphically in Figure 3.3, where tree branches correspond
from left to right to: repayment of both debts, default on both debts, default
on foreign debt only and default on domestic debt only. After repayment, the
government goes back to node V 0. After any type of default, the government
first draws probabilities θh, θf that one or the other market will open. Subsequent
possible choices are depicted on the lower levels of the tree. (Total default has
been put on the second branch due to graphical reasons.)
If the government decides to repay it solves the following problem:
V r(bh, bf , s) = max
b′
h
,b′
f
{
u(cr) + βE
{
V 0(b′h, b′f , s′
}}
(3.29)
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subject to households’ budget constraint (3.22), the foreign bond price schedule
qf (b′f , s) =
E
{
1− d′f (b′h, b′f , s′)
}
1 + r (3.30)
and households’ first-order condition:
qh(bh, bf , b′h, b′f , s) = β
E
{(
1− d′h
(
b′h, b
′
f , s
′
))
u′
(
c′
(
b′h, b
′
f , s
′
))}
u′ (c (bh, bf , s))
, (3.31)
where, unlike for foreign bonds, the price of domestic bonds depends not only
on the probability of default, but also on households’ welfare both today and
tomorrow, and the government budget constraint
T + qhb′h + qfb′f = g + bh + bf . (3.32)
If the government defaults on foreign debt (and keeps servicing its domestic
obligations) the economy suffers an output cost, and is allowed to return to inter-
national borrowing in the future with probability θf . With probability 1− θf the
country remains only on the domestic bond market and the government can still
decide to also default on domestic bonds (yielding total default). The government’s
problem is summarized by:
V fd(bh, s) = max
b′
h
u(cfd)+βE
(
θfV 0(0, b′h, s′)+(1−θf )max
{
V fd(b′h, s′), V td(s′)
})
(3.33)
subject to households’ budget constraint (3.23), households’ first-order condition
qfdh (bh, b′h, s) = β
E
{(
1− dfd′ (b′h, s′)
)
u′
(
cfd
′ (b′h, s′)
)}
u′ (cfd (bh, s))
(3.34)
(where the number of states is reduced relative to the repayment case, as foreign
debt does not affect welfare because it is defaulted on) and the government budget
constraint
T + qfdh b′h = g + bh. (3.35)
Third, if the government decides to default on domestic debt outstanding, it
remains active on international markets, comes back to domestic borrowing with
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probability θh, can still default on foreign debt and suffers a domestic output
penalty:
V hd(bf , s) = max
b′
f
u(chd)+βE
(
θhV 0(b′f , 0, s′)+(1−θh)max
{
V hd(b′f , s′), V td(s′)
})
(3.36)
subject to households’ budget constraint (3.24), the foreign bond price schedule
qhdf (b′f , s) =
E
{
1− dhd′(b′f , s′)
}
1 + r (3.37)
and the government budget constraint
T + qhdf b′f = g + bf . (3.38)
Lastly, at any given time the government can decide to pursue total default.
The economy suffers output penalties for both domestic and foreign default, and
the government comes back to international and domestic borrowing with proba-
bilities θf and θh respectively. The government’s problem is summarized by:
V td(s) = u(ctd) + βE
[
θfθhV 0(0, 0, s) + θf (1− θh)V hd(0, s′)+
(1− θf )θhV fd(0, s′) + (1− θf )(1− θh)V fd(s′)
]
(3.39)
subject to households’ budget constraint (3.25) and the government budget con-
straint
T = g. (3.40)
Now that actions and optimization problems are defined for each actor in the
economy, we can define the equilibrium:
Definition 1. Recursive equilibrium in this economy is (i) the set of prices in re-
payment periods for domestic bonds qh(bh, bf , s) and foreign bonds qf (bh, bf , s) and
the set of prices in partial default periods qfdh (bh, s) and qhdf (bf , s); (ii) government
debt policies in repayment periods b′h(bh, bf , s) and b′f (bh, bf , s) and in partial default
periods bfdh
′(bh, s) and bhdf
′(bf , s); and (iii) government default schedules in repay-
ment periods dh(bh, bf , s) and df (bh, bf , s) and in partial default periods dfdh (bh, s)
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and dhdf (bf , s) such that:
1) Taking as given domestic bond price schedules dh and dfdh and government do-
mestic debt issuances b′h and b
fd
h
′, households’ consumption cr and cfd satisfy house-
holds’ budget constraints and first-order conditions.
2) Taking as given government foreign default schedules df and dhdf , prices qf and
qhdf are consistent with foreign investors’ expected zero profits.
3) Taking as given prices qh, qf , qfdh and qhdf , the government’s default schedules
dh, df , d
fd
h and dhdf and debt policies b′h, b′f , b
fd
h and bhdf solve the government’s opti-
mization problem.
4) Government bond and tax policies and default schedules satisfy the government
budget constraint.
3.4.4 Calibration
To solve the model numerically, we need to assume specific functional forms
and assign parameters. Table 3.1 represents the parameters, which are selected
directly from data. We assume the CRRA utility function with a risk aversion
coefficient σ equal to two. The risk-free interest rate r is set to 1.7%, which is
the average yearly interest rate of a five-year US Treasury bond during this time
period. These parameters are common values used in the real business cycle and
default literature. We calibrate the AR(1) stochastic process for output, based on
the series of Argentinian GDP:
log(yt) = ρylog(yt−1) + ut, (3.41)
where ut ∼ N (0, y).
The government faces two types of costs upon default. The output cost is
assumed to be asymmetric as in Arellano (2008):
ydeft = min{yt, γy}, (3.42)
where y is the mean of the output process and γ takes one of three values for
domestic, foreign and total default respectively. The cost function implies that
default is more costly with a high output realization. The level of government
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Table 3.1: Parameters selected directly
Parameter Value Source
Risk-free interest rate r = 1.7% 5-year US bond yearly yield
Risk aversion σ = 2 Standard in literature
Persistence of output ρy = 0.945 Argentina 1993–2001
Std. dev. of output y = 0.025 Argentina 1993–2001
Government expenditure g/y = 0.25 Argentina 1993–2001
Re-entry to foreign market θf = 0.22 4.6 yrs. exclusion (R&R 2011b)
Re-entry to domestic market θh = 0.5 2 yrs. exclusion (R&R 2011b)
Low tax distortion τl = 0.01 Assumed
expenditure is set to be the average Argentinian government expenditure of 25%
of GDP for the period 1993–2011. This number is not substantially different from
the cross-country average of 31% for developing countries. Based on Reinhart and
Rogoff (2011b) dataset we calculate the median length of domestic default to be
2.5 years and that of foreign default to be 4.6 years.5 This estimate is slightly low
in comparison with the usual average exclusion period of 7.5 years for Argentina
usually applied in default literature.6 Our process of tax distortions is of a reduced
form and cannot be directly taken to data, therefore we make two additional
assumptions. First, we assume symmetry in the process (switching states from
high to low and from low to high happens with the same probability). Second,
we assume taxes in the good state to be almost non-distortionary. However, τL
cannot be zero (as discussed in Proposition 5) as it would make domestic debt
riskless and thereby prevent the algorithm from converging.
After choosing eight parameters directly, we are left with six parameters to be
calibrated. Table 3.2 summarizes the parameters and moments that we match.
We use Reinhart and Rogoff’s dataset to calculate frequencies of different types
5Calculated as the median of averages of defaulting countries
6Gelos et al. (2011) measure exclusion as the years between default and the date of the next
issuance of public and publicly guaranteed bonds or syndicated loans.
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Table 3.2: Parameters selected by matching moments
Parameter Value Target
Discount factor β = 0.95 Debt service to GDP 5.53%
Foreign default output cost γf = 0.97 F-default frequency 3.5%
Domestic default output cost γh = 0.91 Output drop after D-default
High tax distortion τh = 0.1 D-debt to GDP 24.8%
High distortion persistence pihh = 0.7 D-default freq. 2.5%
Low distortion persistence pill = 0.7 Symmetric pihh = pill
of default, periods of market exclusion and drops in output after different types
of default. As in previous literature, we calibrate the discount factor to target a
debt service expenditures-to-GDP ratio of 5.53%. The foreign output cost γf is
calibrated to match the frequency of foreign defaults in Argentina in the last 210
years. Then, we set γh such that the output drop after domestic default is on
average three times higher than after foreign default (as documented by Reinhart
and Rogoff). The persistence of distortion states are assumed to be symmetric and
are set to match the frequency of domestic defaults in Argentina in the last 210
years.
Unfortunately, Reinhart and Rogoff’s dataset does not report debt composition.
Therefore, to calculate debt-to-GDP ratios, we employ the dataset of Panizza
(2008), who constructs his data based on the legal definition, which is consistent
with Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b). We try to match the domestic debt-to-GDP
ratio in Argentina of 24.8%, although the model is not quite able to match this
particular moment closely.
3.4.5 Simulation results
In this section we analyze default policies, debt policies and equilibrium prices
in the calibrated model. Next we examine the quantitative performance of the
model against the data. We describe the algorithm for solving the model numer-
ically in Solution algorithm. Both default and debt policies are four-dimensional
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Figure 3.4: Foreign debt policies given bh = 1.8
objects, as the state space for the economy consists of two endogenous (domestic
and foreign debt) and two exogenous (output and tax distortions) states. For each
variable of interest, we compare policies for different levels of the same type of
debt, keeping the value of the second type of debt constant.
The most interesting findings of the model are revealed by Figures 3.4 and
3.5. Figure 3.4 plots debt policies for foreign debt given that outstanding domestic
debt is positive bh = 1.8. Foreign debt policies are similar to those found in other
quantitative models of sovereign default. The country accumulates foreign debt
when output is high due to low interest rates. Interest rates are low as a result
of the default set being decreasing in y. Also, the government accumulates more
debt when the economy suffers from high tax distortions. This is explained by the
fact that the government avoids using distortionary taxation and instead finances
its expenditures via both foreign and domestic (as we shall see) debt.
Figure 3.5 plots policies for domestic debt. When tax distortions are low (left
panel), the government finances its expenditures in full via taxation for any level of
debt outstanding. This is the situation in which raising taxes comes at the lowest
cost for the economy. In fact, the government is building up assets on the domestic
debt market (optimal domestic debt is the negative corner solution) in order to
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Figure 3.5: Domestic debt policies given bf = 1.8
be able to accommodate more debt movements in the future, when distortions
may be high. When tax distortions are high (right panel) and output is low, the
government is in a state of default and no trade is taking place on domestic debt
markets. When output is middle or high, the government employs a “gambling for
redemption” policy. It finds it optimal to always increase the stock of domestic
debt up to the point where it reaches endogenous debt constraints. Thus, the
government is piling up domestic debt in the hope that it will be able to repay all
of it with taxes, should the low-distortion day arrive. Whenever this day happens,
the government repays its debt in full. If this day does not come, the government
is forced to default on its domestic debt obligations.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 plot repayment and default policies in debt–output space.
White stands for repayment, light gray for foreign default, dark gray for domestic
default and black for total default. We can see that the repayment–default trade-
off for foreign debt is mostly driven by the output process, while tax distortions do
not matter. On the other hand, the default area for domestic debt is much bigger
for the high tax distortion than for the low tax distortion scenario. Also, as in
both cases we set the second type of debt to zero, we cannot observe total default.
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Figure 3.6: Default sets for foreign debt given bh = 0
Figure 3.7: Default sets for domestic debt given bf = 0
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Table 3.3: Cyclical properties
Data (Argentina) Model Arellano (2008)
Foreign default frequency 3.5% 3.5% 3%
Domestic default frequency 2.5% 5.6% x
Total default frequency 1.5% 0.3% x
Average foreign spread 12.67pp 8.9pp 3.58pp
Average domestic spread x 15.5pp x
Foreign debt-to-GDP 17.22% 3.7% 5.95%
Domestic debt-to-GDP 24.78% 13.7% x
Consumption std./ Output std. 1.098 1.088 1.098
To assess the performance of the model, we simulate 1,000 paths from the
model, each with length 10,000, and burn the first 1,000 simulations of each path.
Then we compare the resulting business cycle statistics with the corresponding
statistics from the data. Table 3.3 shows that the results for the benchmark cali-
bration are in line with the data. Our model performs well in many dimensions.
The model replicates reasonably high debts levels and at the same time reason-
ably low default probabilities. It predicts that consumption is more volatile than
output, and that net exports are strongly countercyclical.7
It is worth stressing once again that the two shocks have opposite effects on the
economy. While the tax distortion shock has a substantial impact on domestic debt
accumulation, it has a mild impact on foreign debt accumulation. The opposite is
true for the output shock.
7See Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
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3.5 Secondary markets and haircuts
With the introduction of unconventional monetary policies during the Great
Recession, secondary sovereign debt markets have attracted increasing interest
among economists. In this section we return to the two-period model setting from
Section 3.3 to study how secondary markets affect the government’s incentives
to repay or to default. We will introduce secondary markets in the second pe-
riod. Secondary markets open after nature selects the output and taxation shocks.
Therefore all participants in the market have perfect foresight of what the gov-
ernment will do (repay or default) if no trade in assets takes place on secondary
markets.
3.5.1 Setup
The starting points for the discussion are Propositions 4, 5 and 6, where we have
established that with costly tax enforcement there exist finite default thresholds
for both foreign and domestic debt, and that both debts can be risky due to
the stochastic nature of output and taxation distortions. There are four possible
outcomes of the model in the moment at which secondary markets open, which
are summarized in Figure 3.2. When either both debts are repaid (situation A)
or defaulted on (situation D), the workings of the secondary markets would not
change the final outcome. Therefore our discussion will focus on selective foreign
default (situation B).8 Under situation B in the second period output is low y2 = yL
and tax distortions are low τ2 = τL.
First we will summarize our assumptions about what is happening in the econ-
omy at the moment the secondary markets open, and we introduce some notation.
As long as default costs are positive, there are positive amounts of both foreign
and domestic debts outstanding: bf and bh. Each debt has its respective default
threshold which we derive from (3.15) and (3.16) and denote in levels: B¯f and B¯h.
After a good shock to taxation and a bad shock to output, foreign debt is above
its default threshold bf > B¯f but domestic debt lies below its default threshold
8Selective domestic default, situation C, is its mirror image.
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bh < B¯h. As foreigners know they will be defaulted upon, they are willing to sell
their claims in the secondary market. As domestic investors know there is still
some room for an increase in repayable domestic debt, they are willing to buy
them. Bonds in the secondary market sell at discount price qSM .
For the sake of consistency with the model we keep track of domestic debt
outstanding. However, our analysis is also valid for the case when bh = 0, as
in Broner et al. (2010). Therefore we can see this section as a generalization
of their work in which we allow for costly enforcement.9 As we shall see, what
matters for creating repayment incentives through secondary markets is not the
level of home or foreign debt outstanding, but the relative difference between
above-the-threshold foreign holdings bf − B¯f and below-the-threshold domestic
accommodation space B¯h − bh. We will call the former expression “defaultable
foreign debt overhang” and the latter “domestic debt accommodation space”.
We formulate this situation as a noncooperative game. There are three types of
agents: domestic investors, foreign investors and the government. The outcome of
the game is determined by two crucial conditions: whether every type of investors
can coordinate, and whether total debt inherited from the first period within the
sum of default thresholds bf + bh S B¯h + B¯f .
First, both populations of investors take simultaneous decisions on the amounts
supplied and demanded in the secondary market given the secondary-market dis-
count price and beliefs about the government’s subsequent action (default or re-
pay). After trades have taken place, the secondary market closes and the govern-
ment decides to either repay or default on foreign and domestic investors.
Foreign investors’ strategy space is the quantity of bonds supplied in the sec-
ondary market:
sf = {bSMf (qSM , dSMf )}, xf ∈ [0, bf ].
Domestic investors’ strategy space is quantity demanded in the secondary market:
sh = {bSMh (qSM , dSMh )}.
9In Broner et al. (2010), a government with discretion wants to default on foreign debt be-
cause it faces no penalties upon default δf = 0. In our analysis, foreign default is due to the
government’s discretionary behavior with δf > 0 and an unfortunate output shock.
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The government’s strategy space consists of two decisions (repay or default) on
the two markets:
sg = {dSMf × dSMh }, dSMf ∈ {0, 1}, dSMh ∈ {0, 1}.
Given strategies of the three players we can define payoffs for each player.
Because of risk neutrality of the foreign investor her payoff is defined as her con-
sumption in the second period and is the function of her decision (quantity supplied
on the secondary market bSMf ), domestic investor’s decision (quantity demanded
on the secondary market bSMh ) and the government’s decision (to default or repay
foreign debt dSMf ):
U f =

(bf − bSMf ) + qSMbSMf if dSMf = 0 and bSMf = bSMh
qSMbSMf if dSMf = 1 and bSMf = bSMh
bf if dSMf = 0 and bSMf 6= bSMh
0 if dSMf = 1 and bSMf 6= bSMh
(3.43)
where bf is the amount of government bonds that foreign investors hold from the
first period and qSM is the discount price of bonds on the secondary market in
the second period. The first two cases of equation 3.41 refer to a situation when
demands meets supply and there is trade in bonds on the secondary market. The
last two cases refer to a situation when there is no trade on the secondary market.
On the other hand first and third case of equation 3.41 describe payoffs to a foreign
investor when the government repays foreign debt, whereas second and fourth case
describe payoffs to a foreign investor when the governments defaults on foreign
debt.
Similarly, we define the payoff for the domestic investor. Her payoff differs from
foreign investor’s payoff mainly due to risk aversion. The payoff of the domestic
investor is the utility from consumption (u(c) as defined in equation 3.19) in the
second period after secondary market closes. The domestic investor decides on the
quantity demanded in the secondary market bSMh taking the supply of bonds from
foreign investors bSMf and the government decision to default or repay domestic
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debt dSMh as given:
Uh =

u
(
y2 + bh + bSMh
(
1− qSM
)
− T2 (1 + τ2)
)
if dSMh = 0 and bSMf = bSMh
u
(
y2 − qSMbSMh − T2 (1 + τ2)
)
if dSMh = 1 and bSMf = bSMh
u (y2 + bh − T2 (1 + τ2)) if dSMh = 0 and bSMf 6= bSMh
u (y2 − T2 (1 + τ2)) if dSMh = 1 and bSMf 6= bSMh
(3.44)
Finally, the government moves after the secondary market closes. The govern-
ment decides whether to default of repay both debts dSMh , dSMf taking bSMh and bSMf
as given and its payoff is defined by (3.42). The government decision boils down
to two default thresholds policies as shown in derivations (3.11)-(3.16). These
policies, given the trade on the secondary market in the second period, translate
to:
dSMh (bSMh , bSMf ) =

0 if bh + bSMh ≤ B¯h
1 if bh + bSMh > B¯h
(3.45)
dSMf (bSMh , bSMf ) =

0 if bf − bSMf ≤ B¯f
1 if bf − bSMf > B¯f
(3.46)
A Nash equilibrium of this game is the triplet of strategies {sf∗, sh∗, sg∗} for
which quantity demanded bSMh equals quantity supplied bSMf given market clearing
price qSM∗ and beliefs of investors are consistent with the government decisions
dSM∗h , d
SM∗
f :
bSM∗ = bSMf (qSM∗, dSM∗f ) = bSMh (qSM∗, dSM∗h ) (3.47)
dSM∗h = dSMh (bSM∗h , bSM∗f ) (3.48)
dSM∗f = dSMf (bSM∗h , bSM∗f ) (3.49)
We split our analysis into two parts. In the first, we analyze the situation
when foreign debt overhang is greater than domestic debt accommodation space
(bf − B¯f ) > (B¯h− bh). That is, in order to be repaid, foreign investors have to sell
more bonds than domestic investors can accommodate and still be repaid. It is
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thus impossible that both groups be repaid after the secondary market closes. In
the second part, we analyze the reverse situation, when foreign debt overhang is
smaller than domestic debt accommodation space (bf − B¯f ) < (B¯h − bh). In this
situation domestic investors can safely buy what foreign investors need to supply
in order to be repaid. In theory, secondary markets could allow both groups of
investors to be repaid.
We will look for Nash equilibria in pure strategies with continuous strategy
sets. The precise outcomes of the model will depend on the assumptions we make
about the possibility of investor coordination and of voluntary debt haircuts. In
terms of investor coordination, we consider two different cases. First, we consider
the case in which the set of investors is a continuum (infinite number of investors,
each investor has size zero). Second, we modify this assumption and introduce a
finite number of investors (each investor has size ). This theoretical notion has
a very intuitive interpretation in our game. By assumption, a zero-size investor
does not internalize the effects of her individual decision on aggregate action of the
set of investors of her class (domestic or foreign), whereas an -size investors does.
If there are externalities in this game (and we shall see that indeed externalities
arise) then an -size investor internalizes them. Therefore it is equivalent to say
that zero-size investors cannot coordinate their actions while -size investors can
coordinate. For each of the two parts (foreign debt overhang dominates, domestic
accommodation space dominates) we will analyze four cases, when each set of
investors either can or cannot coordinate.
The second important assumption is either forbidding or allowing free disposal.
When free disposal is forbidden, the amount of bonds issued must be equal to the
amount of bonds claimed. When free disposal is allowed, each investor can volun-
tarily burn some of her bonds, so the amount of bonds claimed can be lower than
the amount of bonds issued. Free disposal also has a very intuitive interpretation
in our example. When free disposal is allowed and exercised, we can think of this
as a voluntary debt haircut.
Table 3.4 gives a brief summary of the results of secondary markets and hair-
cuts, when foreign debt overhang dominates. We are initially, before the secondary
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Table 3.4: Secondary markets and haircuts
Foreign debt overhang is greater
Investors Foreign
Coordinate Don’t coordinate
Domestic
Coordinate
FD (δf ); bSM ∈ (B¯h − bh, bf − B¯f ) FD (δf );bSM = B¯h − bh
SM reduce welfare SM reduce welfare
Haircut restores repayment No Haircut equilibrium
Don’t DD (δh); bSM = bf − B¯f TD (δf + δh);
coordinate
SM likely increase welfare SM reduce welfare
Haircut restores repayment No Haircut equilibrium
market opens, in situation B: the economy would suffer the foreign default cost
δf and the amount of domestic debt bh needs to be either rolled over or repaid
by distortionary taxation. If trade on the secondary market does not alter the
outcome in terms of default of the primary market (the first row of Table 3.4), any
trade on secondary market is undesirable from the welfare point of view, because
it either increases the risk of default or induces dead-weight losses of distortionary
taxation. If trade on the secondary market alters the outcome in terms of default
of the primary market(the second row of Table 3.4), the welfare analysis is am-
biguous in some cases. However, we can provide intuition for some cases. First,
if both domestic and foreign investors are infinitesimal, the economy suffers the
output loss (1−δf )(1−δh)y upon total default instead of the output loss (1−δf )y
upon foreign default, but both debts are set to zero. However, if it was desirable
to have total default from the welfare point of view, total default would happen
on primary market. Second, if foreign investors are -size and domestic investors
are infinitesimal, the economy suffers the output loss (1− δh)y upon domestic de-
fault instead of the output loss (1 − δf )y upon foreign default and a substantial
reduction of foreign debt.
Table 3.5 gives a brief summary of the results of secondary markets and hair-
cuts, when domestic accommodation space dominates. We are initially, before the
secondary market opens, in situation B: the economy would suffer the foreign de-
fault cost δf and the amount of domestic debt bh needs to be either rolled over or
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Table 3.5: Secondary markets and haircuts
Domestic accommodation space is greater
Investors Foreign
Coordinate Don’t coordinate
Domestic
Coordinate
SM restore repayment on both markets
SM restore repayment on both markets
Don’t
Haircut restores repayment No Haircut equilibrium
coordinate
repaid by distortionary taxation. Trade on the secondary market restores repay-
ment of both debt. if both domestic and foreign investors are infinitesimal, the
economy suffers the output loss (1−deltaf )(1−deltah)y upon total default instead
of the output loss (1 − deltaf )y upon foreign default, but both debts are set to
zero. However, if it was desirable to have total default from the welfare point of
view, total default would happen on primary market. Second, if foreign investors
are -size and domestic investors are infinitesimal, the economy suffers the output
loss (1 − deltah)y upon domestic default instead of the output loss (1 − deltaf )y
upon foreign default and a substantial reduction of foreign debt.
3.5.2 Equilibria when foreign debt overhang dominates
Proposition 7. If both domestic and foreign investors are infinitesimal (cannot
coordinate) and the defaultable foreign debt overhang is greater than the domestic
debt accommodation space:
a. Nash equilibrium is indeterminate and degenerate.
b. bSM ∈ (B¯h − bh, bf − B¯f ), qSM = 0.
c. Both debts are defaulted on: dSMh = 1, dSMf = 1.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.4.
The only Nash equilibrium under this specification of the game is indeterminate
and occurs at a discount price equal to zero. This specification of the game suffers
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from a well known equilibrium existence problem due to discontinuous payoffs (see
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a) and Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b)). Because of
discontinuous payoffs, the best response functions of both investors do not cross
at any positive price, which is demonstrated in the proof of the proposition.
Proposition 4 shows then that under certain circumstances secondary mar-
kets do not help create incentives for repayment of government debt, when those
incentives are absent on the primary market. Moreover, as the equilibrium is in-
determinate and degenerate, the outcome of secondary market trade is uncertain.
This result may shed some light on why, in turbulent times, secondary markets
may cease to function. Russia in 1998 effectively defaulted on its obligations to-
wards households but repaid its obligations to firms. Why there was no significant
re-trade of bonds between households and firms on the secondary market remains
an open question, but this proposition may provide some intuition.
We investigate this result further in altering the assumptions that neither do-
mestic nor foreign investors can coordinate their actions. We formalize this idea by
relaxing the assumption of each investor being zero-measure. Instead we assume
that the measure of each investor is  > 0, so that the economy is populated by 1

investors.
Proposition 8. If domestic investors are -size (are able to coordinate) and the
defaultable foreign debt overhang is greater than the domestic debt accommodation
space:
a. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is indeterminate but yields a unique alloca-
tion.
b. bSM = B¯h − bh, qSM = 0.
c. Domestic debt is repaid dSMh = 0 and foreign debt is defaulted on dSMf = 1.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.4.
The result in Proposition 5 is graphically depicted in Figure 3.8. The red cir-
cle and the blue cross show the situation before trade on the secondary market.
With trade, domestic investors increase their holdings up to their default thresh-
old and are repaid (black circle). Foreign investors decrease their holdings, but are
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Figure 3.8: Trade in secondary markets improves welfare (Proposition 5)
nevertheless defaulted on (black cross) as their bond holdings are still above the
default threshold. Note that the equilibrium in Proposition 5 holds when foreign
investors both can and cannot coordinate. The ability to coordinate among do-
mestic investors is not only a sufficient condition to sustain repayment incentives
on the domestic market, but also allow domestic investors to capture the whole
surplus generated by trade on the secondary market (qSM = 0). Hence, trade on
the secondary market does not affect welfare of foreign investors.
Lastly, let us study the reverse situation. Now foreign investors can coordinate
and domestic investors are all zero-measure.
Proposition 9. If foreign investors are -size (are able to coordinate), domes-
tic investors are infinitesimal (cannot coordinate) and the defaultable foreign debt
overhang is greater than the domestic debt accommodation space:
a. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is unique and degenerate.
b. bSM = bf − B¯f , qSM = 0.
c. Domestic debt is defaulted on dSMh = 1 and foreign debt is repaid dSMf = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.4.
Proposition 9 shows an interesting result. Under the mix of unfavorable circum-
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Figure 3.9: Trade in secondary markets destroys welfare (Proposition 6)
stances for domestic investors (a low accommodation space relative to the foreign
debt overhang, and a lack of domestic coordination while foreign investors can
coordinate), introducing a secondary market reverses the selective default result
that would otherwise occur on the primary market.
This situation is shown in Figure 3.9. Again, the blue cross and the red circle
stand for the situation before secondary markets open (foreign default and domes-
tic repayment). Now foreign investors are able to re-trade their defaultable debt
overhang to home investors, and are repaid by the government (black circle). Do-
mestic investors exceed the domestic debt default threshold and are defaulted on
by the government (black cross). Instead of defaulting on its foreign obligations,
the government defaults on domestic debt holdings, and foreign obligations are
repaid.
Proposition 10. If foreign investors are allowed free disposal and are -size (can
coordinate):
a. The game is reduced to two players: foreign investors and the government.
b. Equilibrium is unique.
c. bf − B¯f is freely disposed of.
d. Both debts are repaid: dh = 0 and df = 0.
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Proof. See Appendix 3.7.4.
Proposition 11. If foreign investors are allowed free disposal and are infinitesimal
(cannot coordinate), the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.4.
Propositions 10 and 11 show that voluntary haircuts would occur only when
foreign investors are able to coordinate. This is because without coordination each
investor has incentives to deviate from the haircut allocation and freely dispose less
than bf − B¯f , not expecting this would change the government’s decision. After
a voluntary haircut, foreign debt is repaid. Domestic debt is unaffected and also
repaid. Interestingly, voluntary haircuts increase welfare and restore repayment
incentives in situations when secondary markets may fail to deliver a well-behaved
equilibrium (Proposition 9).
Results in this section may shed some light on the Greek government debt
crisis, when in 2012 private investors agreed to a voluntary haircut while the trade
of government bonds on secondary markets was negligible.
3.5.3 Equilibria when domestic accommodation space dom-
inates
In this part we analyze the situation in which the foreign debt overhang is
smaller than the domestic debt accommodation space (bf + bh) < (B¯h + B¯f ).
Proposition 12. If domestic investors can accommodate all of the defaultable
foreign debt overhang:
a. Nash equilibrium is indeterminate (but well-behaved).
b. bSM ∈ (bf − B¯f , B¯h − bh), qSM = 1.
c. Both debts are repaid: dSMh = 0 and dSMf = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.4.
The result in Proposition 12 is similar to Broner et al. (2010). In their paper,
before the secondary market opens the government wants to default on foreign
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investors (and domestic debt is zero). In the secondary market, foreigners re-trade
all of their holdings to domestic investors, and the government repays in full to
domestic investors. Here, foreign investors only re-trade the amount above their
default threshold (in Broner et al. (2010) this threshold is zero), but it is enough to
restore repayment on the foreign market. Domestic investors increase their hold-
ings, but are still below the default threshold (in the cited paper this threshold is
infinity) and are therefore also repaid by the government. The necessary condition
for secondary markets to restore repayment on both markets when tax enforce-
ment is costly is that the foreign debt overhang is smaller than the domestic debt
accommodation space (bf − B¯f ) < (B¯h − bh).
This result affects the workings of the primary market, as it turns risky foreign
debt into riskless debt. Therefore the discount price on the primary market is
qf = 11+r .
The aim of this section is to show that the effects of secondary markets for
government bonds are ambiguous in the situation where either domestic or foreign
debt would otherwise be defaulted on. This section by no means exhausts the
topic. What this section proves is that strengthening the role and efficiency of
secondary markets is not a remedy that can automatically solve the sovereign risk
problem. We find that the equilibria are dependent on underlying conditions, such
as investors’ coordination abilities and the relative size of demand and supply of
bonds. Clearly more research, both empirical and theoretical, is warranted on the
workings of secondary markets during sovereign risk crisis.
3.6 Conclusions
We develop a model of sovereign debt issuance on international and domestic
markets, and of selective defaults. By adding domestic investors we introduces
a new level of heterogeneity to a standard model of strategic sovereign default.
Our model is capable of replicating selective default frequencies and business cycle
statistics, and we show that including two types of investors brings the model closer
to the data, as it was suggested by Aguiar and Amador (2014). Our model is a
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useful tool to study how the fractions of investors in public debt arise endogenously
in an equilibrium, and how the composition of debt is correlated with spreads and
the total debt. Our model shows that although foreign debt is more valuable
and can in principle be used to smooth both output and taxation shocks, the
government would still use domestic debt to smooth the domestic taxation shock.
In a world with two uncorrelated shocks (output and taxation), two types of debt
(foreign and domestic) are issued, and selective defaults arise endogenously (as we
observe in the data).
On the positive side, we provide a theory of the role of secondary sovereign debt
markets in restoring repayment incentives. Trade in secondary markets can restore
the government’s repayment incentives when the supply of defaultable bonds from
foreigners is low compared to demand from domestic investors. However, when
the supply of defaultable bonds is high (compared to demand), then secondary
markets cannot sustain repayment on both markets. If domestic investors are able
to coordinate, then trade in secondary markets can be welfare-improving for both
sides. Otherwise, if domestic investors cannot coordinate, then it is uncertain
whether any trade would occur on secondary markets.
On the other hand, if foreign investors are able to coordinate then they will
be willing to accept a voluntary haircut on the eve of foreign default. This would
restore debt repayment on the foreign market. In the absence of coordination,
foreign investors will never accept haircuts and foreign debt will be always defaulted
on. In particular situations when secondary markets fail to improve the allocation,
a voluntary haircut does, and vice versa. Our results shed some light on the Greek
government debt crisis, when in 2012 private investors agreed to a voluntary haircut
while trade in government bonds on secondary markets was negligible.
How investors’ coordination may arise endogenously is an interesting and im-
portant issue for further research. However, as investors’ coordination improves
the allocation and welfare outcomes, we hypothesize that within a group each in-
vestor has incentives to defect on coordination and free-ride on the coordinating
majority. Instances of this behavior have been seen in recent default episodes,
especially prior to the 2014 Argentinian default.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Two-period model
A. Algorithm
We solve for the government’s optimal domestic and foreign debt policies in the
first period following these steps:
1. Assuming that (3.17) and (3.18) are satisfied in the second period, we write
the government’s problem as (3.19).
2. The solution to the problem is then a set of two first-order conditions (3.3.2)
and (3.3.2) and pricing rules (3.20) and (3.21).
3. We pick a set of parameters and solve (3.19) numerically.
4. We confirm that the resulting policy functions bf , bh and equilibrium prices
qf , qh satisfy conditions (3.17)–(3.18), and therefore that expectations in
(3.19) are consistent in equilibrium.
5. We vary one parameter at a time within a range where (3.17)–(3.18) are
satisfied to derive comparative statics.
B. Parametrization
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Parameter Value Range Description
y 1 Output today / High output tomorrow
σ 1 Risk aversion of Home agents
Πy 0.72 [0.5 , 1] Probability of high output
Πτ 0.8 [0.5 , 1] Probability of low tax distortion
g 0.7 [0.5 , 0.8] Gov. expenditure
yL 0.5 [0.1 0.7] Low output
τ1 0.1 [0 , 0.2] Tax distortions today
τH 0.15 [0.1 , 0.2] Tax distortions tomorrow (high)
τL 0.05 [0 , 0.15] Tax distortions tomorrow (low)
δf 0.65 [0.42 , 0.87] Output cost of Foreign default
δh 0.05 [0 , 0.15] Output cost of Home default
r 0.00 Risk-free interest rate
3.7.2 Solution algorithm
1. Guess price schedules p0f and p0h.
2. Calculate consumption in autarky caut and value of permanent autarky V aut.
3. Guess four value functions V 00, V 0fd, V 0hd and V 0td using V aut.
4. Calculate optimal policies bf and bh in repayment given V 00 as continuation
value and prices.
5. Calculate value of repayment V r given optimal policies and continuation
value.
6. Repeat steps 4 and 5 for foreign default and domestic default to obtain V 1fd
and V 1hd.
7. Calculate value of total default V 1td given V 1fd and V 1hd and V 00.
8. Derive optimal default policies d comparing four value functions V r, V 1fd
V 1hd V 1td at each grid point {bf , bh, y, τ}.
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9. Derive new value function V 10 as maximum of four value functions used in
previous step at each grid point.
10. Substitute V 00 = V 10.
11. Repeat steps 3–9 until convergence in value function.
12. Given optimal default policies d calculate prices of foreign and domestic debt
q1f and q1h at each grid point using pricing rules (3.29) and (3.28).
13. Update prices q0f = αfq0f + (1− αf )q1f and q0h = αhq0h + (1− αh)q1h .
14. Repeat steps 1–13 until convergence in prices.
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3.7.3 Two-period model (graphical solutions)
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3.7.4 Secondary market: proposition proofs
Proof of Proposition 7
We study situation B depicted in the Figure 3.2: outcome on the primary
market yields foreign default (FD) and domestic repayment (DR). Before engaging
in the trade on the secondary markets, both types of investors (domestic and
foreign) need to form expectations about the government’s decision to default.
There are three possible outcomes: foreign default and domestic repayment (FD,
DR); foreign repayment and domestic default (FR, DD) and total default (FD,
DD). The repayment of both debts is ruled out by the fact that total debt is
greater than the total default limit bf + bh > B¯h + B¯f .
There are two thresholds related to the volume traded in the secondary markets
bSM . If the traded volume lies below lower threshold bSM ≤ B¯h−bh, domestic debt
is repaid, while foreign debt is defaulted. If the traded volume is between lower
and upper threshold B¯h − bh < bSM < bf − B¯f − bh, both debts are defaulted;
if the traded volume lies above upper threshold bSM ≥ B¯h − bh domestic debt is
defaulted, while foreign debt is repaid.
We draw three best-response correspondences: for foreign investors (the solid
red line), for domestic investors (the dashed blue line) and for the government in a
single graph with the amount of trade bSM on the horizontal axis and the price qSM
of debt on the vertical axis. The brown shaded area represents the area of trade,
in which the expectations are consistent with the government decision: in the first
panel the shaded area represents the amounts traded for which the government
will choose (FD, DR), in the second panel the shaded area represents the amounts
traded for which the government will choose (FD, DD) and in the third panel
shaded area represents the amount traded for which the government will choose
(FR, DD). A crossing of the two best best response correspondences, which lies
within shaded area represents a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (secondary
markets clear and expectations of investors are consistent with the government’s
decision). As can be seen in Figure 3.10, the only outcome that is consistent is
the total default. In this case the price on the secondary markets is zero, but the
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amount of trade is undetermined.
Proof of Proposition 8
We follow a similar procedure to 3.7.4. However, there is one substantial dif-
ference. If domestic investors are -size, they internalize the effects of their actions
on the government’s decision. Since bf + bh > B¯h + B¯f at least one type of debt
will be defaulted. The outcome on the primary market yields domestic repayment.
Since each domestic investor is -size, she will never demand any amount that ex-
ceeds domestic default threshold, as this will unambiguously decrease her payoff.
Hence xh ≤ B¯h − bh. In this, domestic investors can effectively insure domestic
repayment.
Therefore, the only possible outcome that is consistent in equilibrium is foreign
default and domestic repayment (FD,DR). Contrary to 3.7.4 we can narrow our
considerations and study only one game when both types of investors expect (FD,
DR). The best response function of single foreign investor depends on whether
she is: (a) zero-size, (b) -size and expecting domestic investors to be zero-size
(uninformed foreign investor) or (c) -size and knows that domestic investors are
-size (informed foreign investor). In Figure 3.11 we draw best response functions
for the three cases.
If foreign investors are infinitesimal (panel (a)) they do not coordinate and
each of them wants to sell all of her debt holdings (bf ) as long as price on the
secondary markets is positive. Hence, there exist a unique equilibrium where
at zero price qSM the maximum possible amount of debt bSM = B¯h − bh, that
insures domestic repayment, is traded. Secondly, when foreign investors are -
size but uninformed (panel (b)), they coordinate their supply on the amount that
exceeds bf − B¯h (that will insure they are repaid by the government in the primary
market) as long as price is positive. Similarly, there exist a unique equilibrium
where at zero price qSM the maximum possible amount of debt bSM = B¯h − bh,
that insures domestic repayment, is traded. Thirdly, if foreign investors are -size
and informed that domestic investors coordinate (panel (c)), the traded amount
remains bSM = B¯h − bh, but the price is undetermined qSM ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof of Proposition 9
We consider the opposite case to 3.7.4. Foreign investors are -size, they in-
ternalize the effect of their actions on the government decision, while domestic
investors are infinitesimal. Since bf + bh > B¯h + B¯f , at least the one type of
debt will be defaulted by the government. Hence, foreign investors coordinate to
insure foreign repayment (FR). The only possible outcome that is consistent in
equilibrium is foreign repayment and domestic default (FR,DD). In Figure 3.12 we
draw the best response functions for this case. There exists a unique equilibrium,
where at zero price qSM the minimum possible amount bSM = bf−B¯f , that insures
foreign repayment, is traded.
Proof of Propositions 10 and 11
We consider an alternative way (compared to Proposition 9) to bring foreign
debt bf down (weakly) below its default threshold B¯f . Foreign investors are -size,
they internalize the effect of their actions on the government decision. As shown in
the previous proposition, engaging in the secondary market does not bring direct
benefit for foreign investors, but it might restore foreign repayment under very
specific circumstances. The option of free disposal plays a similar role. It does not
bring a direct benefit, but it insures foreign repayment as long as foreign investors
can coordinate on the minimum amount of a haircut bf − B¯f . The free disposal
requires only the coordination between foreign investors.
Proof of Proposition 12
We study situation B depicted in the Figure 3.2: outcome on the primary
market yields foreign default (FD) and domestic repayment (DR). Before engaging
in the trade on the secondary markets, both types of investors (domestic and
foreign) need to form expectations about the government’s decision to default.
There are three possible outcomes: foreign default and domestic repayment (FD,
DR); foreign repayment and domestic default (FR, DD) and total default (FD,
DD). The repayment of both debts is ruled out by the fact that total debt is
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greater than the total default limit bf + bh > B¯h + B¯f .
There are two thresholds related to the volume traded in the secondary markets
bSM . If the traded volume lies below lower threshold bSM ≤ B¯h−bh, domestic debt
is repaid, while foreign debt is defaulted. If the traded volume is between lower
and upper threshold B¯h − bh < bSM < bf − B¯f − bh, both debts are defaulted;
if the traded volume lies above upper threshold bSM ≥ B¯h − bh domestic debt is
defaulted, while foreign debt is repaid.
We draw three best-response correspondences: for foreign investors (the solid
red line), for domestic investors (the dashed blue line) and for the government in
a single graph with the amount of trade bSM on the horizontal axis and the price
qSM of debt on the vertical axis. The brown shaded area represents the area of
trade, in which the expectations are consistent with the government decision. A
crossing of the two best best response correspondences, which lies within shaded
area represents a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (secondary markets clear and
expectations of investors are consistent with the government’s decision).
In Figure 3.13 we draw best response correspondences for the case of infinites-
imal foreign and infinitesimal domestic investors. Only in panel (b), depicting the
case when both types of investors expect domestic repayment and foreign repay-
ment (FR, DR), best correspondences cross in the shaded area, which means that
expectations are consistent in equilibrium. In a unique equilibrium both debt are
repaid, the volume volume is however undetermined bSM ∈ (bf − B¯f , B¯h− bh) and
the price is equal to one qSM = 1.
Since bf +bh < B¯h+ B¯f , both debts can be potentially repaid, even without co-
ordination. Coordination of foreign/domestic investors reinforces foreign/domestic
repayment. Interestingly, coordination does not change the outcome. In Figure
3.14 we plot best response correspondences of domestic and foreign investors to-
gether with government’s optimal default decision in single graphs for three re-
maining cases: (a) -size foreign and infinitesimal domestic investors, (b) infinites-
imal foreign and -size domestic investors and (c) -size foreign and -size domestic
investors. For each case best response correspondences differ slightly, but an equi-
librium is the same across all three cases.
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Finally, let us consider two other cases, in which one class of investors consists
of -size agents, whereas the other of infinitesimal agents. As shown in Propositions
8 and 9 the class that consists of agents of -size has an advantage, as they can
coordinate on their most favorable outcome. We want to check, whether in the case
studied here, the side with an advantage can coordinate on their most favorable
outcome.
In panel (a) of Figure 3.15 we plot best response correspondences when foreign
investors are -size (have an advantage) and domestic investors are infinitesimal.
Both investors expect government to default on domestic debt and repay the foreign
debt (FR, DD). Even though foreign investors might potentially coordinate on any
level of debt, for example B¯h − bh, they would not do so. This volume and the
price qSM = 0 cannot be an equilibrium, because there is a profitable deviation for
each foreign investors to reduce her traded volume down to bf − B¯f and therefore
to secure domestic repayment. Foreign repayment and domestic default (FR, DD)
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
In panel (b) of Figure 3.15 we plot best response correspondences when domes-
tic investors are -size (have an advantage) and foreign investors are infinitesimal.
Both investors expect government to default on foreign debt and repay the domes-
tic debt (FD, DR). Even though domestic investors might potentially coordinate
on any level of debt, for example bf − B¯f , they would not do so. This volume and
the price qSM = 0 cannot be an equilibrium, because there is a profitable devi-
ation for each domestic investors to always increase the traded volume, up until
the point, where it meets supply from foreign investors if B¯h − bh and therefore
to secure foreign repayment. Foreign default and domestic repayment (FD, DR)
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
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Figure 3.10: Best response functions for infinitesimal investors
(a) (FD, DR) (b) (FD,DD) (c) (FR,DD)
Figure 3.11: Best response functions for -size domestic investors
(a) Infinitesimal foreign
investors
(b) Uninformed -size foreign
investors
(c) Informed -size foreign in-
vestors
Figure 3.12: Best response functions for -size foreign and infinitesimal domestic
investors
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Figure 3.13: Best response functions for infinitesimal foreign and infinitesimal
domestic investors
(a) (FD, DR) (b) (FR, DR) (c) (FR, DD)
Figure 3.14: Best response functions for -size investors
(a) -size foreign and
infinitesimal domestic
investors
(b) infinitesimal foreign and
-size domestic investors
(c) -size foreign and
-size domestic investors
Figure 3.15: Best response functions with one-sided advantage
(a) -size foreign and
infinitesimal domestic in-
vestors
(FR, DD)
(b) infinitesimal foreign and
-size domestic investors
(FD, DR)
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. (2002): “Directed Technical Change,” Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 69, 781–809.
Acemoglu, D. and D. Autor (2011): Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Impli-
cations for Employment and Earnings, Elsevier, vol. 4 of Handbook of Labor
Economics, chap. 12, 1043–1171.
Aghion, P. (2002): “Schumpeterian Growth Theory and the Dynamics of Income
Inequality,” Econometrica, 70, 855–882.
Aguiar, M. and M. Amador (2014): “Sovereign Debt,” in Handbook of Inter-
national Economics Vol 4, North-Holland, 647–687.
Andritzky, J. R. (2012): “Government Bonds and their Investors,” IMF Work-
ing Papers 12/158, International Monetary Fund.
Arellano, C. (2008): “Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging
Economies,” American Economic Review, 98, 690–712.
Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz, and M. S. Kearney (2008): “Trends in U.S. Wage
Inequality: Revising the Revisionists,” The Review of Economics and Statistics,
90, 300–323.
Banerjee, A. V. and A. F. Newman (1991): “Risk-Bearing and the Theory
of Income Distribution,” Review of Economic Studies, 58, 211–35.
Bauer, C. and J. V. R. Mora (2014): “The Joint Determination of TFP and
Financial Sector Size,” Working paper.
159
160 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baumol, W. J. (1967): American Economic Review, 57, 415–426.
——— (2001): Paradox of the services: exploding costs, persistent demand, vol. 1
of The growth of service industries : the paradox of exploding costs and persistent
demand, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Becker, G. S. (1964): Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis,
11271, National Bureau of Economic Research.
——— (1973): “A Theory of Marriage: Part I,” Journal of Political Economy, 81,
813–46.
Berkes, E., U. Panizza, and J.-L. Arcand (2012): “Too Much Finance?”
IMF Working Papers 12/161, International Monetary Fund.
Bienz, C. and J. Hirsch (2011): “The Dynamics of Venture Capital Contracts,”
Review of Finance, 16, 157–195.
Blanchard, O. J. (1985): “Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons,” Journal of
Political Economy, 93, 223–47.
Blanchard, O. J. and S. Fischer (1989): Lectures on Macroeconomics, vol. 1
of MIT Press Books, The MIT Press.
Bolton, P., T. Santos, and J. A. Scheinkman (2011): “Cream skimming in
financial markets,” NBER Working Papers 16804, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc.
Broner, F., A. Martin, and J. Ventura (2010): “Sovereign Risk and Sec-
ondary Markets,” American Economic Review, 100, 1523–55.
Brunnermeier, M. K., T. M. Eisenbach, and Y. Sannikov (2012):
“Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey,” NBER Working Papers
18102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Buera, F. J. and J. P. Kaboski (2009a): “Can Traditional Theories of Struc-
tural Change Fit The Data?” Journal of the European Economic Association,
7, 469–477.
CHAPTER 3. SELECTIVE DEFAULT 161
——— (2009b): “The Rise of the Service Economy,” .
——— (2011): “Scale and the origins of structural change,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 1, 1–29.
Buera, F. J. and Y. Shin (2013): “Financial Frictions and the Persistence of
History: A Quantitative Exploration,” Journal of Political Economy, 121, 221 –
272.
Cahuc, P. and E. Challe (2012): “Produce Or Speculate? Asset Bubbles, Oc-
cupational Choice, And Efficiency,” International Economic Review, 53, 1105–
1131.
Cameron, S. V. and J. J. Heckman (2001): “The Dynamics of Educational
Attainment for Black, Hispanic, and White Males,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 109, 455–499.
Card, D. and T. Lemieux (2001): “Can Falling Supply Explain The Rising
Return To College For Younger Men? A Cohort-Based Analysis,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116, 705–746.
Cardak, B. A. (2004): “Education Choice, Endogenous Growth and Income
Distribution,” Economica, 71, 57–81.
Chen, Q., I. Goldstein, and W. Jiang (2006): “Price Informativeness and
Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price,” Review of Financial Studies, 20, 619–650.
Clark, C. (1940): The Conditions of Economic Progress, London/New York.
Cooley, T. F., R. Marimon, and V. Quadrini (2013): “Risky Investments
with Limited Commitment,” NBER Working Papers 19594, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
Cooper, R., H. Kempf, and D. Peled (2008): “Is It Is Or Is It Ain’t My
Obligation? Regional Debt In A Fiscal Federation,” International Economic
Review, 49, 1469–1504.
162 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin (1986a): “The Existence of Equilibrium in Dis-
continuous Economic Games, I: Theory,” Review of Economic Studies, 53, 1–26.
——— (1986b): “The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games,
II: Applications,” Review of Economic Studies, 53, 27–41.
De Fraja, G. (2002): “The Design of Optimal Education Policies,” Review of
Economic Studies, 69, 437–66.
Dell’Erba, S., R. Hausmann, and U. Panizza (2013): “Debt Levels, Debt
Composition, and Sovereign Spreads in Emerging and Advanced Economies,”
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 29, 518–547.
D’Erasmo, P. and E. G. Mendoza (2013): “Distributional Incentives in an
Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default,” NBER Working Papers
19477, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Durnev, A., R. Morck, and B. Yeung (2004): “Value-Enhancing Capital
Budgeting and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation,” Journal of Finance, 59,
65–105.
Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz (1981): “Debt with Potential Repudiation: The-
oretical and Empirical Analysis,” Review of Economic Studies, 48, 289–309.
Echevarria, C. (1997): “Changes in Sectoral Composition Associated with Eco-
nomic Growth,” International Economic Review, 38, 431–52.
Eicher, T. (2001): “Inequality and growth: the dual role of human capital in
development,” Journal of Development Economics, 66, 173–197.
Erce, A. (2012): “Selective Sovereign Defaults,” Tech. rep.
Fredriksen, K. B. (2012): “Less Income Inequality and More Growth - Are
they Compatible? Part 6. The Distribution of Wealth,” OECD Economics De-
partment Working Papers No. 929, OECD.
CHAPTER 3. SELECTIVE DEFAULT 163
Freixas, X. and J.-C. Rochet (2008): Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edi-
tion, MIT Press Books, The MIT Press.
Galor, O. and O. Moav (2004): “From Physical to Human Capital Accumula-
tion: Inequality and the Process of Development,” Review of Economic Studies,
71, 1001–1026.
Gelos, R. G., R. Sahay, and G. Sandleris (2011): “Sovereign borrowing
by developing countries: What determines market access?” Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 83, 243–254.
Gennaioli, N., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (2013): “Finance and the
Preservation of Wealth,” NBER Working Papers 19117, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
Gertler, M. and N. Kiyotaki (2010): “Financial Intermediation and Credit
Policy in Business Cycle Analysis,” in Handbook of Monetary Economics, ed.
by B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford, Elsevier, vol. 3 of Handbook of Monetary
Economics, chap. 11, 547–599.
Glomm, G. and B. Ravikumar (1992): “Public versus Private Investment in
Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality,” Journal of Political
Economy, 100, 813–34.
Goldin, C. and L. F. Katz (2007): “The Race between Education and Tech-
nology: The Evolution of U.S. Educational Wage Differentials, 1890 to 2005,”
NBER Working Papers 12984, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
——— (2008): “Transitions: Career and Family Life Cycles of the Educational
Elite,” American Economic Review, 98, 363–69.
Goldsmith, R. (1995): Financial Structure and Development, vol. 1, Yale Uni-
versity Press.
Gordon, P. (2000): “The Americas,” Global Finance, 14.
164 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gourinchas, P.-O. and J. A. Parker (2002): “Consumption Over the Life
Cycle,” Econometrica, 70, 47–89.
Greenaway, D. and M. Haynes (2003): “Funding Higher Education in The
UK: The Role of Fees and Loans,” Economic Journal, 113, F150–F166.
Greenspan, A. (2002): “World Finance and Risk Management,”
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2002/200209253/default.htm.
Greenwood, R. and D. Scharfstein (2013): “The Growth of Finance,” Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 3–28.
Hosios, A. J. (1990): “On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of
Search and Unemployment,” Review of Economic Studies, 57, 279–98.
Hsieh, C.-T. and P. J. Klenow (2009): “Misallocation and Manufacturing
TFP in China and India,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 1403–1448.
Jones, C. I. (1995): “R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth,” Journal of
Political Economy, 103, 759–84.
Jovanovic, B. (2014): “Misallocation and Growth,” American Economic Review,
104, 1149–71.
Jovanovic, B. and B. Szentes (2013): “On the Market for Venture Capital,”
Journal of Political Economy, 121, 493 – 527.
Kane, T. J. (1994): “College Entry by Blacks since 1970: The Role of College
Costs, Family Background, and the Returns to Education,” Journal of Political
Economy, 102, 878–911.
Kaplan, S. N. and P. Stromberg (2003): “Financial Contracting Theory
Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts,”
Review of Economic Studies, 70, 281–315.
Kneer, C. (2012): “The Absorption of Talent into Finance: Evidence from U.S.
Banking Deregulation,” Job Market Paper of Tilburg University, 1–28.
CHAPTER 3. SELECTIVE DEFAULT 165
Kohlberg, E. (1976): “A model of economic growth with altruism between
generations,” Journal of Economic Theory, 13, 1–13.
Levine, R. (2005): “Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence,” in Handbook of
Economic Growth, ed. by P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, Elsevier, vol. 1 of Handbook
of Economic Growth, chap. 12, 865–934.
Levinsohn, J. and A. Petrin (2003): “Estimating Production Functions Using
Inputs to Control for Unobservables,” Review of Economic Studies, 70, 317–341.
Lewin, T. (2008): “College May Become Unaffordable for Most in U.S.” The New
York Times.
Loury, G. C. (1981): “Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earn-
ings,” Econometrica, 49, 843–67.
Lucas, Robert E, J. and L. A. Rapping (1969): “Real Wages, Employment,
and Inflation,” Journal of Political Economy, 77, 721–54.
Lucas, R. J. (1988): “On the mechanics of economic development,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 22, 3–42.
Luo, Y. (2005): “Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders? Evidence from Mergers and
Acquisitions,” The Journal of Finance, 60, 1951–1982.
Maddala, G. S. and S. Wu (1999): “ A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests
with Panel Data and a New Simple Test,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, 61, 631–52.
Maddison, A. (2005): “Measuring And Interpreting World Economic Perfor-
mance 1500-2001,” Review of Income and Wealth, 51, 1–35.
Mayer-Haug, K., S. Read, J. Brinckmann, N. Dew, and D. Grichnik
(2013): “Entrepreneurial talent and venture performance: A meta-analytic in-
vestigation of SMEs,” Research Policy, 1–23.
166 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Merler, S. and J. Pisani-Ferry (2012): “Who’s afraid of sovereign bonds?”
Policy Contributions 695, Bruegel.
Merton, R. C. (1995): The Global Financial System: A Functioning Perspective,
Harvard Business School Press.
MGI (2011): “Big data: The next frontier for innovation, competition, and pro-
ductivity,” The mckinsey global institute report, The McKinsey Global Institute.
Michelacci, C. and J. Suarez (2004): “Business Creation and the Stock Mar-
ket,” Review of Economic Studies, 71, 459–481.
Midrigan, V. and D. Y. Xu (2014): “Finance and Misallocation: Evidence
from Plant-Level Data,” American Economic Review, 104, 422–58.
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990): “Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilib-
rium in Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Econometrica, 58, 1255–77.
Murphy, K. M., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1991): “The Allocation
of Talent : Implications for Growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106,
503–530.
Nash, J. (1950): “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica, 18, 155–162.
——— (1953): “Two-Person Cooperative Games,” Econometrica, 21, 128–140.
Neumeyer, P. A. and F. Perri (2005): “Business cycles in emerging economies:
the role of interest rates,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 345–380.
Ngai, L. R. and C. A. Pissarides (2007): “Structural Change in a Multisector
Model of Growth,” American Economic Review, 97, 429–443.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1982): “Economic policy in the face of declining productivity
growth,” European Economic Review, 18, 131–157.
Obama, B. (2009): “The President Explains His Larger Vision on
the Economy,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/The-President-Explains-His-
Larger-Vision-on-the-Economy.
CHAPTER 3. SELECTIVE DEFAULT 167
OECD (2011): “OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard,” Oecd re-
port, OECD.
Panizza, U. (2008): “Domestic And External Public Debt In Developing Coun-
tries,” Tech. rep.
Pesaran, M. H. (2007): “A simple panel unit root test in the presence of cross-
section dependence,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22, 265–312.
Philippon, T. (2010): “Financiers versus Engineers: Should the Financial Sector
be Taxed or Subsidized?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2,
158–182.
Philippon, T. and A. Reshef (2012): “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S.
Finance Industry: 1909–2006,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 1551–
1609.
Piketty, T. and G. Zucman (2014): “Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios
in Rich Countries, 1700-2010,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Pouzo, D. and I. Presno (2014): “Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Default
under Incomplete Markets,” Working paper.
Reinhart, C. M. and K. S. Rogoff (2011a): “The Forgotten History of Do-
mestic Debt,” Economic Journal, 121, 319–350.
——— (2011b): “From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis,” American Economic Re-
view, 101, 1676–1706.
Restuccia, D. and R. Rogerson (2008): “Policy Distortions and Aggregate
Productivity with Heterogeneous Plants,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 11,
707–720.
Rodriguez, S. B., J. Diaz-Gimenez, V. Quadrini, and J.-V. Rios-Rull
(2002): “Updated facts on the U.S. distributions of earnings, income, and
wealth,” Quarterly Review, 2–35.
168 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rogerson, R. (2008): “Structural Transformation and the Deterioration of Eu-
ropean Labor Market Outcomes,” Journal of Political Economy, 116, 235–259.
Romer, P. M. (1986): “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” The Journal
of Political economy, 94, 1002–1037.
Sahlman, W. A. (1990): “The structure and governance of venture-capital or-
ganizations,” Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 473–521.
Santarelli, E., L. Klomp, and A. Thurik (2006): “Gibrat’s Law: An
Overview of the Empirical Literature,” in Entrepreneurship, Growth, and In-
novation, ed. by E. Santarelli, Springer US, vol. 12 of International Studies in
Entrepreneurship, 41–73.
Schaltegger, C. A. and C. Gorgas (2011): “The Evolution of Top Incomes
in Switzerland over the 20th Century,” CREMA Working Paper Series 2011-06,
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934): The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry
into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interestand the Business Cycle, Transaction Pub-
lishers.
Shu, P. (2012): “Essays on Innovation, Productivity, and Talent Allocation,”
MIT Job Market Paper.
Tobin, J. (1984): “On the efficiency of the financial system,” Lloyds Bank Review,
153, 1–15.
Topkis, D. M. (1998): Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, first edition ed.
Vasishtha, G. (2010): “Domestic versus External Borrowing and Fiscal Policy
in Emerging Markets,” Review of International Economics, 18, 1058–1074.
Veall, M. (2010): “Top Income Shares in Canada: Updates and Extension,”
WORKING PAPER.
CHAPTER 3. SELECTIVE DEFAULT 169
Vives, X. (2005): “Complementarities and Games: New Developments,” Journal
of Economic Literature, 43, 437–479.
Volcker, P. (2009): “Paul Volcker: Think More Boldly,”
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704825504574586330960597134.
Wadhwa, V., B. A. Rissing, and G. Gereffi (2006): “Industry Trends in
Engineering Offshoring,” report, Duke University.
Walker, I. and Y. Zhu (2008): “The College Wage Premium and the Expansion
of Higher Education in the UK,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110, 695–
709.
Weiss, M. (2008): “Skill-biased technological change: Is there hope for the un-
skilled?” Economics Letters, 100, 439–441.
Yaari, M. E. (1965): “Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the
Consumer,” The Review of Economic Studies, 32, 137–150.
Yang, F. (2009): “Consumption over the Life Cycle: How Different is Housing?”
Review of Economic Dynamics, 12, 423–443.
